Conspiracy of peace: the cold war, the international peace

movement, and the Soviet peace campaign, 1946-1956 by Dobrenko, Vladimir
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
Conspiracy of Peace: The Cold War, the International Peace  
Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946-1956 
 
Vladimir Dobrenko 
A thesis submitted to the Department of International History 
of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of 






















I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the 
MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly 
indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any 
work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified 
in it). 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is 
permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis 
may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, 
infringe the rights of any third party. 
 
 





Statement of conjoint work  
I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, 
spelling and grammar by John Clifton of www.proofreading247.co.uk/ 





This thesis deals with the Soviet Union’s Peace Campaign during the first decade of the Cold 
War as it sought to establish the Iron Curtain. The thesis focuses on the primary institutions 
engaged in the Peace Campaign: the World Peace Council and the Soviet Peace Committee. 
Chapter 1 outlines the domestic and international context which fostered the peace movement 
(provisional title) and endeavours to construct a narrative of the political and social situation 
which the Soviet Union found itself in after World War II (as a superpower and an empire 
leading the Socialist Bloc) in order to put forward the argument that the motivations for 
undertaking the project of the 'peace movement', above all, were of an international-political 
nature, rather than of an internal and domestic nature. Chapter 2 starts off with the Soviet 
project of establishing an international peace movement, including firstly the World Peace 
Congress, which simultaneously convened in Paris and Prague, and then proceeds with the 
institutional, political and social development of the Campaign up to the dissolution of the 
Cominform in 1956. The task of this chapter is not merely to chronicle the history of the Soviet 
Peace Campaign, but to extract from the narrative underlying themes and organise them 
accordingly. Finally, Chapter 3 deals with internal Soviet Peace Campaign. The task here is to 
construct a historical account of the Soviet anti-war movement from 1949 to 1956 through the 
institutional history of the Soviet Peace Committee. Furthermore, the aim is to demonstrate the 
relationship between the Soviet Peace Committee and party and state institutions and its 
dependency on and implications for political decision-making processes within the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party. Finally, this chapter will also examine the role of the 
Soviet Peace Committee and its affiliated institutions in the advancement of Cold War 
propaganda through the media (i.e. press, journalism, etc.), literature (i.e. novels, poems, etc.), 
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          INTRODUCTION 
 
On March 13th, 2014, two days before the referendum in the Crimea which would 
become the starting point for what many are calling a new Cold War, a dramatic scene took 
place at the UN Security Council. Addressing the Russian Ambassador to the UN, Vitaly 
Churkin, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk held up the UN Charter and accused Russia of 
violating it:1 
Addressing Mr Churkin directly, he said in Russian that Kiev was "looking for an 
answer to the question, whether Russians want war" with a country with whom it has "for 
decades had warm and friendly relations". 
"I'm convinced that Russians do not want war," he said. "I hope that the Russian 
Government and the Russian president will heed the wishes of their people and that we return 
to dialogue and solve this conflict." 
In response, Mr Churkin said: "Russia does not want war and nor do the Russians, and 
I'm convinced that Ukrainians don't want this either.” 
"Furthermore, we do not... interpret the situation in such terms. We don't want any further 
exacerbation of the situation." 
At the Hall of the UN Security Council, during the past decades since the end of World 
War II, many speeches about peace have been delivered and the word ‘peace’ and its 
derivatives have almost always been the most widely used. Many speeches were made 
especially during the Cold War and occupied much of the history of the United Nations (1946-
1991). The Cold War was accompanied by constant recriminations of aggressive tendencies 
and the never-ending "struggle for peace." In a sense, the Cold War was a "war for peace". 
With almost complete mutual misunderstanding, one thing united Yatsenyuk and Churkin – 
both were brought up in the Soviet era and speak the same "language of peace”. This code was 
hardly noticeable to anyone in the room, apart from them: “Do the Russians want war?” This 
is not simply a rhetorical question. This is the refrain of the Cold War. One of the most popular 
Soviet songs, with words by Evgeny Evtushenko, has since 1961 become a kind of anthem of 
Soviet peace, absorbing all the basic ideological codes developed in Soviet propaganda during 
the formative period of the Cold War, 1946-53: 
 
                                                          




O, do the Russians long for war? 
Ask of the stillness evermore, 
Ask of the field, or ask the breeze, 
And ask the birch and poplar trees. 
Ask of the soldiers who now lie 
Beneath the birch trees and the sky, 
And let their sons tell you once more 
Whether the Russians long for war. 
 
Not only at their country's call 
Did Russian soldiers fight and fall; 
They died that men from ev'ry shore 
Might live without the fear of war. 
Ask those who fought, and those erased, 
Ask those who at the Elbe you embraced. 
These monuments are only for 
To show if Russians long for war. 
 
Yes, we can fight when fight we must; 
Be we don't wish to breathe the dust 
Of soldiers brave from ev'ry clime 
Who give up life before their time. 
Ask of the women in our life, 
Ask of our mothers - ask my wife - 
And you will never wonder more 
Whether the Russians long for war. 
 
Their answer rises loud and clear 
For all men, ev'rywhere, to hear. 
The message now is as before: 
The Russians do not long for war. 
(translation by Leonard Lehrman)2 
                                                          





How durable this linguistic code appears to have been, if two former allies and today’s 
geopolitical enemies resort to it almost a quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War! 
How unreliable and misleading should it have proved to be that even people raised with this 
common language could no longer understand it? The rhetoric of the struggle for peace - this 
is only the tip of the iceberg, the main part of which was hidden beneath the surface of public 
policy. 
This thesis was conceived as an attempt to look at the "battle for peace" in the Soviet 
Union, since it has never been fully explored from this perspective, while the "struggle for 
peace" in the West has been investigated in some detail. However, for war (albeit a cold one), 
as in tango, you need a partner. Therefore, the picture of public policy of Western countries 
will be incomplete as long as there is no clear picture of what was happening on the Soviet side 
during the most crucially formative period of the Cold War of 1946-53. If this will help us to 
understand why this iceberg appeared to be unsinkable, and why possibly a "new Cold War" 
has begun with the same rhetoric of peace on which the former Cold War ended a quarter of a 
century ago, I would consider my mission accomplished. 
 
Situating the thesis within Cold War literature 
 
The early Cold War years produced a generation of historians under social and political 
pressure, whose works at times mirrored the government’s foreign policy. Proponents of the 
orthodox approach to the Cold War, such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Herbert Feis and Louis 
Halle, did not so much attempt to explain the dynamics of the Cold War as justify the US 
Government’s policy of Containment. The justification – that the Soviet Union was an 
expansionist power whose aggressive foreign policy based on Marxist class warfare was a real 
and global threat to internally weak and emerging new nations in Europe, the Middle East, and 
Asia - closely paralleled the official view presented by the United States Government without 
any serious challenge.  
Out of the traditionalist historians, Schlesinger’s analysis best exemplified the over-
emphasis on ideology that was characteristic of many in the field at the time. Schlesinger 
assumed that “Leninism and totalitarianism created a structure…which made post-war 
collaboration … inherently impossible.”3 The fundamental problem with this line of argument 
                                                          
3 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 46 (1967): 12. 
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was that it took the Soviet Union’s official rhetoric on Marxism at face-value, without 
acknowledging the de-ideological shifts which took place once Stalin came to power. The 
signing of the Treaty of Non-Aggression with Nazi Germany in 1939 could have hardly been 
achieved by a Stalin who strictly abided by a version of Marxism-Leninism “the world 
according to which all societies were inexorably destined to proceed along appointed roads by 
appointed stages until they achieved the classless nirvana”.4 The Soviet Peace Campaign was 
very much the work of an ideologically flexible and opportunistic leader who wished to 
preserve the ‘spheres of influence’ not unlike of previous European Powers. In hindsight, the 
Anglo-Saxon bias in Schlesinger’s argument was glaring: It was inevitable that the Soviet 
Union would not be able to collaborate with the Allies after the war because it was not a 
traditional state, but a totalitarian one, “a phenomenon very different from America or 
Britain”.5 Schlesinger’s analysis discounted the fact that besides being a totalitarian state, the 
Soviet Union, like Britain, was an empire wishing to strengthen its security. By 
overemphasising negotiations between top diplomats, Stalin’s paranoia, and Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, Schlesinger’s analysis could not encompass other channels of diplomatic 
manoeuvring, such as the Peace Campaign, employed by the Soviet Union in order to maintain 
a post-war peace. 
Equally problematic for the orthodox approach was to prioritise the historical narrative 
at the expense of analysis and interpretation. They approached the early Cold War period with 
a preference for “letting the facts speak for themselves”, which resulted in historical 
determinism. This was particularly emblematic in Louis J. Halle’s The Cold War as History 
(1967) and Herbert Feis’ From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (1970). 
Though less ideological than Schlesinger, Halle’s and Feis’ works overestimate the inevitable 
outcome of the post-war international landscape. Halle saw the Cold War as a logical sequence 
of history over which the main players had only little control. Yet implicit in the narrative was 
that it was the Soviet Union’s decision to move into ‘power vacuums’ as a result of allied policy, 
which only set it towards a collision course with the Western decision to check Soviet 
expansion. No less importantly, the strength of the traditionalists’ stance was weakened by the 
(understandably) limited access to Russian sources and their low level of Russian. Feis, for 
instance, quoted almost exclusively the English version of the periodical New Times, while 
Halle was limited to citing world leaders.  
                                                          




The revisionists that emerged in the mid-1960s were no less politicised than their 
predecessors. Largely in response to America’s involvement in Vietnam, the so-called 
Revisionist or New Left historians sought to explain the origins of the Cold War as a US 
initiative. William Appleman Williams, as one of the earliest revisionists, put forward a path-
breaking thesis that the United States’ ‘informal empire’ – since the Spanish-American War in 
1898 – precipitated the Cold War.6 In this narrative, it was the Soviet Union, who, as any other 
great power protecting its national interests after two German invasions in less than thirty years, 
found itself reacting to the US Government’s push into its security zone, which was largely 
motivated by the capitalist system’s need to expand into foreign markets and seek foreign 
investment and raw materials. Yet, this thesis failed to account for the Soviet Union’s initiatives 
which only accelerated the Cold War. According to Williams, the United States, relying upon 
its possession of the atomic bomb, believed that the Soviet Government could be pushed back 
to its traditional borders in Eastern Europe by ‘nuclear diplomacy’. However, he failed to 
account for the fact that the United States made great efforts to put atomic weapons under rigid 
international control under the Atomic Energy Commission in 1949, the Soviet Union’s 
uncooperativeness at the San Francisco Conference for a Japanese-Allied peace treaty, and the 
Soviet Union’s perpetual abuse of the veto in the United Nations. 
Thomas G. Paterson’s work, Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan, 
continued in the same vein. Patterson contended that George F. Kennan, as the architect of the 
containment policy, was no less of a cold warrior as the other members of Truman’s 
administration. By accepting Kennan's analysis, Paterson argued that American leaders made 
the mistake when dealing with the Russians of "confusing goals with actual behaviour".7 
Paterson faults Kennan for his failure to realise that what Americans perceived as aggressive 
Kremlin behaviour was in reality only a response to provocative American policies that 
stemmed from an exaggerated view of the Soviet threat.8  
Although revisionists have greatly contributed towards explaining the internal 
dynamics and logic of US foreign policy during the Cold War, much of what is said of the 
Soviet Union’s role in the Cold War is very debatable. The (over)emphasis on the US presented 
                                                          
6 See William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1959); 
William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire (New York: Vintage Books, 1969); 
Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1945-1954 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction 
and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). 
7 Thomas G. Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan (New York, Oxford University Press, 
1988), 47. 
8 For a more balanced revisionist perspective see R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet 
Security Policy, 1917-1991 (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993). 
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the Soviet Union as a victim of misguided US foreign policy. By denying any ideological 
component in Soviet policy and refusing to see Soviet actions as springing from internal needs 
and sources, revisionists rule out the possibility that the Soviets acted as they did in accordance 
with their own internal dynamics. This is a very one-sided view of the historical process, since 
the Soviet Union is merely reduced to responding to America’s unreasonably aggressive 
foreign policy. In approaching matters by analysing American data and motivations alone, 
revisionists fail to treat the Soviet side, and thus deny any possibility of writing history as it 
was, that is, a complex interactive process, in which no one possesses enough of the facts, and 
usually lacks a clear grasp of his own or his opponents' purposes.  
Equally problematic is the revisionist critique of America’s use of its economic power 
as a ‘weapon’ rather than a ‘tool’ for peace during the Cold War. Implicit in this argument is 
that the US alone possessed the military, political and economic power to attempt to fashion 
the world to its liking, and indeed did so. This argument is weakened if we look beyond military 
and economic factors, such as the manipulation of public opinion. The Soviet peace offensive 
demonstrated that the Soviets considered themselves just as capable of shaping the post-war 
world as the US. It was not a question of who manipulated the international situation through 
economic or military means since the US had the economic and military means to do so, while 
the Soviet Union possessed the propaganda apparatus.  
From a methodological standpoint, both orthodox and revisionist modes of engagement 
defined the Cold War on an overtly military and economic basis. Yet, as this thesis will 
demonstrate, one of the most crucial aspects of the Cold War was the propaganda dimension. 
That is not to say that these modes of engagement were mutually exclusive. On the contrary, 
they were strongly interconnected. Bridging the gap between the different ways in which the 
Cold War was waged helps us to see the full picture. For instance, the revisionists pointed to 
the Marshall Plan as the primary way in which the United States waged economic war during 
the early Cold War period. Yet, as this thesis will demonstrate, the Soviet Union understood 
the importance of the economic struggle during these early years and was not merely reacting 
to American initiatives. Through the peace offensive the Soviet Union attempted to infiltrate 
the International Cooperative Alliance and turn it against the US.  
The problems of methodology and theory exhibited by orthodox and revisionist 
scholars – a narrow focus on diplomatic history, (over) reliance on English sources, perception 
of the Cold War as a European conflict above all, and a tendency to blame either the United 
States or the Soviet Union for starting the Cold War - was partly understandable: Besides the 
politicised environment of academia in the West, before the collapse of the Soviet Union a 
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historian’s access to Russian archives was severely limited. Because of a lack of reliable 
sources about the Soviet Union, Western analysts were forced to ‘read between the lines’ when 
it came to understanding the decisions made in the Kremlin. Yet by the early 1990s, with the 
opening of multiple archives, historians no longer had to guess at communist actions, goals and 
intentions. Historians now had access to letters, secret records, meeting minutes and directives. 
As a result, orthodox claims about the extent of Soviet control of the Eastern Bloc, about the 
extent of unity within the Bloc itself, and even basic orthodox assertions about the essential 
nature of Soviet intentions throughout the Cold War are now being reconsidered in light of new 
evidence. 
Before the end of the Cold War these problems were widely recognised and the post-
revisionist school which emerged during the early 1980s – most notably with John Lewis 
Gaddis and Melvyn P. Leffler – attempted to stake out a middle ground: Though the US was 
partly responsible for the Cold War, the Soviet Union posed a genuine security threat to Europe 
and Japan.9 The post-revisionists accepted US European policy while separating it sharply from 
US Third World policies. The escalation of the Cold War was explained by a misperception of 
political and power realities within the context of the constant struggle over power during 
which both the US and the Soviet Union reacted to one another’s (mis)perceived aggression. 
Although linked together by common explanatory factors (e.g. realpolitik, national interests, 
decision-making based on psychological analysis, etc.), post-revisionist historians have come 
to rather diverse conclusions. For instance, in A Preponderance of Power: National Security, 
Truman Administration and the Cold War (1993) Melvyn Leffler attributed the escalation of 
the Cold War outside of continental Europe to the US Government’s (mis)perceived threat of 
communism as dictated by the Domino Theory and Containment. As a result, the Soviet Union 
found itself largely responding defensively to US initiatives. 10  On the other hand, post-
revisionists such as Geir Lundestad, Lloyd Gardner and John Lewis Gaddis have characterised 
                                                          
9 See John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1972); Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic 
History, 7 (1983):171-190; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American 
National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). The post-revisionist viewpoint continues 
to be dominant in the most popular history textbooks; see J. Samuel Walker, "The Origins of the Cold War in 
United States History Textbooks," Journal of American History, 81 (1995): 1652-1661. 
10 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold 
War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992) 513. See also Leffler, "New Approaches, Old Interpretations, 
and Prospective Reconfigurations," Diplomatic History, 19 (1995):173-196. 
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the various episodes of the Cold War as operating within a wider post-war system of a divided 
Europe that suited both the United States and the Soviet Union.11 
Yet, on a more general level, the post-revisionist use of realist theory in explaining the 
Cold War is problematic. The realist theory posits that competition in the name of national 
interests determined policies. Thus, the spread of Communism was bound to fail because state 
nationalism and self-interest, not ideology, were the bases for forming alliances. Taken to its 
logical extreme, it could be argued that there was no Soviet Bloc unified by ideology. However, 
applying such an argument to Europe is less convincing than applying it to the post-colonial 
world. At least on a rhetorical level (and what is the Cold War without rhetoric), ideology 
shaped the political landscape of post-war Europe. Yet, as Odd Arne Westad argues, “the Cold 
War, as a political paradigm, was always stronger in the center than in the periphery”.12 The 
internationalisation of the Cold War did not mean that states on the periphery internalised the 
logic of the centre. Nations which were undergoing profound changes (i.e. independence, 
modernisation, political revolutions, etc.) did not think in terms of the Iron Curtain or 
Capitalism and Communism, but in pragmatic terms by “seek(ing) cooperation with the foreign 
power which could most effectively assist in achieving their revolution”. 13  The Soviet 
campaign was indicative of such a dynamic. At least in terms of cultural diplomacy (which the 
Peace Campaign was very much about) the Soviet Union found itself accommodating powerful 
emerging nations, India and China in particular, who very much sought national interest 
irrespective of the supposed bipolar world.  
Nevertheless, there is something to be said of this approach. In the context of the Soviet 
Peace Campaign, it provides a fresh approach to interpret the campaign’s rhetoric, not merely 
as anti-American propaganda, but a genuine attempt at sending diplomatic ‘feelers’ to the US 
when it seemed that the Cold War could escalate into a real conflict. Even if we take into 
account that the Soviet campaign was rife with antagonistic Marxist ideology, it can still be 
argued that the Soviet Peace Campaign was part of a wider effort (part of which had failed in 
the negotiating rooms) to maintain the immediate post-war geopolitical system (or as the Soviet 
Union understood – ‘spheres of influence’). The orthodox (and even some revisionist) historian 
would dismiss such a thesis by arguing that Marxist ideology, not national interest as evoked 
                                                          
11 See John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 
1987), Geir Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945-1949 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1980), Lloyd Gardner, A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan (Oxford 
University Press, 1986). 
12 Odd Arne Westad, “Rethinking Revolutions: The Cold War in the Third World,” Journal of Peace Research, 
29 (1992): 462. 
13 Ibid., 459.  
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by realists and post-revisionists, dictated Soviet foreign policy (and consequently its 
propaganda). Yet, such an argument calls for a refinement of the meaning of ideology, as 
Douglas Macdonald argues, “…the national interest is a combination of objective (structural) 
and subjective (ideational) factors that cannot be isolated from one another so easily.”14 From 
this perspective, the references to Marxist ideology in the peace campaign did not demonstrate 
a willingness by the Soviet Union to put their ideology above national interests but an 
indication that Soviet national interests were communicated through Marxist ideology, and 
were not necessarily shaped by it. 
 
Situating the thesis within peace movement literature  
 
The proposal in question touches on a wide range of fields, including political, cultural, 
and, above all, institutional history of the Cold War. However, the Soviet anti-war movement 
especially in its institutional dimension is clearly under-researched, which is evident by the 
limited number of secondary sources. 
It is impossible to talk of Western literature on the peace movement produced during 
the Cold War as striving for historical objectivity by post-Cold War standards. Many works 
produced from the late 1960s to the end of the Cold War on peace movements are problematic 
in terms of providing a reference point for my thesis. Firstly, much of it was limited to the pre-
Cold War period. Most historians did not venture to analyse contemporary peace movements.15 
Secondly, historians did not link the peace movements with other areas, such as diplomacy, 
internal bureaucratic dynamics, etc. Even after the Cold War, the history of the peace 
movement of that time has not been written about within the context of the foreign policy and 
cultural framework. Most works approached the peace movement from the point of view of 
social history. Finally, Western literature on peace movements has mainly focused on peace 
movements of particular countries without providing an international context. The idea of a 
                                                          
14 Douglas J. Macdoland, “Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis” in 
Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd Arne Westad, (London: Routledge, 2000), 
187. 
15 Peter Brock, Pacifism in the United States: From the Colonial Era to the First World War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968); Charles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941 (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1973); Lawrence S. Wittner, Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Warren F. Kuehl, Seeking World Order: The United States and 
International Organization to 1920 (Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969); Sandra R. Herman, Eleven 
Against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1898-1921 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1969); David S. Patterson, Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887-1914 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976); C. Roland Marchand, The American Peace Movement and Social 
Reform, 1898-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). 
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peace movement was not exclusive to one country. Its supporters had links with different peace 
groups from other countries. 
Works which dealt with the anti-war movement during the Cold War were very much 
a product of their time; assessing the movement in the present and coloured by bias. A case in 
point is Irving Horowitz’s The Struggle Is the Message: The Organization and Ideology of the 
Anti- War Movement (1970). Though Horowitz details the organisation of the anti-war 
movement, the various social and ideological groups within it, and the changes in philosophy 
and tactics as American involvement in Vietnam deepened, the book is essentially a platform 
for Horowitz (who was a member of the task force on violent aspects of protest formed by the 
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence) for criticising the American 
Left, and in particular its radical wing, for its willingness to employ violent tactics. Furthermore, 
Horowitz explained radicalism in the peace movement in quasi-psychological and sociological 
terms. Radical involvement in the peace movement was characterised by a greater concern with 
self-redemption than with success, “that therapy was more important than victory. Orientation 
overrides achievement. Passion and meaning in struggle were more valuable than material 
accomplishment."16 
Charles DeBenedetti’s The Peace Reform in American History (1984) on the history of 
the American peace movement provided a more balanced overview. Chronologically organised, 
the book succinctly surveys the subject from 1607 to 1975. DeBenedetti tries to define the 
relationships between peace movements and other developments throughout American history. 
DeBenedetti’s subsequent work, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam 
Era (1987), interweaves two major themes: The internal dynamics and tensions within the anti-
war movement as well as the government policies that both spawned and responded to it. The 
work is distinguished by its wide scope of research, including scores of memoirs, journalistic 
accounts and secondary works on aspects of the movement. DeBenedetti’s access to available 
government records of the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations is particularly 
revealing. FBI records substantiated the peace movement’s claims of the government's 
unscrupulous attempts to publicly derail the movement by spreading rumours about the anti-
war leaders' alleged communist connections. 
Nevertheless, DeBenedetti’s book has its limitations. As with other works, 
DeBenedetti’s work relied mainly on records produced by peace groups with little regard to 
                                                          
16 Irving Louis Horowitz, The Struggle Is the Message: The Organization and Ideology of the Anti-War Movement 
(Berkeley: Glendessary Press, 1970), 90. 
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other kinds of sources. Neither did he attempt to compare the American peace movements with 
similar movements in other countries or to consider the impact of peace movements on 
American policy and diplomacy. Equally problematic was DeBenedetti’s inability to 
disassociate himself from the movement. He clearly identified with the peace reform and saw 
a need "to build sizable antibodies within the US body politic against the various war 
pathologies that afflict America and the world".17 He was critical of the movement's radical left 
wing, some of whose supporters hoped to reproduce in the United States a version of the 
guerrilla war being waged in Vietnam. But he was also critical of moderate anti-war liberals 
who sought both to oppose the Vietnam War and disavow Vietnamese communism. They also 
tried to police demonstrations in the United States so as to exclude "extremists", who displayed 
National Liberation Front flags. As Horowitz did, DeBenedetti tended to criticise the 
movement as an insider, instead of evaluating it objectively.  
In contrast to the American peace movement, the British peace movement provides a 
more useful example to draw parallels with the Soviet Peace Campaign. Richard Taylor’s 
Against the Bomb: The British Peace Movement, 1958-1965 (1988) succeeded in objectively 
analysing the movement's rise and decline up to 1965 through the use of an impressive range 
of material on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) with several private collections 
and interviews with many of the most prominent participants. What is particularly revealing, 
in regards to the Soviet Peace Campaign, was the movement’s rather undemocratic origin. 
There was tension between those who saw it as frankly elitist and resisted its expansion into a 
mass movement. It comes as something of a surprise to find Canon Collins trying to avoid 
addressing the first Aldermaston March in 1958, and A. J. P. Taylor resigning in 1961 because 
CND had adopted a democratic constitution! There was also the gulf between those who saw 
CND as essentially a moral-pacifist campaign rather than as a political organisation that would 
achieve its aims through a suitable vehicle such as the Labour Party. 
That fundamental division between the leaders and most of their followers, Taylor 
convincingly argues, was a major contributory factor to the movement's ineffectiveness and 
ultimate failure as it broke apart into tiny squabbling factions. Because Taylor's study excels at 
analysing the various organisational problems of the movement, the ideological debates, and 
the problems of strategic choice, it is a useful reference for my research on the Soviet Peace 
Campaign. 
                                                          




Within the post-Cold War historiography no work parallels my own research more so 
than Robbie Lieberman’s The Strangest Dream: Communism Anticommunism and the U.S. 
Peace Movement, 1945-1963 (2000), which examines how grassroots peace work became 
associated with communist subversion in the early Cold War years thereby silencing whatever 
contributions the peace movement may have had in influencing governmental policy. 18 
Lieberman’s depiction of the political climate in the US during the early Cold War years sheds 
light on why the Soviet Union was so sceptical in its attempts to use the American Communist 
Party to infiltrate the American peace movement. Besides the Red Scare and McCarthyism, the 
post-war period witnessed a major shift in foreign policy thinking amongst liberals. In the 
course of the 1930s and 1940s, many of them became disillusioned with the Soviet Union and 
leftist causes and were now championing anti-communism and interventionism against the 
perceived ‘Domino Theory’. Within this climate, post-war liberalism split apart. The 
celebration of Cold War America, especially among many left intellectuals, cut peace activists 
off from their traditional bases of support. The coalitions and alliances that once bolstered 
peace work were now broken and in disrepair as the peace movement's main bases of support 
became entrapped by bitter quarrels over the communist challenge at home and abroad.  
Lieberman’s work is especially noteworthy on the impact McCarthyism had on the 
peace movement from inside the workings of two organizations: the Women's International 
League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and the newly-created Committee for a SANE 
Nuclear Policy. It is here that the "strangest dream" unravels - "the fear from within the peace 
movement that Communists were taking over".19 The issues confronting peace groups during 
this period were often difficult to separate: "Some activists were concerned mainly with how 
the organization functioned, others with what it looked like from outside". Currying public 
respectability, peace groups went to great lengths to purge communists and former ‘fellow 
travellers’, with many being victims of guilt by association. Lieberman begs an answer to her 
question: "Did excluding Communists strengthen peace organizations by heightening their 
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credibility, or did it weaken them by keeping out skilled organizers and making civil liberty 
battles more difficult to fight?"20 
 Lieberman’s conclusions on the American peace movement are revealing in how it 
compared and contrasted with the Soviet peace campaign. On the one hand, like the Soviet 
peace movement the American peace movement understood the importance of public 
perception and saw infiltrators (in this case communists and ‘fellow travellers’) that needed to 
be purged. On the other hand, as with all of his works, Lieberman’s book attests to the voluntary 
civic nature of Western peace movements by way of their political fragmentation, lack of 
coordination and tensions with governments. None of this was permissible in the Soviet Peace 
Campaign. Nonetheless, as with other works on Western peace movements, Lieberman fails to 
connect the American peace movement to the wider, international peace movement community 
and its role in foreign policy. This is an approach which has largely been ignored within the 
analytical framework of peace movements by historians. This is especially glaring if we 
consider the Soviet Union’s attempts to attract non-communists in the West in order to 
legitimise its own version of ‘peace’ in the eyes of the Western mass public. 
Gerhard Wettig’s work was the first work in the post-Cold War West to document the 
World Peace Council’s attempts at attracting pacifist groups in the West outside of the prism 
of Sovietology. Instead of framing the Peace Campaign as part of the larger tit-for-tat 
propaganda war between the West and the Soviet Union, Wettig attempted to answer whether 
the World Peace Council was more than just a Soviet prop. Both Phillip Deery and Weston 
Ulrich focused on the British Government’s attempts at derailing the World Peace Congress 
which was to be held in Sheffield in 1950. These works are useful in understanding the 
difficulties Western communists had in the West when undertaking the Soviet Peace Campaign. 
However, they only covered half the story. No work has relied on Soviet archival sources to 
account for how the Soviets themselves understood the Peace Campaign and the problems they 
encountered in Europe. 
 
Archives and Dissertation Outline 
 
In telling the story of the Soviet peace movement, I have been greatly aided by three 
main archives in Moscow: the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), the 
State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), and the Russian State Archive of 
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Contemporary History (RGANI). Each archive provided valuable sources of information. The 
Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History was particularly useful since it included all 
the materials of the Foreign Commission of the Central Committee, Molotov’s personal 
documents and Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) documents. From this material I 
was able construct the beginnings of the Soviet peace movement. In addition, the State Archive 
of the Russian Federation included the whole archive of the Soviet Peace Committee. Finally, 
RGANI allowed me to look at the Soviet Peace Committee’s dealings between 1953 and 1956. 
Chapter One offers a detailed analysis of the political, social and ideological origins of 
the Soviet peace movement. The task here is to construct a narrative of the political and social 
situation which the Soviet Union found itself in after Second World War in order to put forward 
the argument that Stalin’s primary motivation for undertaking the project of the 'peace 
movement' was of an international-political nature, rather than of a domestic nature. Central to 
the collapse of the post-war Alliance in the early years of the Cold War was the unbridgeable 
gap between the two superpowers on what peacetime Europe would look like. During the mid-
forties, Stalin framed Soviet security within the context of an Eastern buffer zone. For Stalin, 
the crux of Soviet security relied on consolidating and then maintaining the status quo in 
Europe, which invariably meant the division of Europe into two political blocs. Yet, this 
transition into a divided Europe and its acceptance by the Western powers was not guaranteed 
and therefore ran the risk of renewed military conflict. With a hard-won victory over the Axis 
powers, Stalin understood that the prestige the Soviet Union now commanded, as one of the 
two remaining superpowers, could be harnessed into new diplomatic and propaganda initiatives 
as part of a broader effort to consolidate the Soviet Union’s hold over the Eastern Bloc. The 
peace movement would fulfil this initiative because it had the potential of putting pressure on 
Western governments to not escalate the situation in Europe by convincing Western societies 
of the Soviet Union’s peaceful intentions.  
The consolidation of the Eastern Bloc directly impacted Stalin’s domestic policy. As 
resources poured into rebuilding the country after the war, much more was poured into 
propping up Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe and modernising Soviet nuclear 
capabilities. Stalin was not sure how war-weary Soviet society would react to food shortages, 
rationing, the slow rate of rebuilding and the lack of general reform as security demands took 
priority over improving living standards. The problem was compounded by veterans who had 
witnessed Europe’s higher living standards and therefore could derail the regime’s attempts to 
justify to the public that Soviet foreign policy of consolidating the Eastern Bloc should take 
precedence over domestic politics. Therefore, when the Soviet Peace Committee was 
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established in 1949 in the wake of the World Peace Congress, it served a completely different 
function to the campaign which the regime presided over in Europe. In the Soviet Union, the 
Soviet Peace Committee and its Republic and local offshoots were meant to be the official 
conduit through which people could voice their traumas and war grievances and direct them in 
support of the regime, lest they turned against the regimes handling of Cold War. Chapter One 
concludes with the Marxist/Leninist ideological origins which underpinned the Soviet peace 
movement. Since the Soviet Union was built on an ideology that was based on spreading 
revolution and class war, Stalin had to reformulate Soviet peace rhetoric as ‘peaceful 
coexistence’, without contradicting Marxist/Leninist ideology in order to make it more 
appealing to Westerners. This section logically leads to Chapter Two as it hints at the struggles 
the Soviets would come up against in the West when trying to attract genuine peace movements 
to join the World Peace Council, such as pacifist groups. 
Chapter Two starts off with the beginnings of the peace movement, including the first 
World Peace Congress which simultaneously convened in Paris and Prague, and proceeds with 
the institutional, political and social development of the campaign up to the dissolution of the 
Cominform in 1956. The task of this chapter is not to merely chronicle the history of the Soviet 
Peace Campaign, but to extract from the narrative underlying patterns which emerged in the 
first decade of the Soviet peace movement. The origins of the Soviet peace movement, through 
the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (henceforth referred to as the 
Cominform) in 1947, meant that the Peace Movement would from the beginning be perceived 
as a front for Soviet propaganda. Yet, this is a half-truth. As this chapter demonstrates, Western 
communists and non-communists who took part in the campaign perceived it as a genuine 
movement. Even as the Soviets used bribes and political pressure, as well as simply funding 
much of the movement, they faced growing resentment and criticism from their Western 
counterparts who were expected to implement unsuccessful campaigns. The chapter chronicles 
two major developments within the movement: Its ties to the biological warfare campaign in 
1951, which isolated it from the UN, and the ‘lost’ years of the movement after Stalin’s death 
in 1953 when it had no particular purpose and fractured in the awake of the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary in October of that year. I argue that by 1956 the Soviets saw no need for the movement, 
as the invasion of Hungary did not disturb the European status quo of the two blocs. 
Chapter Three examines the internal Soviet Peace Campaign. The task of this chapter 
is to construct a historical account of the Soviet anti-war movement from 1949 to 1956 through 
the institutional history of the Soviet Peace Committee. Furthermore, the aim is to demonstrate 
the relationship between the Soviet Peace Committee and party and state institutions. In the 
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second part of the chapter, I break down and analyse the type of people who attended the 
endless local and national peace meetings to gain an understanding of how their speeches 
contributed to ritualising these events, in which all participants had predetermined roles to play 
out and spoke in clichés that attested to their faith in the Soviet leadership. It was during the 
first decade of the Cold War that the internal Soviet peace movement ossified into a mindless 
ritual which the Russian poet and dissident Alexander Galich so aptly described in his poem. 
Finally, this chapter will also examine the role of the Soviet peace Committee and its affiliated 
institutions in the advancement of Cold War propaganda through the media (e.g. press, 
journalism, etc.), literature (e.g. novels, poems, etc.), film and political art (e.g. posters, 
caricatures, etc.).  
Given that the Soviet peace campaign was an integral part of Soviet foreign and 
domestic policy, it is surprising that its institutional origins in the formative years of the Cold 
War (1945-1956) have yet to be the subject of serious research. The existing works on the topic 
are few and far between and what has been said has been far too general or treated as a historical 
footnote, dismissed as merely an agitation effort relative to high-ranking diplomatic 
negotiations. In contrast, by shifting the focus for the first time from rhetorical analysis of 
propaganda and into the inner workings of the peace campaign, the thesis at hand presents a 
radical rethinking of the Soviet peace campaign and its importance in Soviet international and 
internal policy.  
Firstly, the thesis posits that the peace campaign was actually two separate projects: 
one for domestic consumption and the other for abroad. As such, they had different institutional 
origins, internal political dynamics and distinct objectives shaped by different contexts. Since 
both sides in the Cold War thoroughly scrutinised the propaganda efforts of the other, I argue 
that the Soviet Peace Campaign abroad was not merely a propaganda offensive but a diplomatic 
initiative that the Soviets used to communicate with the West in place of failed formal 
negotiations on preserving the immediate post-war status quo in Europe.  
By contrast, the peace campaign project at home had different objectives: In the 
domestic sphere, the peace campaign was part of the Soviet leadership’s effort in strengthening 
legitimacy for the regime. I put forward the argument that despite the fact that Stalin was seen 
as the nation’s saviour after the war, there was serious concern as to how the Soviet public 
would react to a new round of isolationism and maintaining an economy which placed a 
premium on arms over consumer products, irrespective of the immense suffering from which 
the Soviet people had only recently emerged. The Soviet Peace Campaign helped to promote 
the new Cold War narrative and to bolster the Soviet public’s self-image as a people of peace.  
22 
 
Seen from the perspective of winning ‘hearts and minds’, the Soviet leadership wished 
for as many people as possible to join its peace campaign and had to compromise. In order to 
attract as many non-communists as possible, it would be more flexible in its dealings with 
foreigners. The domestic peace movement, by contrast, had no such constraints and was, 
therefore, controlled more tightly and was more dogmatic in its Leninist-Marxist interpretation 
of peace. 
By focusing on how the Soviet leadership formulated, implemented and modified the 
peace campaign abroad in accordance to Western perception, the thesis makes vital 
contributions to a topic that hitherto has not been adequately researched. The existing literature 
relegated the Soviet Peace Campaign to a more general anti-Western campaign. As such, the 
peace campaign was viewed as a public relations failure driven by Leninist-Marxist ideology. 
By focusing on the institutional foundations of the peace campaign in early Cold War period, 
the thesis is set apart from existing literature on Cold War propaganda and Soviet foreign policy 
in several ways. The institutional dimension of the peace campaign strips away the Leninist-
Marxist ideology assumption to reconsider the day-to-day realities of running the campaign 
pragmatically.  
Therefore, by shifting the focus from official Soviet rhetoric and the Western public’s 
response to it (of which substantial literature already exists) to the Soviet formulation of 
initiatives in response to that very same popular reception – i.e. toning down ideological 
rhetoric, divorcing the peace campaign from communist parties, drawing in moderates and 
especially non-communists - the thesis challenges the long-held assumption that the Soviet 
Peace Campaign abroad was driven from the outset by Marxist-Leninist ideology of 





The Political, Social and Ideological Origins  
of the Soviet Peace Movement 
 
Fall of an Alliance, Rise of ‘Peace’  
Victory in World War II found Stalin and the Soviet Union in a situation for which they 
were very much unprepared. From the 1920s right up to the commencement of World War II 
in September 1939, the Soviet Union was viewed by the public in the West with suspicion and 
distrust; its calls for a Comintern Popular Front in the 1930s21 against fascism largely fell on 
deaf years and culminated with Stalin signing a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, 
effectively losing much (but not all) credibility that the Soviets had in the eyes of Western 
leftists. More than ever, the invasion of eastern Poland in September 1939, the ‘mutual 
assistance’ pacts forced upon the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that gave the 
Soviets air naval bases in those countries, and the unprovoked invasion of Finland in October 
confirmed to many on the left the Soviet Union was beginning to resemble the old Russian 
Empire. As a result, in December 1939 the League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union.22 In 
essence, the Soviet Union found itself a pariah state, along with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy 
and Japan.  
However, the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany in 1941 and the alliance 
which formed in its wake created unforeseen consequences for the Soviets to manage their new 
(self) image. On the one hand, the Americans and the British were willing to temporarily see 
the Soviet Union as an ally for democracy in the common cause against Nazi Germany, thus 
granting political prestige which it had never enjoyed up to that point it in its existence. On the 
other hand, this prestige rested on how the Soviets would conduct their foreign and domestic 
policy and the extent to which they could conform to Western notions of democracy and respect 
for the sovereignty of other European nations, international law and basic human rights. This 
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was always going to be a failure, as Stalin understood diplomacy mainly in 19th century 
imperial terms23  in which victors were entitled to ‘spheres of influence’ that transcended 
national sovereignty and disregarded Western concepts of human rights. During the war years, 
it was evident that the Soviets were incapable of cultivating a Western-friendly image. For 
instance, Hitler’s defeat in Stalingrad in February 1943 did not see the strengthening of Allied 
cooperation. As Vojtech Mastny explains, “the Russians began almost immediately to put that 
solidarity to the test” by “harassing the British personnel attached to the arms convoys, 
interfering with their navigation and subjecting them to various indignities”.24 The Soviet 
silence on the importance of the American Lend-Lease deliveries in the press resulted in the 
United States Ambassador, William Harrison Standley, publicly criticising the Soviet Union.25 
The post-war image of an ally of the West had now to contend with the sense of imperialistic 
entitlement that came with victory over the Nazis. Now was the time to restore Russia’s 
historical rights, lost in the previous ill-fated wars of the twentieth century, and to convert the 
gigantic losses and victories into lasting security for the Soviet Union and its ruling circle.  
But Stalin complicated diplomatic perceptions by balancing two contradictory 
positions: How to consolidate Eastern Europe as a buffer zone without having it seem as such. 
Stalin wanted to preserve stable relations with the West for a number of reasons, including 
preventing the resurgence of German and Japanese power as well as legitimising the new 
borders of the Soviet Union and confirming its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. In 
Stalin’s view, an amicable division of war spoils was clearly preferable to a confrontation with 
his wartime allies. Cooperation was also necessary to secure economic assistance for 
reconstruction and allowed time for British-American differences to surface. Finally, because 
Stalin was fully aware of the formidability of the British-American military-industrial alliance, 
he wanted to prevent a conflict he knew the Soviet Union could not win, or postpone it until 
there was a fracture in the Western alliance system that could give the Soviet Union a wining 
shot. In short, Stalin hoped to combine his geopolitical agenda with cooperation from the West 
– at least during the crucial transitional period of settling post-war problems – but between 
these two tasks the former clearly assumed a priority. Stalin may have been convinced that the 
British and Americans gave tacit approval for Eastern Europe to be his ‘sphere of influence’, 
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but as it became clear, it had not meant imposing Soviet-style political and economic systems. 
From the Anglo-American perspective Stalin was reverting back to the Leninist-Marxist 
ideology of spreading communism.26 From Stalin’s perspective, there was no “blueprint for a 
Communist take-over” but an “acknowledgement [of] the post-Second World War settlement 
between ideologically opposed victors”.27 
In fact, Stalin’s approach to strengthening security was haphazard and inconsistent and 
suggested not a grand geostrategy based on Marxism but a reaction to the (perceived) intentions 
of the Americans and the British. As Svetozar Rajak argues, Stalin came to understand that 
Soviet marginalisation in Italy in 1943 and Britain’s military intervention in Greece in 
December 1944 meant that the British and Americans were asserting their power ‘within their 
zone of occupation’. Stalin’s definition of ‘zone of occupation’ evolved with what he perceived 
to be America’s and Britain’s ‘zone of occupation’. In Italy and Greece, despite communism’s 
popularity, Stalin instructed the local communists not to engage in political subversion. Yet, 
this merely revealed the fact that Stalin could only control foreign communists to a limited 
degree. Despite his understanding that Greece would fall within the Western sphere of 
influence, the Greek communists instigated a civil war that for the West merely reinforced 
Western suspicions of a Soviet grand expansionist scheme and compelled the Truman 
Administration to formulate a new foreign policy of ‘containment’ of communism based on 
economically rebuilding Western Europe through the Marshall Plan and later organising 
NATO. 
The Cold War did not start off with the resumption of ideological tensions between 
capitalism and communism but with the more practical question of how the rebuilding of the 
German economy (and by extension the European economy) would impact the hard-won 
security that the Soviets had achieved in the wake of the Third Reich’s defeat in May 1945. As 
Hans-Peter Schwarz argues, one of the primary factors for the failure of joint occupation was 
the establishment of separate zones of administration in Germany, despite the fact that the four 
Allies – the British, French, Americans and the Soviets – had agreed to coordinate all rule 
through the Allied Control Council (ACC) by requiring unanimity for all decisions. Yet during 
the first years of post-war occupation, the ACC “degenerate(d) into a cumbersome multilateral 
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body” that was incapable of making common decisions.28 The ACC’s ‘contradictory dualism’, 
with the aim of coordinating decision-making between the four occupied zones on the one hand, 
and on the other, requiring unanimity from the commanders-in-chief ensured that in the case 
of a veto each occupied zone would be able to implement its own policies. 
All this meant that the Soviet conception of post-war peace in Europe sharply diverged 
from the other Allies. Yet this had less to do with ideological differences between Marxism 
and capitalism and more to do with the differing priorities the Allies had for post-war Europe. 
For the Americans the most important aspect of the post-war settlement was to withdraw 
American troops from Europe by helping Western Europe get back on its feet economically. 
By May 1946, the strain of paying for administrating their occupied zones compelled the 
British and the Americans to agree to a joint economic administration – a Bizone – to come 
into effect at the beginning of 1947.29 With the Germans allowed to run the Bizone’s economic 
administration and the Economic Council (Wirtschaftsrat), the American’s had signalled the 
first step in handing over political control to the Germans.  
This only reinforced the fact that the rebuilding of Western European economies relied 
on a robust German economy, in particular the coal and steel industries of the Ruhr and the 
chemical, electrical and machine-tool industries. 30  From the Soviet perspective, as an 
international pariah and one which up to that point was not integrated into the Western 
European economic system – both out of its own Marxist ideological principles and Western 
perception of Soviet desires to spread Marxist revolution to all of continental Europe – 
rebuilding Western Europe was of secondary importance and not desirable at all if it required 
the strengthening of Germany’s economy and loosening of political control (and from the 
Soviet perspective, accordingly, Germany’s military capabilities). Throughout 1945 and 1946, 
many military commanders “…cast aside the Bolshevik code of modesty and aversion to 
property and acted like Spanish conquistadores, accumulating war booty”.31 Reparations – 
much of which went to the Soviet military and state security elite – were the main 
preoccupation of the Soviets in their zone. In effect, Germany “was a giant shopping mall 
where they did not pay for anything”.32 The Soviet conception of peace did not extend beyond 
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the cessation of war to tackle the economic and political problems the Germans were facing 
after the war.  
Even before the end of the war in May 1945, the Soviets had already come to realise 
that American post-war aid would not last. At the end of April 1945 the Truman Administration 
ceased the Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR, which had been so vital during the war. This 
only highlighted just how fragile the Soviet economy was after the war, as the State Defence 
Committee (GKO) decided to appropriate 113 million dollars from gold reserves to make up 
for losses.33 With the Truman Administration failing to renew the Lend-Lease programme for 
the Soviets in September 1945, they viewed their occupied German zone as the only reliable 
source of war reparations. To Soviet planners, “the Western insistence on a certain amount of 
German industrial recovery for the sake of the economies of Western Europe smacked of a 
silent cooperation between the capitalists of the Western powers and those of western 
Germany”.34 The blame for this spiral of mutual suspicion can largely be attributed to the 
Soviets, who failed to seriously consider the Western concept of long-lasting peace, which 
relied on Germany’s economic recovery for Europe’s stability. The American’s viewed Soviet 
hindrance to Germany’s economic recovery as something that would create conditions for 
social and political discontent that could lead to a new war. The Soviet idea of maintaining 
peace, in its basic form, went no more than beyond military occupation, and in its more subtle 
form, allowed for Soviet-friendly puppet states. Thus, economic recovery for the Soviets, in 
the Western sense, was not a way of achieving long-lasting peace, but a bourgeois abstraction 
that had the potential to result in another attack on the Soviet Union. 
  Although the French opposed the American and British efforts to relax constraints on 
German production, there was now a clear divide between the Soviets and the other Allies. 
Both suspected the other of attempting to build Germany for its own advantage. Thus, during 
the Moscow and London meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers of April and December 
1947, the Americans refused meet further Soviet suggestions for rebuilding German 
institutions – fearing they were intended to establish communist influence in the West. Indeed, 
the dilemma for the Soviet Union was that as it had emerged as one of the two superpowers, it 
gained political power and prestige on the global stage but had neither the means to help rebuild 
Europe economically nor the vision for its political stabilisation which went beyond its own 
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security considerations that merely envisioned Eastern Europe as a buffer zone against future 
German attacks. Some, such as Vojtech Mastny, have argued that Stalin’s idea of Eastern 
Europe as a buffer zone had its origins in 1943 when he was unable to obtain a territorial 
settlement from Germany.35 In essence, the Soviet conception of maintaining the Alliance (and 
therefore, peace) was a balancing act of creating Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe without 
resorting to force and to do so without the United States and Great Britain perceiving it is as 
hostile takeover which required countering with the establishment of a corresponding Western 
Bloc. 
 On the diplomatic front, Stalin had hoped for ‘quiet revolutions’ in Eastern Europe to 
avoid any damage to the Alliance that could arise from US and British suspicions that he 
intended Eastern Europe to be under Soviet control. Accordingly, national communist parties 
in countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania would take power slowly and indirectly. 
The communists employed a two-prong strategy. By forming political coalitions with centre 
and leftist groups, they attempted to distinguish themselves from the Soviet model of socialism 
by avoiding a dictatorship of the proletariat. For all intents and purposes, the façade of 
democracy was to remain in the form of political coalitions, multiparty systems and parliaments. 
At the same time, with the help of Soviet advisors, national communist parties used 
administrative pressure to strengthen their grip on the state apparatus by expanding 
government-owned industry and taking over key sectors such as transportation, finance and 
initiated land reform. However, on Soviet orders, they stopped short of fully nationalising 
industry and collectivising agriculture. 36  
  Once their power over the state was consolidated, the communists employed a mix of 
administrative pressure, subversion and direct repression to attack both their social democratic 
‘allies’ and political opponents. Much of the repression against political rivals was under the 
pretext that rivals were plotting against the state. Such tactics had already been employed in 
Eastern and Central European countries before the war and immediately after. In Bulgaria, 
political rivals such as the leader of the Agrarian Union, Georgi Dimitrov, and defence minister 
and leader of the Zveno Party, Damian Velchev, were removed from power and in the case of 
the former, arrested and put on trial. Such patterns of intimidation and electoral manipulation 
were repeated ahead of elections in Romania in November 1946 and Poland in January 1947. 
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In other countries, domination was achieved by forcibly merging other leftist parties with 
communist parties. In the German occupied zone, the German Communist Party (KPD) united 
with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) to form the communist-dominated Socialist 
Unity Party (SED). By the late 1940s, most of the leftist parties that were allowed nominal 
independence functioned as tokens of the ‘democracy’ facade the Soviets had hoped would 
smoothen the transition of Eastern and Central Europe to spheres of influence.  
 Throughout the war and leading up to the Marshall Plan, Stalin saw no need to develop 
a particularly new method of public relations between the Soviet Union and the outside world. 
As Eduard Mark argues, from 1941 to 1947 both the Comintern - the Soviet led organisation 
for coordinating ‘the fight against the bourgeoisie’ with other communist parties - and its 
successor - the Department of International Information - would consolidate Eastern Europe 
by establishing national fronts that were reminiscent of the Kremlin’s push for a Popular Front 
to counter fascism in the 1930s.37 The primary difference between the Popular Front of the 
1930s and the National Front during very early years of the Cold War was that the former was 
a broad coalition of mainly leftist groups while the latter aimed for mass public support. In 
essence, the National Front strategy of creating popular democracies would allow for seamless 
Soviet consolidation of Eastern Europe without resorting to force. As Eduard Mark argues, 
communist parties in Eastern Europe would gain power by “the creation of broad communist 
dominated coalitions that outwardly observed the conventions of ‘bourgeois democracy’”.38 
This would have the dual benefit of weakening local anti-communist forces (and therefore anti-
Soviet) while retaining the veneer of ‘democracy’ by keeping popular support through 
programmes of reform and recovery and minimising Western objections to the creeping 
establishment of regimes dominated by communists and directly subject to Moscow.39 This in 
fact established the model for the future peace movement. 
 The problem was that none of this was convincing. From the American and British 
perspective, the Soviet conception of a post-war settlement of Eastern Europe as a Soviet 
sphere of influence began to resemble a repetition of Hitler’s expansion prior to the start of 
World War II in September 1939. Such a perception was expressed publicly and behind closed 
doors as early as 1946. Winston Churchill's "Sinews of Peace" address in March 1946, at 
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Westminster College outlined Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe as an "iron curtain", while 
George F. Kennan, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the United States to the Soviet Union, 
connected the communist takeover of Eastern and Central Europe with Marxist ideology. 
Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ argued that Soviet policy saw a future with capitalist countries as 
inevitable and in order to avoid conflict would not only expand westwards to create buffer 
states but strengthen ties with Marxists in capitalist countries to gain as much political and 
propagandistic leverage in those countries as possible.  
 The overarching design of the Truman Administration was to lock West Germany and 
Japan into permanent association with a Western alliance system spearheaded by the United 
States. To do this, additional risks had to be taken to cede more sovereignty to the West 
Germans and the Japanese in return for their promises to stay aligned with the West and allow 
the United States to use their territories to enhance its strategic reach. From an inchoate 
beginning, Harry Truman and his advisers had transformed the strategic posture of the United 
States in the post-war world. Their overriding priority was to prevent a totalitarian adversary 
from conquering or assimilating the resources of Europe and Asia and using them to wage war 
against the United States, as the Axis powers had done during World War II. Even if the United 
States were not attacked, as it had been at Pearl Harbour, it could not be indifferent to what it 
perceived to be Soviet aggression or communist subversion. Having witnessed Soviet 
consolidation of Eastern and Central Europe during the first two years after the war, Truman 
had come to the conclusion that nations which were still free needed to be united under one 
military framework otherwise communism would absorb all of Europe and economically 
isolate America.40 
George Kennan’s predictions were only partially realised. Stalin may have viewed a 
future conflict with the West as inevitable, but the division of Europe in the wake of the 
Marshall Plan consolidated a status quo in Europe that fit with Stalin’s idea of security. Stalin 
understood this new European status quo as not merely the creation of an Eastern Bloc but also 
the strengthening of the Western Bloc by holding back any forces which might destabilise the 
political and economic order of Western Europe. The creation of the Cominform, therefore, 
was not merely to coordinate the activities of various communist parties, but a vehicle for Stalin 
to align them with his foreign policy of maintaining the two blocs. In Stalin’s mind, Greece 
and Italy were by 1944 Western Bloc countries. The fact that the Greek Communist Party 
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started a civil war in Greece despite Stalin’s orders and that Tito's plans to absorb Albania and 
Greece in cooperation with Bulgaria, thereby setting up a powerful Eastern Europe Bloc 
outside Moscow's control, only reinforced Stalin’s belief that no communist party in Europe 
should endanger Soviet security by spreading Marxist revolution. 
Stalin’s dealings with the Italian and French Communists highlighted the contradictory 
desire to restrain the communists, on the one hand, and test their loyalty to the Soviet Union, 
on the other hand. In the Italian case,41 as Silvio Pons argues, the strategy that emerged at the 
March 1944 meeting between Stalin and the head of the PCI, Palmiro Togliatti, was to avoid 
civil war and social revolution since the political divisions in Italy were making it possible for 
the British to expand into the Mediterranean and instead adapt a policy of ‘national unity’ to 
counter the threat of civil war and any further British incursion into the Mediterranean. They 
also agreed that the ‘two camps’ dividing Italy (traditional post-fascist institutions vs. anti-
fascist forces) were weakening the country and facilitating British expansion in the 
Mediterranean. In essence, before the war’s end it was already clear as to how the communist 
parties of Western Europe would be used to consolidate various political goals. In Western 
Europe, the French and Italian communist parties were tools for maintaining Soviet influence 
in countries that Stalin understood to be firmly within the Western sphere of influence. In 
contrast to Eastern Europe, where democracy was used as a facade to mask the takeover by 
communist parties and their socialist reforms, in the West, Stalin instructed communist parties 
to genuinely work in left-wing coalitions. A moderate approach by the Italian Communist Party 
was seen as the best way to preserve a balance of power between the Soviet Union and Great 
Britain. As Silvio Pons argues, the Stalin-Togliatti meeting of March 1944 was thus a paradigm 
of communist policy making in the post-war years. 42  Above all, Stalin viewed Western 
communist parties as tools for continental politics in which “Communist moderation in 
coalition building was in keeping with the joint Soviet goals of maintaining relations with the 
Western powers while simultaneously keeping a check on their conduct in the West’s own 
sphere of influence”.43  
Having made a powerless and partitioned Europe one of the key essentials of Soviet 
security as he comprehended it, Stalin was sure to see any indications of its recovery and 
unification with unease. He appeared comfortable with the increase in US military assistance 
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to Greece and Turkey―countries peripheral to both Soviet and American security―after the 
announcement in March 1947 of the Truman Doctrine establishing US support for democracies 
threatened by communism. He became, however, justifiably alarmed by the launching of the 
Marshall Plan three months later, aimed at the economic, political, social and moral rebirth of 
Western Europe as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism.44 As Geoffrey Roberts argues, the 
Marshall Plan, following the Truman Doctrine and other negative developments in post-war 
Soviet-Western relations, confirmed Moscow's deepest fears about the possibilities for 
collaboration, negotiation and agreement with the West. What the Marshall Plan suggested was 
the ultimate failure of what can be called an integrationist strategy in US foreign policy-the 
political and economic integration of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence into the wider 
European and international context. With the coming of the Marshall Plan, that kind of 
integration, it seemed to Moscow, was only possible on the basis of giving up vital Soviet 
positions and interests in Eastern Europe.45  
The announcement of the U.S. Marshall Plan for Europe in June 1947 complicated 
Stalin’s strategy because it threatened to move Western countries in a decidedly pro-American 
direction, whereas Stalin’s strategy relied on a politically neutral Europe where national 
communist parties would have some leverage in government. The contradiction between 
making communist parties in Western Europe more acceptable to the public and integrating 
them into mainstream politics on the one hand, and the need for submission and obedience to 
the Cominform’s ‘two camp’ line was never resolved by Stalin. Therefore, the Soviet decision 
to abandon the Paris Conference was announced while the Italian Communist Party’s (PCI) 
Central Committee was still in session. From the perspective of Western communists, the 
Soviet Union was reversing its own policy. Instead of playing a constructive role by going 
along with other political parties and public opinion on the Marshall Plan, Western communists 
were now expected to boycott the Marshall Plan, just as their Eastern counterparts would do. 
Western communists were aware that such a move might backfire. Italian communists initially 
hoped to remain cautiously positive about the plan in order to avoid alienating Italian public 
opinion. The Soviets were unwavering, and the Western European parties were forced to 
change their stance. The change was apparent as early as  July 4th, 1947, when Togliatti again 
spoke to the PCI Central Committee, this time in a more alarming tone. Among other things, 
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he referred to the possibility that the line of “progressive democracy” launched by the Italian 
communists, with its emphasis on peaceful tactics, might no longer be appropriate in the new 
international context. The Soviet Union’s staunch opposition to the Marshall Plan thus placed 
Western European communist parties in an unwelcome position. They were now forced to 
contemplate the prospect of instigating political violence in their own countries.46  
The Soviets regarded the Marshall Plan as a political rather than a military threat. 
Accordingly, they responded to it by a political act―the creation in September 1947 of the 
Cominform as an organisation of their dependent communist parties designed both to supervise 
their campaign to destabilise the pro-American governments in Western Europe and to 
consolidate Soviet control of Eastern Europe. The proclamation at the founding meeting of the 
Cominform of the doctrine of “two camps” by Stalin's chief ideologue Andrei A. Zhdanov 
conveyed Moscow's perception of two hostile blocs along with its determination to fight the 
capitalist one by any means short of war―the essence of the Cold War.47 
In a meeting with Dimitrov on August 8th, 1947, Stalin stated his unhappiness with 
French communists, attacking their policies as “absolutely mistaken.” He was also scathing 
about Italian communists. Stalin’s bluntness during this meeting indicates that he had already 
sought to denounce the policy agreed earlier by the PCI and PCF. The meeting foreshadowed 
Zhdanov’s infamous attack on the Italian and French communists at the Cominform’s founding 
conference in September 1947. The decision to sacrifice Western communists was made in 
August 1947, in accordance with a memorandum submitted by Zhdanov to Stalin. It is worth 
discussing two further points here, however. First, the Cominform conference had not given 
clear indications to communists in Western Europe about whether they should continue in their 
“parliamentary way.” Second, even the conversations with Stalin did not resolve the question 
of any future strategy. The Stalin-Secchia Pietro (a deputy to the Constituent Assembly) 
meeting was shrouded in even more ambiguity that their meeting in 1944. Stalin gave Secchia 
reason to believe that civil war was not likely, however, he left a great deal of room for various 
interpretations to made by communist parties in Western Europe, including the views espoused 
by factions that wanted to provoke civil war (as Stalin himself knew). The Soviet leader 
allowed this lack of clarity to persist partly because he wanted to avoid tying his own hands, 
but also because of uncertainty in the Soviet decision-making process. The records of the 
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meetings between Secchia, Zhdanov and Stalin and other archival documents on the 
Cominform reveal these conflicting aspects of the Soviet Union’s reaction to the launching of 
the Marshall Plan.48 
The change in Soviet policy towards the PCI and the fate of Italian communists in late 
1947 and early 1948 did not seem fully adequate to confront the challenge initiated by the 
Cominform. The Eastern Bloc was shifting towards isolationism, with less focus being placed 
on countering Western interests, something which had been raised amid great fanfare in 
September 1947. Moreover, Soviet officials continued to avoid offering an alternative to the 
Marshall Plan. Their reticence accentuated the dilemma of the Western European parties. In 
vain, the Italian communists pleased with the Soviet Union to make an official pledge of 
economic and food aid in the event of a leftist victory in national elections. Stalin stated that 
this request was dangerous and that any such move would be interpreted as a violation of Italian 
national sovereignty. The Soviet Union thus adhered firmly to the rule of avoiding interference 
outside of its own sphere of influence—interference that might prove costly in Eastern Europe. 
This stance implied the need for a degree of passivity vis-à-vis Western Europe.49  
In private, however, the Soviet leader probably viewed the Italian elections of April 
1948 as a turning point—just as the United States had. The results not only confirmed the 
failure of the strategy adopted by West European communist parties after the setting up of the 
Cominform, but also showed the daring of the forces of the opposite “camp.” Consequently, 
the Soviet Union deemed it even more appropriate to define its security concerns within the 
narrow limits of the Eastern Bloc. As Silvo Pons argues, from this point on, the policy of 
attempting to prevent the formation of a cohesive Western Bloc was largely abandoned.50  
Despite the outcry Moscow raised at allegedly aggressive Western intentions, its 
internal assessments show that its concern was not so much about the prospective alliance’s 
modest military capabilities as about what its coming presaged for the future. Rightly 
estimating its creation as primarily a diplomatic act, the Soviets responded to it by a political 
and propaganda offensive masterminded by Foreign Minister Viacheslav M. Molotov and his 
assistants without input from the military. The offensive opened with the publication on 
January 29th, 1949, in Izvestiia, of a lengthy declaration protesting the forthcoming formation 
of NATO. 
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At Moscow’s signal, communists in Western Europe stirred up a massive ‘peace’ 
campaign against the project. Starting with French party boss Maurice Thorez invoking the 
threat of war but not its inevitability, the campaign grew progressively shriller. According to 
Giancarlo Pajetta of the Italian party directorate, the point was "to make it clear that we are in 
a position to create . . . a difficult situation for those who want war”. 51 By the end of February, 
leading Western European communists were publicly serving notice that if war were to come, 
the Red Army would be welcomed in their homelands as a liberator.  
Since the Red Army’s success had been based on a massive concentration of manpower 
and equipment in World War II, its substantial demobilization following the defeat of Nazi 
Germany suggested that Moscow, despite the cooling of East-West relations, did not view a 
new outbreak of hostilities likely. However, to counter the American nuclear advantage and 
the West's overall superiority in resources, which would be decisive in any outbreak of 
hostilities between the East and West, the Soviet leadership tried to conceal the degree of the 
Red Army’s demobilization and the defensive nature of its strategy. Since it was all but 
impossible to distinguish between an offensive and a counteroffensive strategy, however, the 
concealment served Moscow’s interests poorly by stoking up Western fear of its military power 
and inviting countermeasures. 
 However, in June 1948, the Soviet Union made its greatest blunder. In reaction to the 
Western military governors’ invitation to convene a constitutional assembly for their zones and 
undertake a separate currency reform (in June 1948), Stalin ordered the blockade of the roads 
and waterways to Berlin. The Western powers had to decide whether to abandon their plans to 
establish a Western government or pull out of their sectors in Berlin with a tremendous loss of 
prestige. The blockade threatened war and was a massive gamble. It helped convince Western 
public opinion of the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the determination of 
the Germans in West Berlin to resist Soviet pressure had another significant impact in the West. 
For the first time since the war, West Germans appeared to be opting voluntarily for the West 
and capable of becoming reliable allies in the Cold War. When President Truman, supported 
by London and Paris, decided to break the blockade with a huge Allied airlift, Stalin dared not 
interfere; his gamble had been a massive failure. Nobody could have thought up a better plan 
to convince West Germans of the need to accept a provisional division of their country.52  
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In the autumn of 1949, after the setting up of the West German Government, Stalin 
allowed the GDR to be established, thereby sealing the division of Germany, even though he 
had always been against it. However, although the Soviet Union lost its chance to attract 
Germany into its orbit or, at least, neutralise a united Germany, it had a crucial strategic 
advantage within the heart of Europe. The GDR served as a reliable ‘iron wall’ that separated 
Poland from the West. Thereafter, the exposed western sectors of Berlin always reminded 
Western statesmen and FRG leaders that they were extremely susceptible to Soviet pressure.53 
 The emergence of NATO did not trigger any frantic military build-up by the Soviets. Despite 
their obvious concern, they did not appear as if they were worried by the alliance’s alleged 
aggressive intentions. Their military response was moderate rather than alarmist: a 20 percent 
increase in defence spending, mainly for public effect, reinforcement of the troops stationed in 
East Germany, and the establishment of an office to supervise the modernisation of the armed 
forces of its Eastern European allies. Having previously preferred to keep them weak as 
potentially disloyal, Moscow now initiated a purge of their officer corps, to replace holdovers 
with more reliable party men.54  
From his well-placed spies, Stalin was well informed about NATO's capabilities and 
intentions. This unintended ‘transparency’ of the alliance during a period of critical weakness 
may have been a blessing in disguise. Although the  Soviet dictator could never be absolutely 
certain that the West were not plotting to attack him―and had in fact been led by his doctrine 
to believe precisely that― he could at least be certain that an attack was not immediately likely. 
It was extremely important that the intelligence he received from NATO's innermost sanctums 
did not encourage him to launch a preventive war while this appeared feasible, but rather to 
postpone it indefinitely. Therefore, he could embark on long term Cold War confrontation.  
In mid-1949, Stalin told China's second-ranking communist, Liu Shaoqi, that war was 
unlikely as no one was strong enough to wage it. This was a logical assessment of both the 
Soviet Union and the West, and greatly contrasts with the exaggerated estimates of Soviet 
capabilities in NATO's early planning documents, particularly its first strategic concept of 
October 1949 and its medium-term plan for a five-year development of its conventional forces 
adopted half a year later.55  
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Up until then, the Soviet Union had not regarded NATO as a credible threat. However, 
it epitomised the hostile capitalist conspiracy that had always been an integral part of Soviet 
thinking. It bore testimony to all that had gone wrong with Stalin's post-war quest for security 
that had so unexpectedly made him feel more insecure. It indicated the West's material 
superiority that could be called upon to defeat the Soviet Union in a war of attrition. It stood 
for the worst that Stalin had reasons or imagined having reasons to fear in Europe―U.S. atomic 
bombing, restoration of German power, and the attraction of the voluntarily unifying Western 
Europe on his forcibly regimented Eastern Europe. Despite this, what NATO did not represent 
at that time to Stalin was a credible military threat. Encouraging Western leaders to transform 
it into one was another of Stalin's miscalculations.56 
Stalin’s desire to establish a buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe suggests an 
interesting dynamic between his foreign and domestic policy. Rather than domestic politics 
contributing to Stalin’s foreign policy and to the Cold War, as James Richter argues57, it was 
in fact foreign policy which shaped domestic policy. Make no mistake, after the catastrophe of 
the Nazi invasion and occupation, the Soviet people craved security keenly, but as to how this 
was to be achieved was entirely in Stalin’s hands. Stalin’s preference for domination in Central 
and Eastern Europe over official diplomatic channels that would guarantee Soviet security 
without dividing Europe was a key factor in the East-West division of Europe and the 
breakdown in relations between the former allies of the United States and Soviet Union. The 
latter was significant in changing Soviet foreign and domestic policy and the direction of Soviet 
propaganda.  
In foreign policy, Stalin was keen to deescalate tensions between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. By 1947, when the Eastern Bloc had been consolidated, Stalin felt that the 
best strategy for a stable Europe was to rein in Western communist parties (particularly in 
Greece, Italy and France) in case they took the political initiative into their own hands and 
threatened the stability of the Western Bloc. Even if the Cominform, the World Peace Congress, 
the various national peace committees and the World Peace Council were seen by the Allies 
and the Soviet Union as crude propaganda tools for different reasons – for the former as 
communist infiltration and attempted social instability, for the latter a way to negatively 
influence public opinion on Allied foreign policy – the peace movement in one important way 
complemented U.S. containment. Through the Cominform and the peace movement, Stalin 
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rolled back any attempts by Western communists to win elections or cause any serious 
economic or political disruptions in the ‘Western’ Bloc.  
Within the Soviet Union, the breakdown of relations with the United States had a 
powerful impact on domestic policy. As US economic aid ceased and with the onset of a 
potential military conflict with the West, Stalin’s domestic policy once again harkened back to 
the 1930s of economic autarky and isolationism. In both cases, the international pressures 
resulting from the division of Europe compelled Stalin to establish a global and domestic peace 
movement. In both cases, the Soviets intended the peace movements to be mass movements, 
attracting as many people as possible. Yet, when it came to building the peace movement in 
the Soviet Union, Stalin had to formulate legitimating myths about the country's role in the war 
and the post-war world in order to justify the dire economic conditions the Soviet people found 
themselves in and to mobilise them for rebuilding the country.  
 
Peace Sells, but who’s buying? 
 
In this section I trace the conditions of post-war Soviet society to demonstrate what 
concerns the Communist Party had about the ramifications of its decision to stand by its harsh 
economic and political policy after the war, instead of conceding to the Soviet people’s hopes 
for economic reform. I argue that while victory in the war made the regime more popular than 
ever, its popularity was based on people’s hopes for higher standards of living. Just as the 
Soviet Union was consolidating its buffer zone, it had lost whatever economic aid it had been 
receiving during the war. Stalin understood that this trade-off between military security and 
living standards would damage his popularity (and thus legitimacy), in particular among 
specific groups who had a strong sense of entitlement from past grievances (the suffering 
inflicted on the peasants by collectivisation) and recent sacrifices (soldiers coming back from 
the front). For the Party, it was crucial that a convincing campaign addressed issues of food 
shortages, high prices and rationing to make it clear to people that the biggest reward for victory 
in the war was not future economic prosperity, but the maintenance of peace.  
In the second half of this section I trace back the mobilising campaigns throughout the 
late 1920s and up to the eve of the war in order to demonstrate the continuity of the Soviet 
Peace Campaign with past campaigns. Here, I argue that the peace campaign was the product 
of tension in the Party between using Marxist-Leninist ideology and Russian nationalism as a 
mobilising tool. This dilemma was violently solved by the Nazi invasion, when during the war, 
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the Party attempted to co-op patriotic sentiments into ‘official patriotism’ and shape the 
mythology of the war. By co-opting patriotism, the Party was bypassing (but not ridding itself 
of) Marxist-Leninist ideology and its focus on internationalism, which as a tool for mobilising 
the Soviet public, proved itself inadequate. In this sense, the Soviet Peace Campaign was 
unique because it functioned side by side with more ideologically-driven propaganda of 
Stalin’s Short Course, which had been used during the late 1930s and employed again after the 
war. This explains then why the peace campaign functioned within ‘official patriotism’. It had 
to be a ‘grassroots’ and ‘civic’ movement without the explicit appearance of the Party.  
The decision to launch the peace campaign in the Soviet Union, beginning with the 
establishment of the Soviet Peace Committee in 1949, was not taken in haste but as a response 
to the political, social and economic situation that had been developing in the Soviet Union 
since the end of the war in May 1945. Elena Zubkova has characterised the first three years of 
the post-war period as “one of the key phases in the development of Soviet government and 
society”. By 1949, the regime had achieved its core security goals of establishing an Eastern 
buffer zone and gaining control over Western communist parties through the Cominform. 
However, this came at a considerable price. The regime had not only lost significant diplomatic 
ties with the West but crucial economic assistance that came with it. The US cancellation of 
Lend-Lease in September 1945 and the calculated-to-be-rejected provisos of the Marshall Plan 
in 1947 meant that the Soviet regime was once again economically isolated and had to resort 
to transferring the full cost of economic rebuilding on the Soviet people as the price for 
consolidating the Eastern Bloc. 
As Fieseler argues, the first few years after the war were to be a crash course in 
rebuilding the country in order to safeguard its ‘spoils of war’. At the same time, the social 
consequences of the war had to be ‘overcome’ so as not “to threaten the regime from within 
and endanger its ideological and structural make-up”. 58  The press had again and again 
promised ‘comprehensive care’ to injured and crippled veterans and thus confirmed the Soviet 
state’s commitment to welfare.  
The question of peace was inextricably linked to Soviet domestic policy. While Stalin 
had intended for the political and economic structures of the USSR to remain unchanged, the 
war had fundamentally changed the hopes and expectations of what people expected from the 
government given the massive sacrifices endured. During the first 3 years after the war, the 
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Party had to contend with, above all, the hope for the liberalisation of the Stalinist regime. As 
Zubkova argues, the “postwar situation…rearranged priorities of different categories of society 
in pursuit of their interests, and influenced the relationship between the people and the state”.59  
What emerges in the post-war ruins is a divergent regime and population. The war 
forced the regime to give up a degree of control over the people as victory over the enemy was 
given top priority. After the war, Stalin was keen to re-establish this control and return society 
to a kind of ‘barracks’ that were “ideally manageable units of administration” for “establishing 
a kind of collateral dedication to duty”.60 For the people, the war gave an opportunity for 
genuine civic spirit, stripped of the regime’s ideological and propagandistic façade.61 It was 
the formative experience of fighting for one’s life and fatherland, and not as sate duty, that 
made pre-war life a distant past.62 Although this is not to suggest that the war had delegitimised 
the regime in the eyes of the public or changed people’s relationship to the regime, the 
psychological impact of the war - first and foremost, the initial shock of invasion and the Red 
Army’s subsequent retreat in the face of years of official Soviet propaganda - allowed people 
to think critically and outside of the limited bounds permitted by the regime. 
This ‘psychological orientation’ was no more apparent than in those at the front, who 
had experienced life abroad and could now compare living standards between Europe and the 
Soviet Union.63 The regimes anxiety over a possible neo-Decembrist plot may have been 
grossly exaggerated, but given the post-war makeup of society it was expected. The war had 
changed the face of society, with the traditional categories— the urban and rural industrial 
workers and civil servants, youth and pensioners—gone. The war had transformed the bulk of 
Soviet men into veterans, who totalled 11 million people by the end of the war.64 Everybody 
had to transition to normal society after the war, but it was the veterans who would find it the 
most difficult to economically, socially and psychologically adjust to peacetime life, especially 
the youngest solders who had gone to the front without gaining any skills. The social and 
economic alienation the veterans would come to experience in the wake of the Cold War only 
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strengthened their sense of belonging, even if it never manifested into any political action. Yet 
the thought of military trained men who had been exposed to the higher standards of the West 
questioning or even challenging the regime was enough for Stalin to immediately set upon 
reaffirming his role in the victory.65 
Propaganda organs, such as Pravda, launched a campaign to monopolise public 
discourse on Stalin’s role in the war on the day after the victory. Pravda divided the credit for 
winning the war in the following way: “the heroism and military prowess of the Red Army and 
of the Soviet people was led to victory by the organisation of the Bolshevik Party. It was ‘led 
by our great Stalin…Long live our great Stalinist victory!’”.66 In his ‘Address to the People’ 
on May 9th, 1945, Stalin made no mention of the Party, simply addressing himself and the 
people as ‘we’, promising that “the innumerable deprivations and losses suffered by our people 
in the course of the war, the intensive labour in the rear and at the front, offered on the altar of 
the country, have not been made in vain and eventuated in the complete victory over the 
enemy.”67 It was this hierarchy which would inform the rhetoric of the Soviet Peace Campaign 
four years later: Just as Stalin had led the country to victory he would maintain peace during 
the Cold War. 
It was important for Stalin to maintain a monopoly on rhetoric as the first signs of 
economic hardship for the country began to appear in the summer of 1946. Just as the Soviet 
peace campaign bound people to put their trust in Stalin to maintain peace, it bound them to 
his post-war domestic policy. The food supply crisis in the summer of 1946 was the first taste 
of the economic hardship resulting from the West’s economic embargo.68 Even though the 
1946 harvest was 7.7 million tonnes smaller than that of 1945 due to the harsh weather, the 
regime insisted on pushing through with requisitioning and to avoid any reduction in the state 
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grain reserve. 69 As a result, the majority of collective of state farms were forced to give up a 
portion of crops that would usually have been shared among the peasants.70  
From a propagandistic perspective, economic dislocation also threatened the Party’s 
official line on domestic policy. Without any information on the Party’s economic plans, many 
people resorted to rumours to make sense of the regimes plans. In the summer of 1947 in 
Moscow, it was widely rumoured that there would soon be, around July, 15th another increase 
in ration prices. Once again, great lines formed in the stores, and people began withdrawing 
money from savings accounts. In the course of 1947, 1948, and even at the beginning of 1950, 
there were many cases of the interrupted supply of bread and other vital food products. 
Rumours created war panic and undermined official propaganda.71 
The Soviet regime understood that the priorities in building the Eastern Bloc and 
rebuilding the country were starting to clash. Judging by the questions most often raised at 
lectures and interviews at industrial enterprises, on collective farms, and in government 
institutions, there were a lot of doubts about the wisdom of supplying other countries with food, 
something really difficult to understand in view of the food supply crisis at home. This 
particular concern reached massive proportions in 1946-1947, the most urgent period in the 
domestic food market. Stalin had to convincingly justify the Soviet Union’s external and 
internal predicament with a campaign so that its foreign policy was seen as legitimate by the 
public.  
The traumas of war had cancelled out the disillusionment many felt after the war for 
reform and the loosening up of the Stalinist regime. The threat of war would long be perceived 
in the people’s view as the explanation of their economic problems, and the saying “just don’t 
let there be war” would serve as the ultimate justification of the deprivations of the post-war 
period, for which there would otherwise have been no explanation. Once the Cold War began, 
the regime could use military factors to explain all of the problems endured by the Soviet people. 
In Zubkova’s words, “the perception of happiness as the absence of unhappiness took form 
among people experiencing the disasters of wartime, especially the attitude toward life and its 
problems. Here was the origin of the incantation “but for the war”, and the willingness to 
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forgive the government for all of its unpopular policies if only it fulfilled the people’s wish to 
avoid a new war”.72  
With the launch of the peace campaign, this attitude of the people was consciously 
utilised by the government and its propaganda. As recent allies were transformed into enemies 
whose aggressive intentions obstructed social programmes and thus weighed heavily on a 
people still suffering from the recent war, the regime hoped for people to rally around it. Yet 
as Zubkova argues, the government’s explanation “cannot be considered exclusively as a 
propagandist trick or an example of the clever manipulation of public opinion”, since “the 
psychology of hostile encirclement was part of the Soviet mentality, a characteristic feature of 
the thinking not only of the people, but of the leader as well”.73  
The regime was spurred into launching a peace campaign because it dealt directly with 
foreign policy issues, something which the public increasingly became interested in. Usually 
two-thirds of the questions in the resumes prepared for the central authorities concerned matters 
of international affairs, the situation in different countries, and foreign-policy initiatives of the 
Soviet leadership. In contrast, only one third of questions dealt with the internal situation of 
the country. Another reason for the increased interest in foreign policy was that it was simply 
impossible to openly discuss the domestic situation. The famine in the country, for example, 
could not be mentioned, though the euphemism “provisioning problems” could be. The 
supreme authority could not be criticised (such criticism was regarded as anti-Soviet 
agitation).74 This was not on ideological grounds, as most were preoccupied with day-to-day 
life rather than ‘capitalist’ aggression or national liberation movements in Europe and China. 
Yet people’s interest in problems of international life was linked with their day-to-day life and 
“their need to be reassured that there would be no new war.” Hence, a peace campaign had to 
address the following issues: to convincingly demonise the West (particularly America) as 
warmongering, Soviet diplomacy’s ability to preserve the interests of peace, and the 
strengthening of the Soviet Bloc (which was viewed as a guarantor of peace).  
Yet unlike other propaganda campaigns, the requisite of the peace campaign was that 
it had to have the appearance of a grass-root, civic organised campaign, stripped of any 
officialdom. The main channel for official discourse was the official network of information, 
which included propagandists and agitators, and the media network of newspapers and journals, 
posters, cinema and radio. The resort to rumours already undermined officially-sanctioned 
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discourse. Public scepticism towards official information “could be read creatively in order to 
learn something, which was not intended by the senders of the message”.75 Therefore, it was 
the public space that needed to be monopolised so that other opinions would be pushed out. It 
was the congregation of the people that the regime had to control. Face-to-face communication 
created rumours which allowed the sharing of individual memories and ideas between more 
and more people, creating a parallel universe of information to the official channel.76 This 
space had to be under control by channelling official discourse through a seemingly mass 
grassroots movement.  
The fundamental characteristic of the Soviet Peace Movement, even if its state 
sanctioned origins are taken into account, was that it was modelled as a mass, civic and 
grassroots movement. That is, those involved in numerous meetings and propagated Stalin’s 
rhetoric on the Soviet Union’s peaceful intentions were not Party cadres, but ordinary people. 
To understand why the regime decided to model the peace movement on a grassroots 
organisation we must trace the pre-war strategy of the regime to mobilise the public. The 
decision to make the peace movement into a ‘civic organisation’ was the culmination of the 
tumultuous developments and failures of state propaganda organs between the Great Terror 
and before the Nazi invasion in 1941.  
One major lesson which the Soviet regime learned from their experiences from the late 
1920s to the early 1930s was to de-ideologise the peace campaign. It proved to be effective 
during the war when official ideological propaganda rhetoric was quickly dropped as its failure 
to rally the nation in defence of the state became apparent. In its place, the state adapted a more 
straightforward, emotive rhetoric of ‘official patriotism’, with the press producing ‘narrative 
of peoples’ as symbols of the “unity of the great family’’.77 No longer was the struggle against 
the enemy framed in Marxist terms, but as the defence of the motherland. Internationalism was 
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dismissed with the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943 for traditional Russian patriotism, 
as exemplified by an agreement between the state and Russian Orthodox Church in September 
of the same year.78 
Yet even if the cult of Stalin continued to dominate official propaganda organs, war 
journalists and correspondents, such as Ilya Ehrenburg (who would later become vice-deputy 
Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee), Konstantin Simonov and Vasily Grossman brought 
to the fore de-ideologised and personal accounts of the war that appealed to humanistic values 
aimed at ordinary people. As Jeffrey Brookes notes, Ehrenburg and others “briefly appropriated 
the flowers and children that the press had previously identified with Stalin and used them to 
tell a story with other heroes”.79 Their wartime accounts about obligation, citizenship and 
courage were part of the mobilisation effort that brought victory. Yet they also reflected the 
public’s aspirations for a post-war Soviet civil society.  
It was during the early post-war years that Stalin once again attempted to re-impose the 
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy on the propaganda organs as way to “put the genie of an imagined 
civil society back in its box”.80 Stalin had traded any economic prosperity that would have been 
possible under positive cooperation with the Allies for a buffer zone in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The challenge that the Soviet government faced during the early post-war years was 
to present convincing propaganda to a population that had been transformed by the war, with 
new identities and civic courage, and convince them that the rebuilding and strengthening of 
the Soviet state was more important than any economic or political reforms that the people 
might have felt entitled to for their sacrifices in the war. In order to effectively mobilise the 
Soviet public it had be done without resorting to ideological propaganda, which had been 
delegitimised and looked upon with ridicule after the war. 
By the end of the war, the cycle from Marxist ideology to popular patriotism had been 
completed.81 The Great Patriotic War changed the regime and the public’s self-perception: 
victory was not a result of Marxist superiority as an ideology but a combination of the people’s 
heroism and sacrifice and Stalin’s leadership, as Soviet patriotism, the love of the Motherland, 
and the Soviet project (building communism) were fused together. 82  The sacrifices made 
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during the war made Marxist-Leninist internationalism less of a useful creed for mobilising the 
Soviet public for rebuilding the country. Soviet patriotism also deemphasised class warfare, 
which made it more inclusive and easier for those with ‘alien’ class origins to be more openly 
involved in the Soviet project. As Sheila Fitzpatrick argues, “for the majority of post-war 
citizens…‘Sovietness’ was a natural attribute of all those who had fought in the war, either 
actually at the front or metaphorically on the ‘home front’, and survived”.83  
It was from these convulsions – the constant struggle between Marxist-Leninist 
propaganda and populist patriotic propaganda – that the Soviet Peace Campaign formed. The 
War itself ended this struggle, as Marxist-Leninist ideology and popular myths came to work 
in tandem. As Amir Weiner noted, “Marxist eschatology…provided the Soviet polity with 
historical meaning by situating it in the context of a perceived human destiny”, but “…that 
policy was legitimized by certain myths… such as the Great Patriotic war, which related it to 
a concrete situation”.84 Thus, the Soviet peace campaign was used to legitimise Stalin’s foreign 
policy by playing its part in elevating the Great Patriotic War into a myth and using it to give 
meaning and understanding to Soviet domestic policy so that people would accept the post-war 
situation not as a betrayal of the sacrifices they made but an achievement of the Soviet state to 
guarantee peace.  
It was this mythical representation of the war, with its heroism, sacrifice and victory 
that shaped the peace campaign, with its carefully coordinated, yet endless meetings. For this 
to be convincing, the pre-war state sanctioned ideological propaganda, which had to be 
thoroughly discredited after the war, had to fuse with the new myth of the Great Patriotic War. 
The state may have orchestrated the peace campaign, but this time it was Soviet citizens and 
not the Party cadres who used it as a platform to express - albeit within the bounds of regime-
approved rhetoric - their hopes, fears, pride and, crucially for the state, their allegiance and 
trust in the Soviet regime as guarantor of peace. It was this ‘mandate’ that allowed the peace 
campaign to connect domestic policy (rebuilding and rearming without outside economic 
assistance) to foreign policy (the consolidation of the Eastern Bloc) and to justify the lack of 
reforms on the grounds that consolidating security was more important to achieving peace than 
economic or political reforms.  
Yet this is not to suggest that the regime acknowledged this change. Even as it engaged 
with the public on a grassroots level, the Party presented the post-war project of ‘reconstruction’ 
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as “recreating as exactly and as quickly as possible the pre-war situation that had been 
destroyed”.85 That meant not just reconstructing ruined cities and railroads but also – to the 
disappointment of those who had hoped for institutional reform and liberalisation – 
strengthening (and, if necessary, recreating) collective farms and re-imposing discipline in the 
cultural sphere. While agitators in the kolkhoz were likely to be exiled and members of the 
intelligentsia – in literature, the arts and scholarship – risked their careers during the 
disciplinary campaigns in 1946–1948 known collectively as the Zhdanovshchina, they were 
unlikely to be arrested and executed. It was, nevertheless, made clear that there would be no 
major reforms or liberalisation of the Stalinist system.  
 
A Revolutionary Theory of Peace 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to trace and document the formation of Soviet "soft 
power", cultural diplomacy and the "battle for hearts and minds" during the first decade of the 
Cold War. At the heart of this process was the so-called "struggle for peace", which had its 
own institutional, political and ideological dimensions. Its goals corresponded to both foreign 
and domestic policies. These two spheres were closely intertwined: After the war the Soviet 
Union unexpectedly found itself with the new status of a world power and embroiled in a new 
imperial project (the creation of the Eastern Bloc, and later "the world socialist system"). At 
the same time, victory in World War II finally legitimised the Soviet system,86 while the 
merging of the National Bolshevik ideology of the Stalinist regime with its xenophobia, autarky 
and imperial designs demanded the cultivation of a new Soviet identity.87 
At no time during the Soviet "struggle for peace" was peace ever intrinsically valuable. 
It was always understood to be strictly political, i.e. confrontational. And, therefore, it can be 
seen as the very opposite of peace. In the Soviet interpretation, the struggle for peace was a 
struggle for Soviet strategic objectives during the Cold War. It is easier to understand the 
specifics of the Soviet struggle for peace when referring to the criticism of Soviet imperialism 
made by major Soviet dissidents, who, although representing opposing poles of the political 
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spectrum - from liberal-internationalist (Sakharov) to conservative-nationalist (Solzhenitsyn) - 
agreed that the Soviet "struggle for peace" was nothing but a form of war. 
Pacifism was Sakharov's central idea, which he consistently defended in such works as 
Razmyshleniia o progresse, mirnom sosushchestvovanii i intellektual'noi svobode (1969), Mir, 
progress, prava cheloveka (1975), O strane i mire (1975), an “Open Letter to Brezhnev” in 
1980, and Trevoga i nadezhda (1990), etc. For Sakharov, pacifism, non-violent alternatives 
and human rights movements were closely linked. Moreover, it was namely pacifism that was 
a priority, while national interests were secondary.88 This line of liberal dissidence was in sharp 
conflict with the nationalist-traditionalist émigré camp, at the centre of which was Solzhenitsyn. 
Solzhenitsyn, being a Russian nationalist and critic of empire, built his criticism of 
Soviet hegemony on the basis of the Russian pacifist tradition. In the work Peace and Violence 
(1973), where Solzhenitsyn, by the way, put forward Sakharov as a candidate for the Nobel 
Peace Prize, he argued that "the juxtaposition of 'peace-war' a logic error (...) War is massive, 
thick, loud, bright, but far from the only manifestation of eternally uninterrupted wide-ranging 
global violence. The juxtaposition is but logically balanced and morally valid, there is 'peace-
violence.'" In fact, Solzhenitsyn noted, besides wars, history is full explosions of revolutionary, 
national, religious, racial, political, and other forms of violence that disrupt social peace. 
Therefore, in Solzhenitsyn's understanding, "pacifism is not against war, but against violence. 
Humanity constantly gravitated towards a nonviolent alternative." As examples, he cited the 
Indian Ahimsa, Christ's Sermon on the Mount, Tolstoy's nonviolent resistance to the evils of 
violence, and Sakharov's antinuclear pacifism.89 
Of course, Russia's history had its own peculiarities. The external factors may include: 
from civil wars before and during the Tatar siege to the persistent search for warm sea ports to 
expansion into to the East and South to its militant history to the idea of 'defending the 
motherland', Russia itself became the target of aggression in the 19th and 20th centuries and at 
the same time was itself an active aggressor. There were internal factors: authoritarianism, 
serfdom, a lack of parliamentary and human rights, the suppression of alternative thinking and 
developed ideas of violent revolutionary social renewal, whereas the parliamentary nonviolent 
alternative was not receiving a response. This was not conducive to the development of pacifist 
ideas in the country. The specifics of the history of the Russian church were also a big factor, 
considering that no powerful heretical Protestant denominations existed in Russia, and it was 
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precisely from the many sects in the West (e.g., Quakers) that many pacifist ideas originated. 
As Solzhenitsyn noted, Marxism caught on in Russia because it diverged from the ideas of 
social peace/harmony. On the contrary, “the Marxist ideology has always been an ideology of 
struggle/class war and never concealed its tendency towards violence. It picked out of the 
historical and cultural context ideas of retaliatory beginnings, rebellion, revolutionary, and 
besieged fortress."90 
In this regard, Lenin took а consistently Marxist position. Before the revolution, he 
actively opposed Tolstoyism. As is known, Leo Tolstoy advocated the idea of Christian non-
resistance, arguing that non-violence is not passivity or reconciliation with the refusal to fight 
violence: “To not resist evil by force, it does not mean not to resist evil, but to not resist evil 
by violence (...) You cannot put out fire with fire, pour water over water, destroy evil with evil. 
And yet [people have grappled with] this matter since the dawn of time and have brought about 
the situation in which we find ourselves in."91 
Although pacifist ideas were widespread in Russia in the late 19th - early 20th century92, 
they did not have broad social support and were confined to the intellectual and cultural milieu. 
At this time, Lenin sharply criticised pacifism (particularly during World War I) in the works 
English Pacifism and the English Dislike of Theory (1915), Pacifism and the Slogan of Peace 
(1915) and Bourgeois Pacifism and Socialist Pacifism (1916). Opposing the war and calling 
for the defeat of their own government, the Bolsheviks put forward the slogan of "turning the 
imperialist war into a civil war". This was essentially a slogan of class war, which, needless to 
say, contained little pacifism. 
Lenin proceeded from the fact that the problem of war and peace was a problem of class. 
For Lenin, pacifism as a resistance to all forms of war, which called for the cessation of war 
and the upholding of peace, regardless of eradicating the root causes of war, was primarily "an 
ideological trend (...) - the inevitable fruit of the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, in which 
everyone’s living conditions are held captive to bourgeois and democratic prejudices." 93To 
him pacifism seemed unacceptable because "pacifists dream of perpetual peace without 
throwing off the yoke and domination of capital" and that the essence of pacifism was "the idea 
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that war is not linked with capitalism, there is no continuation of the policy of peace.94 This is 
theoretical falsity; and practical falsity in in the fact that it bypasses social revolution."95 
If so, then pacifist ideology is not simply hostile to Marxism, but is directly aimed at 
strengthening the ruling regime: it is "speaking the language of mathematics, both necessary 
and sufficient to fool the workers: it's impossible to offer them any less, since one cannot lead 
the masses, without promising them a fairer world and not frightening them with dangers."96 
This was how Lenin explained pacifism’s rise during wartime. He wrote that the "imperialist 
bourgeoisie require lackeys to console and soothe the angry masses with a sweet chant of 
peace'', that the "bourgeois pacifists and reformists are people who, as a general rule, in one 
form or another get paid for strengthening the rule of the bourgeoisie by means of influence 
peddling so that they lull the masses and distract them from the revolutionary struggle."97 
In pacifism he saw the same danger as in religion, which lulls the mass consciousness: 
"Social pacifists, that is, socialists in name, conductors of bourgeois pacifist hypocrisy in 
practice, now play absolutely the same role as the Christian Pope has played for centuries, 
embellishing phrases about love of neighbour and the commandments of Christ's policy on the 
oppressed classes (. ..) reconciling the oppressed classes to their domination."98 Therefore he 
called for "winning over the millions of workers that the bourgeois pacifists have duped."99 
In full accordance with this programme, the Soviet government curtailed the activities 
of numerous pacifist organisations along with different political and religious organisations 
(including the particularly discriminated-against Tolstoyans Mennonites, Adventists and 
Doukhobors). Therefore, by the time of Stalin's rise to power (1927-29), there were no pacifist 
organisations that had existed since before the revolution and the first years of Soviet power. 
Pacifist alternatives were now exclusively in dissent. It is sufficient to mention the work of the 
writer and religious thinker Daniel Andreev, Peace Rose The Rose of the World (1950-58), 
which he wrote in prison, and which put forward original ideas of ecumenism and pacifism 
associated with the Russian religious tradition. 
With the intensification of the conflict between the former allies, from the very 
beginning of the Cold War, previous Soviet anti-pacifist discourse was confronted with the 
realities of the post-war world. When it came to violence and war, Stalin remained a consistent 
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disciple of Marx and Lenin. Thus, he argued that Marx's phrase about violence as a “midwife 
of history, pregnant with the new” was brilliant and the best formulation of the essence of 
historical materialism. It is not surprising, therefore, that during the Stalin era, when 
revolutionaries, the leaders of popular uprisings and military leaders were glorified, concepts 
such as pacifism, humanism, peace-making and nonviolence received only negative 
connotations and were referred to as "imperialist," "bourgeois" and "abstract". 
Two weeks after the Fulton speech on March 22nd, 1946, Stalin's response during an 
interview with Associated Press correspondent Gilmore was published, in which he made no 
mention of Churchill's speech and praised the UN as an organisation whose strength "lies in 
the fact that it is based on the principle of the equality of States and not on the principle of the 
domination of some over others. If the United Nations Organisation succeeds in the future, too, 
in maintaining the principle of equality, then it will undoubtedly play a great positive role in 
guaranteeing universal peace and security." He called fears of war baseless, proclaiming that 
"neither nations nor their armies seek a new war. They want peace, and seek to secure the peace. 
That means that the present war scare does not come from that direction. I think that the present 
war scare is aroused by the actions of certain political groups who are engaged in propaganda 
for a new war and thus sowing the seeds of dissension and uncertainty." Although Stalin replied 
briefly to Gilmore's last question on what was needed to be done in order to prevent war, his 
response indicated that he understood the Cold War as a purely propagandistic enterprise: "It 
is necessary that the public and the ruling circles organise widespread counter-propaganda 
against the propagandists for a new war, as well as for the maintenance of peace; that not a 
single utterance of the propagandists for a new war gets away without the rebuff it deserves on 
the part of public opinion and the press; that in this way the war-mongers be promptly exposed 
and given no opportunity to misuse freedom of speech against the interests of peace." 100 
Thus, according to Stalin, the main task was, in fact, to propagandise peace. A year 
later, on April 9th, 1947, in conversation with Harold Stassen, Governor of Minnesota (1939-
43) and future President of the University of Pennsylvania (1948-53), Stalin spoke of the 
principle of peaceful coexistence between communism and capitalism. He developed the idea 
that wars occur not only between states representing different systems, since the "economic 
systems in Germany and the United States are the same, but, nevertheless, war broke out 
between them". This was unorthodox for Marxist reasoning: "The U.S. and U.S.S.R. systems 
are different but we didn’t wage war against each other and the U.S.S.R. does not propose to. 
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If during the war they could co-operate, why can’t they today in peace, given the wish to co-
operate? Of course, if there is no desire to co-operate, even with the same economic system 
they may fall out."101 It turns out that everything was determined by "the desire to cooperate", 
and not strictly by the “class laws of social development”. It was all a preamble for disavowing 
previous irreconcilable statements. 
On Stassen's puzzling question on how the Soviet Union could cooperate with the 
capitalist countries, Stalin replied that he "could not have possibly said that two different 
systems cannot cooperate. The idea of cooperation between the two systems was first expressed 
by Lenin. Lenin is our teacher, says I. Stalin, and we Soviet people - students of Lenin. We 
never have nor will we ever deviate from Lenin's instructions." It may be, that Stalin had said 
in the past that one system, for instance, the capitalist, does not want to cooperate, but this was 
attributed to a lack of willingness rather than a lack of opportunity to cooperate. As for 
opportunities for cooperation, Stalin adhered to Lenin's view on the possibility and desirability 
of cooperation between the two economic systems. As to the desire of the people to co-operate 
on the part of the U.S.S.R. and the Party, it is possible—and the two countries could only 
benefit by this co-operation. For Stassen, it remained only to answer that "the statements I 
referred to are those made by you at the Eighteenth Communist Party Congress in 1939 and 
the plenary session in 1937—statements about capitalist encirclement and monopoly". From 
Stalin's announcement, Stassen concluded that "now, after the defeat of Japan and Germany, 
the situation had changed".102 
Interestingly, once he began the usual revision of Marxist doctrine and rewriting Lenin 
to recast him into a "fighter for peace," Stalin was nearly compelled to abandon ideology in 
favour of realpolitik in this interview. He bluntly told his U.S. interviewer that mutual 
accusations of monopoly capitalism (USA) and totalitarianism (USSR) were no more than 
propaganda: “As for indulging in criticisms of monopoly and totalitarianism - this was 
propaganda, while Stalin considered himself to be ‘a business-like man’. ‘We should not be 
sectarian’ Stalin would say. ‘When the people wish to change the systems they will do so. 
When we met with Roosevelt to discuss the questions of war, we did not call each other names. 
We established co-operation and succeeded in defeating the enemy."103 
These two interviews with Stalin (1946 and 1947) give different starting points, yet they are 
unanimous in the fact that what lies, in Stalin’s view, at the heart of the ensuing Cold War is 
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propaganda. Stalin himself begins to act in accordance with the parallel reality created by this 
propaganda. So, in an interview with Pravda on February 17th 1951, he indulges in rhetoric 
about who wants peace more - the Soviet Union or the West, exposing the "warmongers": 
"Prime Minister Attlee portrays himself as a champion of the world. But if he really stands for 
peace, why did he reject the proposal of the Soviet Union to the United Nations for the 
immediate conclusion of a peace pact between the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, 
China and France? If he really stands for peace, why did he reject the proposals of the Soviet 
Union for an immediate start to reduce arms; for an immediate ban on nuclear weapons? If he 
really stands for peace, why does he persecute supporters of peace; why did he forbid the 
Congress of Defenders of Peace in England? Is the campaign for the defence of peace a threat 
to England's security? Clearly, Prime Minister Attlee stands not for the preservation of peace 
but for the outbreak of a new world war of aggression."104 
These rhetorical passages belong to the realm of pure propaganda. Stalin was acting out 
fully in accordance with the task which he set himself at the time, when on February 1st, 1951, 
the Soviet Union suffered a fiasco at the UN. On this day, the General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 498, condemning the People's Republic of China as an aggressor. Since the Korean 
War was the first large-scale confrontation between the two camps, and the Soviet Union was 
isolated, Stalin made a desperate attack on the UN. In an interview he stated that he regarded 
the UN decision as "shameful": "Really, one must have lost what was left of conscience to 
maintain that the United States of America, which has stolen Chinese territory, the island of 
Taiwan, and fallen upon China's borders in Korea, is the defensive side; and on the other hand, 
to declare that the Chinese People's Republic which has defended its borders and striven to take 
back the island of Taiwan, stolen by the Americans, is the aggressor."105 Stalin carried out the 
attack on the UN in full accordance with the logic of the Cold War: as the UN cannot be an 
instrument of the Soviet Union, it becomes "an instrument of a war of aggression. In reality, 
the United Nations Organization is now not so much a world organization as an organization 
for the Americans and treats American aggression as acceptable (...) The United Nations treads 
the same disgraceful path as the League of Nations. Thereby it buries its moral authority and 
dooms itself to decay."106 What way out did Stalin see out of this situation?  
A reporter's question about whether he thought a new world war inevitable, Stalin 
delivered a monologue which would then be quoted in the Soviet press an infinite number of 
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times. He proclaimed that war cannot be considered inevitable, despite the fact that in the U.S., 
Britain and France there are "aggressive powers that long for a new war. They need war to 
achieve super-profits and to plunder other countries. These are the billionaires and millionaires 
that regard war as a fountain of revenue that brings colossal profits. They, the aggressive 
powers, hold the reactionary governments in their hands and guide them. But at the same time 
they are afraid of their people who do not want a new war and are for the preserving of peace. 
Therefore they take the trouble of using the reactionary governments to ensnare their people 
with lies, to deceive them, to represent a new war as a war of defence, and the peaceful politics 
of peace-loving countries as aggressive. They take the trouble to deceive the people, to force 
them and draw them into a new war with their aggressive plans." That is why "they fear the 
campaign for the defence of peace, they fear that this campaign would expose the aggressive 
intentions of the reactionary governments," and why "they oppose the proposals of the Soviet 
Union on the conclusion of a peace treaty, on the limitation of armaments and on the forbidding 
of atomic weapons; they fear that the acceptance of these proposals would frustrate the 
aggressive measures of the reactionary governments and render the arms race unnecessary."  
Despite all this, Stalin knew the answer to the question of what will end the struggle 
between aggressive and peace forces: "Peace will be preserved and strengthened, if people take 
the preservation of peace in their own hands and will defend it to the end. War may be 
inevitable if the warmongers succeed in ensnaring the masses with their lies, in deceiving them 
and drawing them into a new world war. Therefore, a broad campaign for the preservation of 
peace as a means of exposing the criminal machinations of the warmongers is now of 
paramount importance."107 
The more the USSR became isolated in the UN and Soviet politics became aggressive, 
the more desperate it "fought for peace". Realpolitik, which Stalin demonstrated in 1947, even 
without having the atomic bomb, was replaced by a rigid Marxist rhetoric, imposed at a time 
of increasing Stalinist paranoia and conspiracy theories.  
In his last work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (1952) Stalin devoted a 
chapter to "the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries", in which he rationalised in 
Marxist terminology the lack of "willingness to cooperate". Here he argued that "the 
inevitability of wars between capitalist countries remains in force", because Lenin's thesis that 
imperialism inevitably generates war was not out-dated, despite the "rise of powerful popular 
forces working for peace, against a new world war". These forces, according to Stalin, stand 
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only for peace, unable to eliminate the real preconditions of war - imperialism: "The object of 
the present-day peace movement is to rouse the masses of the people to fight for the 
preservation of peace and for the prevention of another world war. Consequently, the aim of 
this movement is not to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism - it confines itself to the 
democratic aim of preserving peace. In this respect, the present-day peace movement differs 
from the movement of the time of the First World War for the conversion of the imperialist 
war into civil war, since the latter movement went farther and pursued socialist aims".  
Stalin did not rule out that in "a definite conjuncture of circumstances the fight for peace 
will develop here or there into a fight for socialism. But then it will no longer be the present-
day peace movement; it will be a movement for the overthrow of capitalism." In other words, 
the imperialist war will escalate into class war. Meanwhile, Stalin depicted the "struggle for 
peace" almost as pacifist and depoliticised. He explicitly states that "most likely is that the 
present-day peace movement, as a movement for the preservation of peace, will, if it succeeds, 
result in preventing a particular war, in its temporary postponement, in the temporary 
preservation of a particular peace, in the resignation of a bellicose government and its 
supersession by another that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace. That, of course, will be 
good. Even very good. But, all the same, it will not be enough to eliminate the inevitability of 
wars between capitalist countries generally. It will not be enough, because, for all the successes 
of the peace movement, imperialism will remain, continue in force - and, consequently, the 
inevitability of wars will also continue in force. To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is 
necessary to destroy imperialism."108 
It was not by chance that in the Soviet Union this work was seen as Stalin's ‘political 
testament’. The ending statement - an example of Stalinist dialectic - was not just a 'classic', 
but best illustrated the specifics of the Soviet struggle for peace and why it was truly important 
to wage a war for it. However, after paroxysms of World War II and the outbreak of the Cold 
War with its arms race, pacifism found new life (suffice to mention the Russell-Einstein 
Manifesto of 1955, which initiated the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs). 
But the Soviet "struggle for peace" was set up in opposition to pacifism. 
Although at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956 Khrushchev spoke 
in a conciliatory tone that "there is no fatal inevitability of war," he added that "in an atomic 
war socialism will win."109  Declarations and statements made at the Moscow Meeting of 
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Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957 and 1960 continued to assert the Stalinist thesis that 
only the "victory of socialism in the world would finally eliminate the social and national 
causes of all wars." They treated the peaceful coexistence of states as a "form of class struggle 
between socialism and capitalism". The United States, which the peace struggle was to be 
directed against, was called "the biggest international exploiter (...) the main bulwark of world 
reaction and the gendarme (...), an enemy of the peoples of the world." 110  This position 
remained virtually unchanged until the beginning of perestroika. So even at the peak of the 
Detente, Brezhnev asserted at the 25th Congress of the CPSU in 1976 that capitalism is 
incapable of existing "without resorting to aggression and threats of weapons, but encroaching 
on the independence and interests of other peoples."111 
The end of the Detente in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served as a 
flashpoint for a home-grown pacifist movement. In 1982 the first independent pacifist group 
appeared in the Soviet Union: "For the establishment of trust between East and West." Its 
members were subject to KGB repression and harassment by the Soviet Peace Committee. 
They were against the aggression in Afghanistan, for the right to refuse military service for 
conscience reasons and the introduction of alternative military service, the demilitarisation of 
society, the abolition of the death penalty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic 
states and other countries.112 
But along with the official "struggle for peace" and dissident pacifism existed semi-
legal pacifism. In his book, We - the People of the Sixties [Mȳ - shestidesyatniki], one of the 
most prominent liberal writers of the war generation, Ales Adamovich, wrote of the 
"underground pacifism" of front-line soldiers-turned-writers as being far from patriotically 
one-sided.113 These ideas were expressed during the Military Literature and the Nuclear Age 
Conference in Minsk in 1983. However, pacifist ideas were not openly expressed in the USSR 
until the beginning of perestroika and the proclamation of Mikhail Gorbachev's 'new thinking'.  
Even in the early 1980s, Soviet propagandists continued to struggle with the "social-
pacifism of rightist opportunists and rightist revisionists" which "objectively serves as a fifth 
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column in the ranks of the communist and workers' movement." 114  Explaining the 
incompatibility of pacifism with the Soviet "struggle for peace", Soviet propagandists noted 
that "the essence of pacifism is not the struggle for peace but an absolute struggle for an abstract 
peace, without eradicating the root causes of war, without overthrowing the regime whose 
policy exacerbates global climate, and which, ultimately, is the cause of war." 115  It can, 
therefore, be said that the essence of the Soviet "struggle for peace" was not so much the 
struggle for peace but the struggle against imperialism. 
Thus, even on the eve of perestroika, official Soviet propaganda continued to assert 
that "the struggle for peace in modern terms - in essence a mass democratic struggle (...) The 
immediate objective of the anti-war struggle is not to abolish capitalism but to prevent a world 
war. However, the communists explain to their partners in class alliance that it is precisely the 
aggressive militaristic policy in its most naked form which reflects the essence of modern 
imperialism and its class aims. In these conditions, the struggle against the aggressive policy 
of the ruling circles of the USA and its allies acts as a struggle against the very essence of 
modern imperialism. This struggle not only expresses humanist values, but also the class 
interests of all participants in the anti-war movement."116 
It was because pacifism's main priority was upholding peace as such that Soviet fighters 
for peace viewed pacifism as hostile - not so much in its form as in its essence: "Because of its 
essence, the pacifist struggle for peace, even though if its political content is progressive, it is 
at odds with the essence of the Communists struggle for peace. Consequently, Marxism and 
pacifism express differing essences in the anti-war movement and this very clash between them 
is a clash of different entities." 117 
And yet, forty years of experience of the "struggle for peace" taught Soviet "peace 
activists" that it was necessary to seek forms of cooperation with the pacifists. If during the 
Stalinist years they were talked about with open hostility, now it was written that "Marxist-
Leninists never link together binding associations for practical cooperation with the pacifists 
with a need for a certain ideological choice. Ideological differences do not have to be an 
obstacle to unified socio-political action. An example of this is the nearly 30-year participation 
of Soviet scientists in the work of the Pugwash movement (...)."118 
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It took decades until pacifism had ceased to be seen only as an enemy. Moreover, in 
1983, Soviet propagandists claimed that "an important feature of the ideological confrontation 
between Marxism-Leninism and pacifism on the issues of war and peace is that - propaganda 
against pacifism should be done tactfully, in a calm and respectful tone, excluding any type of 
insult to the feelings and identity of pacifists. The important thing is that Marxism-Leninism, 
while opposing pacifist ideology, supports their practical steps in the fight for peace and is not 
fighting against pacifists, but is for them; for them to overcome in their minds the utopian, non-
scientific views on the solution to the problem of war and peace."119 
When at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on February 13th, 1984, 
Chernenko repeated Stalin's 1947 mantra of how "the great Lenin bequeathed to us the principle 
of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. We are ever true to this 
principle"120 it might seem that Soviet political thought had been conceptually suspended in 
animation since the forties. But it was not. Although criticism of pacifism in the Soviet Union 
turned into a real industry121, discussions during mid-1980s show that not only had the tone 
and discourse changed, but there was a revision of some of the major ideological postulates, 
which although occurred with some reservations a few years later, in the wake of Gorbachev's 
announcement of a new course in foreign policy, would radically change the understanding of 
the 'struggle for peace' itself.  
On the eve of perestroika, Soviet propaganda manoeuvred between loyalty to the 
principles of class war and realpolitik. It was awkward manoeuvring from the Stalinist 
"struggle for peace" which could already be seen dying. The fact was that, pacifism, so disliked 
by Soviet propaganda, was strongly associated with the main political enemy of the Bolsheviks 
- social democracy. To the extent that the position (and consequently political weight) of social 
democracy grew in Europe, ideological differences, especially strong under Stalin, were put on 
the back burner and the fear of social democracy subsided and was replaced by a sense of 
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urgency for building constructive relations. Of course, professional Soviet peace fighters would 
now assert that "at the forefront of the struggle for peace are the Communists, for whom the 
struggle to prevent the threat of nuclear war is the foundation of all their foreign policies".122 
However, they had to concede that "modern social democracy is a major force in the 
international labour movement".123 Now it was said that during the previous two decades (i.e. 
after Khrushchev) there had "been some positive developments" in the relationship between 
Communists and Social Democrats. Cooperation with the Socialist International developed 
during contacts with Western socialists (Willy Brandt, François Mitterrand, Olof Palme, Neil 
Kinnock and others). The position of the Soviet Union was interpreted as "balanced" and aimed 
at dialogue for "strengthening the anti-war movement, strengthening the labour movement in 
the front of the struggle for peace"124 , whereas the position of the social democrats was 
supposedly "reluctant". 
These reservations had to conceal the obvious: in the struggle for peace, the Soviet 
position at the beginning of the Gorbachev era practically coincided with the position of the 
Socialist International, the former implacable enemy of the Bolsheviks. However, before the 
official proclamation of ‘the new thinking’ this was presented as the opportunism of social 
democrats themselves: the alleged "contacts between the two currents of the labour movement 
and their specific interaction in the struggle for disarmament contributed to some positive 
evolution of social democracy's conception of foreign policy" 125 , and not the Soviet 
communists. Soviet ideologues suggested, though not really trusting their new allies, that social 
democrats were now claiming that the social democracy was supposedly always a "fighter for 
peace and opposed to the war". 
According to the Soviet side, this was certainly not the case, since previously "such 
broadcasted slogans of peace and calls for collective security in practice were accompanied by 
support for aggressive foreign policy actions of U.S. imperialism and ascribing aggressive 
intentions to the Soviet Union."126 However, in the mid-1950s a shift began. In 1957, the social 
democrats supported several Soviet proposals to limit nuclear weapons production; the VI 
Congress of the Socialist International (1959) secured a positive attitude towards the idea of 
creating a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe; and the X Conference of Socialist International 
                                                          
122 V.F. “Kommunisty i sotsial-demokraty v bor'be protiv ugrozy iadernoi voiny,” in Kommunisty i bor'ba za mir, 
ed. L.M.  Minaev (Moskva: institut Marksa-Engel'sa-Lenina pri TsK KPSS, 1985), 93. 
123 Ibid., 94. 
124 Ibid., 96. 
125 Ibid., 99. 
126 Ibid., 99.  
60 
 
(1966) discussed the need for general and complete disarmament and the prohibition of the use 
of space for military purposes. Thus, Soviet propaganda, moving ever-closer to the social-
democratic position, attempted to depict social democrats as opportunists. "Under the 
conditions of the Detente (...) begins and a more realistic approach to foreign policy issues by 
powerful forces of social democracy."127 The social democrats condemned the coup in Chile, 
welcomed the elimination of regimes in Portugal, Greece and Spain, demanded the end of the 
war in Indochina, and finally made for peaceful coexistence as the "only approach to 
contemporary international politics". 
In reality, the convergence was gradual. The 1978 Socialist International Conference in 
Helsinki was the first time that a CPSU delegation (headed by the Secretary of the Central 
Committee on International Affairs Boris Ponomarev) attended the conference. The blame for 
the crisis in the relationship between East and West was shifted completely by Soviet 
propagandists to the social democrats. They argued that, until the mid-1960s, "there was a sharp 
turn to the right in the entire the social democratic movement; In those years the rightist circles 
managed to push it into the abyss of anti-Soviet militarist hysteria and channel it into imperialist 
preparation for aggressive military-political actions against the USSR and other socialist 
countries."128 In general, the position of the social democrats on the issue of the struggle for 
peace was treated as opportunistic (as they were supposedly forced to reckon with the will of 
voters) and that the Soviet "struggle for peace" should not rely on them in any way, since 
several social democrat leaders were "implicated in the spread of the Pentagon-penned myth 
of 'the Soviet military threat' and participate in a variety of ideological and other diversions of 
imperialism against socialist countries"129. From all this it is impossible to understand why the 
social democrats changed if the communists were allegedly always "unwavering [in their] 
principle position". It is easy to assume that the shift occurred precisely on the Soviet side. 
When Gorbachev proclaimed in his book Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the 
World that "the core of the new thinking is the recognition of the priority of human values and 
more precisely - the survival of humanity"130 it was then impossible to conceal this political 
shift.  
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After August 20th, 1949, when the first Soviet atomic bomb131 was detonated at the 
Semipalatinsk test site, the Soviet Union conducted hundreds of nuclear weapons tests. From 
1954 onwards tests began on the northern islands of Novaya Zemlya - constant tests (except 
during the 1989 moratorium). As Pravda reported in October 24th, 1990, in the period from 
1981 to 1990, 714 nuclear explosions were conducted on Soviet nuclear test sites. In 
Kazakhstan alone there were 467, 131 in the north range and 115 (from 1963) at underground 
sites. It was not surprising, therefore, that it was in Kazakhstan that the antinuclear movement 
"Nevada - Semipalatinsk' began in February 1989 with aim of banning new types of weapons 
of mass destruction. The leader of the movement was the People's Deputy of the USSR Kazakh 
writer Olzhas Suleymenov, who proclaimed that the struggle for peace starts "in our own home 
because for too long we fought for peace throughout the world. Let everyone start from their 
homes. We want to shut down the test sites." He introduced in the Supreme Council "a bill 
banning the production and testing of nuclear weapons"132. At the same time, several other 
movements arose, including the anti-nuclear movement, For a Nuclear-Free North133 , the 
Soldiers' Mothers Movement, the revived Tolstoyan societies in Moscow and Kiev, the 
Tolstoyan Society of the USSR, and the Yasnaya Polyana Fund Accord. The group Trust 
became a pacifist movement at the beginning of perestroika. It had branches in Moscow, 
Leningrad, Lvov, Kiev, Chernobyl, Kuibyshev, Baku, Riga, Saratov, Vyborg and even Paris. 
Its aims included alternative civil service, disarmament, demilitarisation of society, human 
rights, democratisation of the army, and the creation of a “Union of Soviet refuseniks”. At the 
end of 1990 at a meeting in Moscow of several peacekeeping, human rights, and youth 
organisations, the Movement for Demilitarization was formed.134  
Against this background of genuine, grassroots, informal and non-institutionalised 
pacifism, the Soviet Peace Committee, as well as other state-sponsored and party 
nomenclature-led "social organizations", was in deep crisis. The Soviet press began to write 
openly that it is now "impossible to carry out class-based politics and to mechanically follow 
the governmental policy in international relations and especially to impose it on its foreign 
partners. Deprived of an independent peacekeeping outlook and not recognizing the trans-
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ideological peace movements in the 80s that were close to pacifism, the Soviet Peace 
Committee began to lose confidence in the wider circles of Soviet society."135 
The WPC found itself in an equally difficult position and also began rapidly losing 
authority by being in line with Soviet foreign policy and trying to monopolise the leadership in 
the global movement for peace. "The bitter story of the WPC's leadership” - wrote chairman of 
the board of the Japanese Peace Committee Akira Kashi – “was that by obeying great power 
chauvinism and hegemony for many years, it has forced the movement to follow the foreign 
policy of some governments. This was the main cause of confusion in the WPC and the 
international nuclear movement."136 Just as it had been in the early years of the Cold War, the 
main obstacle to reform, even at the end of the Cold War, was the Soviet Peace Committee. 
American anthropologist R. Prince, who represented the U.S. in the WPC, wrote that the Soviet 
Peace Committee blocked any possibility of reform in the WPC: "In my view, this organization 
has been working on itself, having lost touch with mass movements. Mass meetings remain 
only for functionaries and the sole purpose of giant ceremonial meetings is only to demonstrate 
'who's who' of the independent movements and organizations. Numerous committees are 
concerned with their own affairs (...) In the main, it is the money of the Soviet people that is 
being wasted, who have not a clue as to who is spending it and calling it a struggle for peace."  
In fact, the Soviet "struggle for peace" finished along with the Cold War, which proves 
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  CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Global Peace Campaign:  
Establishing the Soviet Brand of ‘Peace’, 1947-1956 
 
Cominform Beginnings  
 
The Soviet Peace Campaign began with a declaration of (ideological) war against the 
West. In the wake of the Marshall Plan in June 1947, Stalin called upon the representatives of 
nine European communist and workers (communist) parties of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, 
Hungary, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and the Soviet Union to convene in Szklarska 
Poręba (Poland) to establish the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties, known as the 
Cominform. Brushing aside the Marxist revolutionary ethos of its predecessor, the Comintern, 
the Cominform had more modest and pragmatic aims: simultaneously provide a forum for the 
communist parties and coordinate their work. The meeting was noteworthy for establishing the 
Soviet foreign policy that would last until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Andrei Zhdanov, 
speaking for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, laid the groundwork for the "peace" 
offensive, in which the "international arena" was divided "into two major camps"— "the 
imperialist and antidemocratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic 
camp, on the other". Zhdanov identified "the principal driving force of the imperialist camp" 
as the US and “the anti-Fascist forces comprise … the U. S. S. R. and the new democracies".137  
The cycle of campaigns which followed from the Cominform meeting established the 
nature of the ‘peace offensive’ in its initial stage as a bureaucratic initiative with the task of 
political and cultural infiltration abroad. A campaign would start off with an ‘appeal’ for peace 
from a ‘non-governmental’ organisation, publicised in the press, endorsed by other ‘non-
governmental’ organisations, and meetings, protests, conferences and congresses would be 
organised in which votes would be put forward for establishing a new organisation. This was 
how the ‘peace campaign’ was launched abroad.  
The founding of the Cominform and the launching of the peace campaign played a 
tortuous role within Stalin’s overall post-war foreign policy. With the launch of the Marshall 
                                                          
137 Committee on Un-American Activities, Report on the Communist ‘Peace Offensive: A Campaign to Disarm 
and Defeat the Unite States, (Washington D.C.: Committee on Un-American Activities, 1951), 4.  
64 
 
Plan, Stalin was convinced that the US intended to economically rebuild Western Europe and 
consolidate it within its own ‘sphere of influence’. Thus, the Cominform’s task of enforcing 
the Eastern bloc to toe the Stalinist party line was a response to the perceived shift in post-war 
Europe from a multi-polar system to an American-led anti-Soviet coalition. Yet the Cominform 
and the ensuing peace campaign were not merely aimed at turning Western public against this 
bipolar political design. The rhetoric of peace was intended to promote the immediate post-war 
status quo in Europe, in which Stalin wished to “convert the gigantic losses and victories into 
lasting security for the Soviet Union and its ruling circle”.138 
In the autumn of 1947, an open letter addressed to "Writers and men of culture in the 
United States of America!" was signed by 12 Soviet writers, including Alexander Fadeev, 
Constantine Fedin, Boris Gorbatov, Valentin Kataev and Alexander Korneichuk. All coming 
through the Stalinist system, they would become the backbone of the peace campaign. Fadeev 
was the co-founder of the Union of Soviet Writers and its chairman from 1946 to 1954, Fedin 
was a novelist and literary functionary who would also go on to serve as chair of the Union of 
Soviet Writers, Korneichuck was a playwright, literary critic who held senior positions in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Arts of the USSR and as Deputy Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR. Their letter was published in the journal Soviet Literature in 1948, and read in part as 
follows:  
 
“The ideas of fascism have of late been constantly finding champions and proponents 
among prominent statesmen, diplomats, military men, industrialists, journalists, and 
even scientists in your country...The peoples of the world want to hear their voices from 
the pages of newspapers, magazines, and books, from the boards of theatres, from 
canvases and screens… we call upon you, masters of American culture, to raise your 
voice against the new threat of fascism, against the instigators of war.”139  
 
In the wake of this ‘spontaneous’ campaign, a World Congress of Intellectuals in 
Defence of Peace was held in Wroclaw, Poland on August 25 to 28, 1948, and announced the 
establishment of the International Committee of Intellectuals in Defence of Peace. It was 
attended by hundreds of writers, artists and scientists representing 46 countries, primarily 
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supportive of left-wing policies. They included Pablo Picasso, Louis Aragon, Frédéric Joliot, 
Irène Joliot-Curie, Aldous Huxley, Julian Huxley, Bertolt Brecht, Jorge Amado, György 
Lukács, Fernand Léger, Roger Vailland, Salvatore Quasimodo, Paul Éluard, Olaf W. Stapledon, 
Leon Moussinac, Jorge Amado, Alan J.P. Taylor, John Haldane, Dominique Desanti, Martin 
Andersen-Nexo, Sir John Boyd-Orr, William Gropper, Eugénie Cotton, Anna Seghers, Aubrey 
Pankey, Alves Redol and Julien Benda.140 With a total of 600 participants, the congress was 
the first test run for the Soviets in attempting to gather intellectuals and cultural figures from 
all over the world and forcing upon them a Soviet definition of peace after the war. Ultimately, 
it allowed the Soviet Union to consolidate a portion of intellectuals for its own propaganda 
cause while alienating several Western figures, namely from America and Great Britain.  
The Congress was officially proposed by Polish communist activist and writer, chief of 
the communist press and publishing syndicate, Jerzy Boresza, who with other Polish activists 
and politicians saw it as an opportunity to strengthen ties with the West.141 However, any 
notions of the conference being neutral were dispelled. At the beginning of the meeting a short 
letter by Albert Einstein to the congress was read out which omitted a call for the creation of a 
global body to oversee the development of atomic energy. The initial friendly climate changed 
dramatically after the chairman of the Soviet delegation Alexander Fadeev, who sharply 
attacked US policy, proclaimed among other things that "The shackles of US imperialists have 
turned the world into a police precinct and its people into slaves of capital".142 Criticising 
writers who in his opinion had betrayed the proletariat, Fadeev said: "If the jackals could learn 
typing, if hyenas knew how to wield a pen, what would come out would certainly resemble 
books by Miller, Elliot, Malraux, and Sartre" (all prominent Leftists in the West who were 
critical of Soviet human rights abuses).143  Responding to Fadeev’s speech, which caused 
consternation among part of the delegates, the prominent British historian, Alan J.P. Taylor, 
responded: "The task of intellectuals is to preach tolerance and harmony rather than hatred. 
And here is proclaimed a war, not peace. Comparing American democracy with fascism is 
unacceptable."144 The atmosphere at the congress became increasingly unpleasant. In view of 
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this situation, some of the participants of the congress, among them Julian Huxley (then 
director of UNESCO) and Alan J.P. Taylor, left the meeting.  
Despite these walkouts, the Soviets were successful in imposing their definition of 
peace on other Western figures. At the end of the conference the Soviets pushed through a 
resolution to defend world peace which stated that “The culture of humanity was saved from 
fascist barbarism by the democratic forces of the Soviet Union and the nations of the United 
Kingdom and the United States. However, contrary to the wishes and desires of the peoples of 
the world a handful of greedy people in America and Europe who have inherited the fascist 
idea of racial superiority and the negation of progress…are planning the assassination of the 
spiritual heritage of peoples of the world."145 The various delegations voted for the adoption of 
the text first among themselves with Argentina, Belgium, France and Poland all in favour. 
Upon the US and British delegations fell a deep silence. Yet only 11 delegates voted against: 
7 out of 32 from the US, and 4 out of 32 from Britain.146  
From the Soviet perspective, this was a victory. The Soviet delegations managed to 
shape the agenda of the conference, effectively overtaking those who could obstruct the Soviet 
definition of ‘peace’ and ‘warmongers’. The congress was part of Stalin’s aim of slowing down 
the development of the nuclear weaponry by the West at a time when the USSR was still a year 
away from obtaining its own. The aim of the congress was to influence world public opinion, 
portraying the communist powers as supporters of peace, and the West as a threat to it. The 
timing of the congress also coincided with another international event in Wroclaw, the 
Exhibition of the Regained Territories, which was used by Polish propaganda to justify the 
territorial changes of Poland after World War II and the securing of the so-called Regained 
Territories. Together, the congress and the exhibition aimed to convince the world that the 
border change was beneficial to Europe and world peace, which was part of the Soviets general 
aim of consolidating the Soviet Bloc as a buffer zone.  
Besides the standard barrage of anti-Americanism, the World Congress of Intellectuals 
was noteworthy for calling on the establishment of national branches and electing a Standing 
Committee with headquarters in Paris. The French capital would have a lasting impact on the 
Soviet peace campaign. Intended as a secure location for communist-backed organisations, 
with the Standing Committee surrounded by a network of communist-front organisations such 
as World Federation of Trade Unions, World Federation of Democratic Women, World 
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Federation of Democratic Youth, and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, 
the choice of location proved to be a mistake.  
The Congress of Intellectuals was important for another reason: it called for a Scientific 
and Cultural Conference for World Peace to take place in New York from March 25-27. 
Nominally organised by the communist-backed National Council of Arts, Sciences, and 
Professions (a descendant of the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, 
Sciences, and Professions which was founded by Louis F. Budenz, former managing editor of 
the Daily Worker – a Comintern-backed Communist Party USA publication – and was 
repudiated in 1946 by Harold L. Ickes, its chairman, because of its communist character), the 
aim of the conference was to test out the peace campaign abroad in order to use its template for 
the World Peace Congress to be held in Paris the following month. As a propaganda campaign, 
the conference failed spectacularly. The Conference was attacked by civic organisations. 
Outside of the Waldorf Astoria, where the conference was being held, demonstrators organised 
by the American Legion, Catholic and patriotic groups harassed the attendees, most notably 
the cream of the US cultural elites such as Lillian Hellman, Clifford Odets, Leonard Bernstein 
and Dashiel Hammett. Arthur Miller recounted how “… every entrance would be blocked by 
a line of praying nuns for the souls of the participants, who had been deranged by Satanic 
seduction”.147  
The legitimacy of the conference was further damaged by Vladimir Nabokov’s 
participation (as part of the CIA’s effort to disrupt the conference). Nabokov managed to 
humiliate Shostakovich by asking him if he agreed with Pravda’s call for the ban on the music 
of Paul Hindemith, Arnold Schoenberg and Igor Stravinsky in the Soviet Union on the grounds 
of “decadent bourgeois formalism”. Shostakovich, taken aback and pale, was only able to 
answer after ‘consultation’ from a KGB apparatchik that he “…fully agree(d) with the 
statements made in Pravda”.148 
Timing was crucial: the first World Peace Congress was planned more than three 
months before the Scientific and Cultural Conference. The disaster of that conference had 
several ramifications. Firstly, the Soviets stepped back from relying on visibly communist 
organisations. The negative press surrounding the Scientific and Cultural Conference made the 
Soviet leadership determined to draw in as many non-communist participants as possible in 
order to off-set the communist element of the campaign. However, the ‘peace campaign’ 
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became more centralised. From 1947 until the Scientific and Cultural Conference in March 
1947, the operation was in the hands of the Cominform. By contrast, the Central Committee 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took direct control of organising first World Peace 
Congress, as this ratified resolution from January 6th makes clear: 
 
“1) With the aim of mobilizing forces which stand for peace and checking the war 
mongers it is considered imperative that a World Congress of peace supporters and 
representatives of democratic organizations convene in Paris (or Geneva) in February-
March 1949. In the event of difficulties in organizing the Congress in Paris (or Geneva) 
it is possible to convene the Congress in Warsaw or Prague. 
2) Take steps to ensure that as many representative of democratic organizations as 
possible (i.e. trade unions, youth organizations, women’s organizations, peasants’ 
organizations, cooperatives, religious organizations, cultural organizations, journalist 
organizations, academic organizations, writers’ organizations, artistic organizations, 
representative of parliamentary groups) take part in the Congress. 
3) The initiator of the Congress should be the International Liaison Committee, which 
should be elected at the Congress of Culture (in Wroclaw) jointly with the International 
Women’s Committee, Committee of Democratic Youth, and other organizations. 
4) It is imperative that the Congress passes a special resolution on the establishment of 
a Peace Committee or a similar type organization.  
5) Earmark $75,000-100,000 for the convening of the Congress.”149 
 
Yet despite these circumspect directives, the preparatory committee responsible for 
organising the Congress came to a standstill almost immediately. In February 1949, the French 
government launched an investigation of the French Communist Party, accusing it of 
intelligence gathering for the USSR. The Interior Ministry arrested 4 French communists who 
worked as representatives for the Soviet Information Bureau. By March 15th the visas for Soviet 
delegates to the preparatory committee expired. The French Government came under pressure 
from ‘progressive intellectuals’ to extend the visas for Soviet delegates. By this time the Soviets 
were under siege. During preparation, the Soviets were convinced that the French Government 
had attempted to derail the event by getting “reactionary pacifists”, “revolutionary pacifists” 
                                                          




“revolutionary-democrats” involved. While the Soviets were desperate to get non-communists 
involved they had their boundaries. They were approached by the French Federation of Youth 
and a certain ‘G. Davison’ who came to Paris and demanded to be part of the congress to voice 
his manifesto. The French press hyped up Davison’s movement and he demanded that visas be 
given to all delegates.  
Another, more pressing problem emerged within the preparatory committee. The head 
of the Polish delegation, Jerzy Borejsza (head of the giant publishing house Czytelnik (Reader) 
and one of the organisers of the Wroclaw meeting in August 1948), came into conflict with the 
Soviet and French delegates. The writer Louis Aragon had caused a headache for the Soviets 
by hyping up the importance of the congress in the press, which had only made the French 
authorities suspicious that the whole affair was a Soviet intelligence gathering mission. In order 
to downplay the French media’s negative image of the upcoming Congress and allay the fears 
of the French Foreign Ministry, Borejsza gave an interview in which he downplayed the 
importance of the upcoming congress, seeing no real outcomes from it and, in his opinion, the 
French authorities should give everyone a visa to attend the congress in Paris.150 
The problems with the French authorities meant that many delegates were refused visas 
into the country. As a result, the first World Peace Congress took place simultaneously in Paris 
and Prague. It established a World Committee of Partisans for Peace, led by a twelve-person 
Executive Bureau and chaired by Professor Frédéric Joliot-Curie, a Nobel Prize-winning 
physicist, High Commissioner for Atomic Energy and member of the French Academy of 
Science. Most of the Executives were communists (including Joliot-Curie himself). The 
Bureau of the World Peace Congress also included 10 Vice-Chairmen, the Secretary General 
Jean Laffitte and other 7 secretaries, who were in charge of operational work, including 
Palamedes Borsari (Brazil), Reverand John W. Darr (USA), Zhilberd De Chambray (France), 
Amy Xiao (China, later replaced by Li Yi-Mann), Fenoaltea Giorgio (Italy), Guliaev (USSR) 
and Ivor Montagu (England, later replaced by Roy Gorham). Laffitte lead the Secretariat, the 
apparatus in Prague and the French Peace Council, while Guliaev led the organisational work 
of the Secretariat and coordinated work with the Peace Committees of Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland and Belgium. Roy Gorham was engaged in the national Peace Committees of 
England, USA, Canada and Australia, while Lee Yi-Man was engaged with the socialist 
countries of Asia and Southeast Asia. Within the Secretariat, five members of the WPC also 
worked. These were preoccupied with ties with Latin America, international organisations 
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working for peace, cultural exchanges and celebration of great anniversaries, propaganda and 
information, as well as an editorial committee, which produced a variety of newsletters. In 
addition, within the apparatus of the Secretariat worked 60 people from the Soviet Union, 
China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, England, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Brazil, and 
Syria. From November 1950 to December 1953, 5 WPC sessions were held and between them 
many Bureau meetings. At each session of the World Peace Congress by-elections for the WPC 
were held, so that by the end of 1953 it consisted of 440 people.151 
The congress was widely publicised in the Soviet Bloc, with the official organ of the 
Cominform, For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, ‘welcoming’ the Paris Peace 
Congress in its March 1949 issue.152 Yet the proceedings of the congress demonstrated just 
how narrow the meaning of peace was. During the course of the sessions, the victory of the 
Chinese Communist armies was announced, bringing the assembled ‘peace’ delegates to their 
feet in an outburst of cheering. The delegates were asked if they wanted the Chinese war to 
continue. They answered with a thundering "Yes!" They were asked if they wanted peace now 
in China. They shouted "No!"153  
Officially, the congress was presented as an occasion for all strata of society to converge 
in the name of peace, with the intelligentsia and the workers taking a lead with 719 and 664 
delegates, respectively.154 Yet, as the real numbers demonstrate, the Soviets relied heavily on 
the intelligentsia (e.g. scholars, professors, writers, journalists) and white-collar professionals 
(e.g. engineers, lawyers, doctors), which made up more than two thirds (1034) of the 1556 of 
the delegates. The occupational makeup of the delegates consisted of 193 scholars, 356 workers, 
246 writers and journalists, 140 students, 128 trade unionists, 102 directors of schools and 
teachers, 97 deputies and senators, 84 lawyers, 58 doctors, 51 engineers, 63 theatre directors, 
artists, and musicians, 26 peasants and 12 farmer labourers.155In reality, the congress reflected 
a curious mix of Soviet strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, the event went smoothly, 
with the typical barrage of speeches and resolutions condemning the Americans and praising 
the Soviets. This was mostly due to the firm grip the Soviet had in deciding the political 
composition of the congress: communists – 1205 (59%), socialists – 189 (9.5%), liberal-
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democrats – 274 (13.1%), Christian democrats and religious members - 75 (2.5%), and 
members of bourgeoisie parties – 14 (0.6%). 156 
On the other hand, the congress highlighted the lack of legitimacy of the peace 
campaign in the West. As indicative of the national make-up of the congress, the campaign 
failed to attract non-communists. France had the biggest delegation – 610 delegates, with 482 
communists, Italy contributed 459 delegates of whom 256 were communists, while of the 262 
English delegates, 162 were communists. In essence, the congress failed to make the 
propaganda breakthrough in the West and became an occasion for preaching to the converted. 
In terms of alliance-building, the congress found the Soviets at a dead-end. Failing to 
substantially expand their base beyond the communists of Italy, France and the UK, the Soviets 
would find themselves oftentimes (over)reliant on these groups to carry out the peace campaign 
in the West. However, reliance on their communist counterparts did not always ensure success. 
Communists and communist-affiliated groups in the West were marred by various internal 
problems and faced suspicious governments and masses, which were, at best, indifferent to the 
Soviet call for peace. For the Soviets and their counterparts, a point of contention was whether 
the movement should adopt more of a grass-roots approach to leadership, one that allowed for 
spontaneous initiatives or continue with a centralised, bureaucratic leadership where nothing 
happened until it was approved by the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council. From the Soviet 
perspective, spontaneity was needed to give the movement a sense of scale and national 
participation. On the other hand, to be effective, the movement needed tight organisation and 
planning. The Soviets had to contend with many communists in the West who were not in 
agreement with the Soviet organisational framework or even the Soviet priorities.  
Ahead of the plenary session of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress 
in Stockholm in March 1950, the Soviets were determined that left-leaning organisations play 
a part in the signature-collecting campaign in what would become the Stockholm Appeal. This 
called for an unconditional ban on nuclear weapons and the establishing of strict international 
controls in overseeing it. It would be received coldly by the Western press and governments, 
but for the time being it was essential to gain grass-root support. 
Tensions between the Soviets and their Western counterparts arose between March 15th 
and 19th, 1950 during a Stockholm session of the Permanent Committee of the WPC on the 
effects of Soviet control of the movement. Soviet control of the movement meant that the WPC 
was slow to defend itself against accusations of Soviet control in the Western press. During the 




session, the Italian communist senator, Emilio Sereni, General Secretary of the Italian Peace 
Committee, insisted that “we have to talk about the autonomous nature of our Movement”.157 
Sereni’s enthusiasm and sincerity betrayed a certain naivety characteristic of Western leftists 
at the time on how mass persuasion worked in the real world. Sereni passionately argued that 
“without a doubt, the communists played the biggest part in the beginnings of our Movement. 
I too am a Communist and feel no need to hide this. Admittedly, our movement did not emerge 
spontaneously, but the atomic bomb, as far as I know, did not emerge spontaneously either.” 
Yet within the same speech Sereni warned that within the movement there are those who would 
not agree with “what has been said by some here that they would want to in ‘a Stalinist 
world’”.158  Sereni suggested the movement avoid such expressions “not as a question of 
formality… [or] a political stunt… [but] as a practical question” so that “dozens of millions 
can joins us”.159 Sereni and other Western leftists in their push towards making the movement 
more transparent in its political affiliations did not understand that for the Western press it was 
easy to equate communism with Stalinism. As the Soviets understood it, it was much more 
effective to attract people by disassociating the Soviet Union from its own campaigns rather 
that putting out public statements in a vain attempt to persuade people of the movement’s 
political autonomy. In reality, the movement had to establish links with (and within) the trade 
unions to gain grassroots support for its campaign, which was not always guaranteed.  
The level of control at the top and attempted manipulation at the grassroots level was 
evident with the Stockholm Appeal. In preparation for the 15-19 March session in Stockholm, 
the Soviet delegation held a prior meeting with Jolie Curie, Jean Laffitte, Laurent Casanova 
and Emilio Sereni since “it was essential for the Soviet committee to take a number of measures 
in order to ensure that the work of the session goes smoothly”.160 They discussed the order of 
the work to be undertaken at the session. During the meeting Jolie Curie and Jean Laffittee laid 
out their positions in the speeches that they would be making at the session. It was decided that 
Jolie Curies would propose during the session the “urgency of declaring that government which 
initiates a first-strike attach against any other nation as criminal”161. The Stockholm Appeal 
was essentially instigated by the Soviet Union. 
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The Italian Communist Party provides a vivid example of the Soviet method of 
backroom dealings for the Stockholm Appeal at the grassroots level. At the 22nd Congress of 
Italian National League of Cooperatives held in Florence on 15-25 December 1949, the Italian 
Left were more than willing to show that they were ready for negotiations. According to a 
report by the head of the Soviet delegations, the Chair of the Revision Committee of 
Tsentrosoyuz, the socialist D. Timofeev, proclaimed that “One of the main objectives of the 
League is to protest against contracts which have military goals. As we fought for the liberation 
of our country from fascism and military oppression we now too must fight for peace in the 
whole world and for the unity of the Democratic Cooperative Movement.”162 The member of 
the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, Novallo, put it more 
bluntly: “It is urgent that there be unity and solidarity between workers, unions, and cooperative 
organizations in the struggle for peace.”163  
Not coincidentally, the congress took place during Stalin’s 70th birthday. Accordingly, 
Stalin’s ‘politics of peace’ was praised and a meeting among city residents of Florence was 
organised by the Italian Communist Party, which was attended by the Soviet delegation of 
cooperatives. Fadeev’s report paints a rather bombastic picture of the event:  
 
“A massive hall of the palace where the meeting took place was overflowing 
with workers, artisans, the intelligentsia and the members of their families. Many 
women brought their children along. All aisles were also filled with attendees. With a 
paper on the life of comrade Stalin, a member of CC of the Italian Communist Party, 
President of the National Cooperative League, Senator, G. Cheretti, was constantly met 
by stormy ovations […]  
When it was announced that a member of the Soviet delegation would give a 
speech it was met with wild ovation. Even before the Italian translation was read to the 
crowd every mention of the names ‘Stalin’ and ‘Togliatti’ was met with wild applause. 
With the words ‘Soviet people believe that blood spilled by the Italian people will not 
be in vain, but will serve to foster the Italian Peace Movement against the war mongers’ 
the crowd stood up. By the end of the meeting dozens of hands were reaching with 
handshakes to the Soviet delegation to greet all of the Soviet people.”164 
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What the report did not mention was that during their stay, the Soviet delegation were 
approached by Senator Cheretti to request that Tsentrosoyuz donate a ‘gift’ of 30 tractors to 
the Agricultural Cooperative of South Italy and Sicily. As it happened, the Agricultural 
Cooperatives of South Italy and Sicily up until then had refused to buy tractors, since the Italian 
government was forcing them to buy American tractors. Seizing the opportunity, Tsentrosoyuz 
asked the Central Committee to endow them with 30 tractors that they could give as a ‘gift’. 
The Italians received 20.165  
Getting Cheretti for the Soviet campaign was crucial. In Helsinki, between August 14th 
to 18th, 1950, a session of the Executive and Central Committee of the International 
Cooperative Alliance (ICA) was to take place, bringing the national cooperatives of all 
countries together. As a return for the ‘gift’, Cheretti coordinated his work with Soviet 
delegates, whose directives included “putting forward a proposal for the ICA to intensify 
efforts in the struggle for peace and for the CC of the ICA to approve the Stockholm Appeal” 
and to have the “CC of the ICA call on the main union cooperatives of all nations to send their 
representatives to the Second World Peace Congress”. This was a rather peculiar order of 
priorities, if one considers that, in principle, the cooperative movement’s main objective was 
to safeguard worker’s rights, not engage in a peace campaign.166 Cheretti performed his part 
by defending the Soviet Bloc countries’ participation in the ICA (and in effect legitimising the 
Soviet cause) by criticising those who claimed that the “cooperative movement in the countries 
of People’s Democracies (strany narodnoi demokratii) was under pressure”.  
However, Cheretti’s support was not enough to legitimise the Stockholm Appeal for 
the countries participating in the ICA. With the Swedish delegates particularly vocal against 
the Stockholm Appeal’s dubious wording on banning only atomic weapons, only 25 countries 
voted in favour of it. Thirty-seven were against it, putting the supporters of the Soviet proposal 
in a minority. The reception to the Stockholm Appeal was indeed cold. The head of the Soviet 
delegation, Alexander Fadeev (Vice-President of the Standing Committee of the World Peace 
Congress and Secretary General of the Union of Soviet Writers), bitterly complained that the 
“the Swedish press and radio (excluding the progressive press) were completely silent on the 
work of the session... The press and radio did all they could to hush up the session 
proceedings.”167 Such a reception was understandable given the inconsistent tone of the Soviet 
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peace campaign at the time. While one Soviet organ would preach the banning of nuclear 
weapons, another would praise them – and both in the name of peace! Just five months before 
the launch of the Stockholm Appeal in March 1950 Mikhail Suslov, Secretary of the CC 
responsible for international affairs, gave the speech, ‘Defence of Peace and the struggle 
against the war mongers’, at the third Cominform conference in November 1949. The timing 
was crucial, since three weeks earlier the Soviet news bureau TASS had officially confirmed 
that the Soviet Union had succeeded in building its own atomic bomb. Suslov’s speech was 
unabashed in its support of the Soviet Union having the atomic bomb and on the militant 
attitude of the peace campaign: 
 
“TASS’s report has caused embarrassment and confusion within the camp of 
imperialists and war mongers, weakened its strength, and delivered a shattering blow 
to Truman’s and Churchill’s ‘atomic diplomacy’. They built their hopes on the 
monopoly of the atomic bomb and on blackmailing nervous people with this weapon. 
At the same time, all defenders of peace are welcoming the Soviet Union’s possession 
of the atomic bomb as victory for peace since they know that the Soviet authorities stay 
true to their political beliefs and, irrespective of them possessing the weapon, and by 
their old position of unconditionally banning atomic weapons […] 
From the fact that the anti-democratic imperialist camp has weakened one 
cannot also conclude that threat of war has also lessened. They would be deeply 
mistaken. History teaches that the more insecure imperialists are the more enraged they 
become, increasing the chances of military adventurism on their part.” 168 
 
Suslov’s speech demonstrated that the Soviet peace campaign had yet to formulate a 
coherent rhetoric and organise internally. Judging by the hostile reception of the West toward 
it was not surprising that by the second half of 1950 the initiative for the campaign had moved 
away from the militancy of the Cominform towards the more (gradually) cautious line of the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry. By no means did this entail the loosening of the Soviet control over 
overseas operations. 
This also reflected the movement’s fortunes in attracting the masses. A top-secret 
comprehensive analytical survey was prepared in March 1950 by the Soviet Embassy in France 
on the movement’s situation. In France, local peace committees had Christian democrats as 
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majorities, which was a problem since it required formulating a mutual language to build trust 
and cooperation. In Italy, the movement found itself at a dead-end, as it failed to gain ground 
outside of the major urban areas. It was the traditional supporters of leftist politics, such as the 
intelligentsia and artists, and working class people, such as dockers, sailors and railway 
workers, whom the movement managed to attract. Yet even among these groups the support 
was not as great as was hoped since “in 1949, during the formation of the French delegation to 
Moscow all liberal figures, under various pretexts, turned down invitations to go to 
Moscow”.169 However, the report also highlighted that the Soviet understanding of success did 
not always have to do with mass membership, but the level of control they were able to exert 
on national peace committees. In Norway, for example, the movement was deemed to be in 
trouble not because of mass indifference but because it was connected to the opposition which 
arose within the Norwegian Communist Party. The head of the opposition became the Secretary 
of the Committee, Tedemond Johansson, a close friend of Peder Furubotn, who had been 
expelled from the Norwegian Communist Party in 1949 on charges of nationalism and Titoism. 
The report concluded rather conspiratorially that “in fulfilling the wishes of Furubotn he 
[Johansson] did everything possible to divide the Committee”.170  
The report did manage to highlight some success and a faint glimmer of hope. American 
communists, who had yet to see any success, were recommended to “establish an organ with 
mass representation” since “progressive trade unions, women, youth, and a few religious 
organizations make up a serious base for the establishment of mass organizations for 
Americans in the defence of peace”. There was some success in smaller countries such as 
Belgium, where in some regions 50-90% of the population signed the Stockholm Appeal, and 
in Western Germany, where within 4-5 months of establishing the German Peace Committee, 
30 organisations joined it. 
What was perhaps puzzling was that given the highly detailed nature of these reports, 
why the Soviets pursued policies that brought little success. Even more so, those at the top, 
such as Molotov, actively and successfully campaigned to steer the movement to be more 
flexible. A decree on the ‘Measure to be taken to further expand the Peace Movement’ 
practically reflected the conclusions reached by reports: “Significant shortages, which impede 
the growth of the Peace Movement, still remain a tight noose around national committees. 
Oftentimes the Movement exhibits almost purely party-oriented inclinations, barely attracting 
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any non-communist figures or organizations who potentially can become members of the 
Movement. Within the Movement’s leading cadres, the Permanent Committee and the Bureau 
of the WPC being among them, the Communists dominate, with only a small number of 
representatives of other political and non-political leanings. Consequently, many public figures 
– that is, academics, artists, as well as those belonging to trade unions, athletic, cooperative, 
cultural, and other organizations – which could be part of the Peace Movement have chosen to 
stay away from it”. 
 A July 1950 briefing on the Swedish peace movement exemplified this. The report 
pointed out that the peace movement was completely under communist control and that social 
democrats did not take part in it. However the report also conceded that “the Communist Party 
in leading the Peace Movement in Sweden has bad relations with the intelligentsia and attempts 
to recruit the intelligentsia into the Movement were not met with success”. It turned out, for 
example, that despite the very fact that it was in Stockholm where the Appeal had passed, in 
Sweden itself no work was undertaken to collect signatures and the communist press did not 
publish anything on the struggle for peace. The fact of the matter was that the signature 
campaign was and remained “an undertaking beyond the strength of the small-numbered and 
weak Swedish Peace Committees”.  
The Swedish Peace Committee’s weakness was attributed to its staff. The Chairman of 
the Committee, Eva Paimer, was the wife of Gustav Johansson, executive editor of the main 
communist paper in Sweden, Ny Dag. According to the report, she “lacked ability, 
organizational talent, and authority”, while the Committee Secretary and communist, Per-Olov 
Zennström “treated the intelligentsia with weak nerves and bad organizational ability”171. Of 
the 36 members of the committee, “many are only nominal members and don’t conduct any 
work.”172 Besides this, there were many among them who came out against the USSR, with 
one member proposing to establish “a socialist party in Sweden independent of Moscow and 
modelled on the party of Tito”.  
It would later be revealed that out of the purported 500 million signatures, only 
50,706,000 was from the West and out of those, France and Italy, the two biggest pro-
communist countries in Western Europe, accounted for 23,000,000 million signatures leaving 
27,706,000 for the rest of Western Europe, all of the countries of the Americas and Asia.173  
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The Soviet response to problems facing its movement was multi-faceted. It consisted 
of control and manipulation, intrigue and rebranding: funding and Soviet agents was used to 
gain dominance of various Soviet-fronted organisations in the West and constant double-
dealing and conspiracies were used to purge the movement of those who were not in line with 
the Soviet conception of peace. It was apparent by 1951 that working through communist and 
communist-fronted organisations was ineffective in gaining mass support in the West. In order 
to expand the base of the peace campaign, the Soviets would not only have to work with the 
communist parties of the West, but through them. In order to draw in non-communist 
individuals and organisations, the Soviet leadership used the Soviet delegates as a go-between 
with communists in the West.  
Since the first World Peace Congress in Paris and Prague, there had been deliberations 
regarding tens of millions of francs for propaganda materials, travel abroad and publishing. 
Expenses for the congress amounted to 31 million francs ($100,000), while the proposed Peace 
Awards were estimated to cost 15 million francs. Distribution of peace-themed films and 
publishing materials from the congress both amounted to one million francs each, while the 
work of the committee (including accommodation, transportation and staff salary) cost 3 
million francs and a bi-weekly monthly journal 30 million francs per year.174 The fact that the 
national peace committees in the West were unable to raise such funds only highlighted their 
dependence on the Soviet Union and its satellites for funding and, in turn, reinforced Soviet 
infiltration and control of all the important committees associated with the peace movement. 
The Kremlin was not only able to get its people into the Standing Committee, but also within 
the committee’s inner workings. That is how the editorial board of the journal Peace Defenders 
was sent a Soviet representative (an agent by the name of Trishin), who sent back reports to 
the Soviet leadership on the development of the journal. Yet it was Molotov’s involvement 
which demonstrated the Soviet grip on Soviet-backed publications in the West. 
Initially, no consensus existed as to what the general tone of the Soviet-backed journals 
should be. The Soviets knew less of what they wanted than what they did not want, namely 
religious and pacifist groups whose conception of peace clashed with their own. For instance, 
the Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, Nikolai Tikhonov, writing to V. Grigorian 
(Chairman of the Foreign Committee of the Central Committee), complained that “the journal 
Peace Supporters is wholly inadequate to become a genuine, militant, purposeful organ of the 
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world peace Movement. Many of the publications of the journal bear the marks of pacifism.” 
175 Tikhonov had envisioned a more confrontational, straightforward and uncompromising take 
on the ‘struggle for peace’, warning that the “publications in the journal could (mis)lead readers 
into overestimating the strength of imperialism. What could potentially arise for the reader of 
the journal is not a spirit of the struggle against the war mongers but instead a fear of them.”176 
 Yet it was Molotov who took the initiative to tone down the militancy of the journals 
in order to appeal to a broad spectrum of people. The change was apparent following the 
Stockholm Appeal when Soviet-backed publications were in full-swing promoting the Appeal. 
In a letter to Molotov, Grigorian had suggested that the French edition of the journal Peace 
Supporters should publish the Standing Committee’s appeal and have it accompanied by an 
editorial note.177 Molotov was presented with drafts of the editorial note, since according to 
Grigorian the original French text was ‘unacceptable’.178 Comparison between the original 
French text and Molotov’s edits demonstrate a willingness to move away from the abrasive 
tone of the original, which branded those who did not sign the appeal as warmongers: 
The following is the French draft of the editorial note: 
 
“It is imperative to call upon every man and woman - irrespective of political and 
religious views, occupation and social status – to give their signatures to the Stockholm 
Appeal. It should be demanded of every single person who has not signed the Appeal 
to explain themselves and be shown that by refusing to do so they side with the enemies 
of peace. Anyone who has a heart and a conscience should sign the Appeal, since it is 
aimed at ridding humanity of deprivation and death.” 179 
 
The following is Molotov’s edited version: 
 
“Ladies and Gentlemen, to those of you who have signed the Appeal! Ask your 
elected members of parliament, city councillor, heads of the trade unions, peasant, 
artisan and other public organizations which you are member of to sign up to the Appeal.  
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Try to get a public explanation from those who refuse to sign this Appeal for 
peace and security for all nations! 
Ladies and Gentlemen, all young people, with no exception, give your 
signatures to the Stockholm Appeal in the defence of peace!”180  
 
Molotov was equally adamant refashioning another journal, Peace. This journal was 
published until the formation of the World Peace Council (prior the World Peace Council, the 
Standing Committee of World Congress of Peace published the journal Peace Supporters). 
When the World Peace Council was established, the Soviet delegation suggested that the 
journal be renamed Struggle for Peace, but was met with opposition from the other delegates. 
Molotov was against the idea, while Fadeev, in a letter to Stalin, suggested that the Soviet 
delegation drop the matter, since “naming the journal Struggle for Peace turns it into an openly 
communist title, since the phrase ‘Struggle for Peace’ is still used by the Communist press in 
Western Europe, America, and the Soviet Union. The title ‘Peace’ is more acceptable to non-
communists who are involved in the peace campaign.”181 In the end, the journal was re-titled 
In Defence of Peace as a compromise. This was an indication that the Soviet leadership, in 
particular Molotov, were becoming aware of Western public perception of the peace movement, 
which created tension with their Western counterparts who did not necessarily appreciate the 
Soviet strategy of separating the peace movement from communist influence.   
This journal was conceived as a ‘broad platform’ (for diverse political outlooks) to draw 
in non-communist groups from the West. The mission statement of the new editorial board was 
to “build a bridge between two worlds – the West and East. If we acknowledge the possibility 
of peaceful existence, then we must demonstrate this by initiating free discussions between the 
two existing systems”.182 
Yet these compromises were not the only ones that the editorial board found themselves 
having to make, as lack of readership that had plagued Peace Supporters was now evident with 
In Defence of Peace. Problems with the journal’s lack of appeal to the target audience were 
apparent. Tikhonov and Ehrenburg not only constantly complained to the CC that the quality 
of the content in the journal was of an “extremely low standard”, but also proposed quite a 
radical solution. Since national peace committees were allowed to alter a quarter of the content 
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of each issue (i.e. editing out portions of the content and replacing it with something else) 
Tikhonov and Ehrenburg not only proposed to allow just 1 or 2 articles intended for the target 
audience of each particular country, but have completely different content for each country, 
since they understood that the target audience of France, for example, differed to that of Poland.  
The proposal did not come into fruition. Molotov rejected it, not out of fear that such 
decentralisation would undermine Soviet control, but out of pragmatism. In reply to 
Ehrenburg’s and Tikhonov’s letter, Molotov asks as to “who will write it?” - implying the lack 
of people for such a massive undertaking.183 Despite all the effort, the journal was a financial 
liability. As the organ of the World Peace Congress, it was published in France, the Soviet 
Union, China, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Australia and Algeria. The 
French edition of the journal was the costliest and by August 1951 was on the verge of closure, 
requiring 18 million francs (most of which had to go towards covering expenses for the issues 
that had been printed but had not been sold). Having completely covered the expenses for 
printing the journal in capitalist countries, the peace campaign was overstretched and in 
complete financial chaos. Consequently, the 18 million francs had “to be paid by us (the 
Soviets), since $15,000 that are to be invested by national peace committees of the GDR, 
Romania, China, Poland and Bulgaria towards reprinting their own versions of the journal will 
now entirely go towards printing a Swedish version of the journal.”184 In reaction to the dire 
financial situation, the Soviets requested that all nation members “directly address the financial 
(situation) of the journal through the Soviet representative to the editorial board, comrade 
Efimov, instead of the World Peace Congress”.185 
Paradoxically, Soviet (over)funding was a source of the campaign’s weakness. By 
attempting to cover the expenses of printing the journal in as many countries as possible, the 
quality of the content had significantly deteriorated and the journal was unable to properly 
target the intended audiences. It was not surprising, therefore, that by the end of 1951, the 
Soviets, already burdened by the situation in Europe, considered publishing a Mexican version 
of the journal as sufficient to target the whole of Latin America and a single version in Arabic 
to target Algeria, Egypt and the Lebanon.186 And yet this (over)funding had its own logic: it 
allowed the Soviets to have a tight grip on other national peace committees that they deemed 
as stepping out of line.  
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And this was part of the problem: for a magazine that was meant to considerably 
distinguish itself from other Soviet propaganda it took the same approach of Soviet 
centralisation, censorship and content as Cominform propaganda. Two years prior to the World 
Peace Congress’ launching of Peace Defenders in 1949, the journal For a Lasting Peace. For 
a People’s Democracy! was established at the Cominform’s first meeting in September 
1947.187  Before publication, each issue of this journal was sent personally to Stalin and 
Molotov in Moscow to be censored. Pavel Yudin, the Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosopher, 
politician and academic, as head of the journal from 1947 to 1950, at times would have 
corrections dictated from Moscow.188 The target audience for the journal was not the average 
communist party member or the interested non-communist, but rather the functionaries of the 
international communist movement, as a training and propaganda guide for party members, for 
activists. The journal employed ideological clichés and focused mainly on the achievements of 
communist-controlled countries such as collectivisation, industrialisation and party discipline 
and to assert the principal themes of anti-Western and anti-Titoist campaigns and the ‘struggle 
for peace’189.  
The magazine Peace Supporters proved to be more a battleground for the Soviets to 
vent their frustration at the British Peace Committee. A scathing article attacking the British 
Peace Committee was published in the February 1950 issue criticising it for its sluggishness 
and defeatist attitudes. The following month at the Stockholm session of the Permanent 
Committee of the WPC, British Peace Committee Chairman J.G. Crowther expressed rather 
understatedly that "our committee was not quite satisfied with the form of criticism contained 
in an editorial”. Despite ideological solidarity with the Soviet Union, the openly critical nature 
of the article highlighted a clash of different institutional cultures between the members of the 
movement. As Crowther argued, “in England it is the custom that when someone intends to 
make a public criticism, he sends the person who is being criticized their comments prior to 
publication so that misunderstandings can be resolved before the critical statement is released 
to the press. In our case this was not afforded to us.”190 Crowther acerbically argued that since 
“this criticism is out in the open, our committee is looking forward to…publish a 
response…where we would have stated some critical comments on the Secretariat of the 
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Permanent Committee in regard to the situation of countries where the peace Movement is 
underdeveloped.”191 
Instead of helping to foster a united front, Peace Supporters only dredged up unresolved 
issues that the movement had not up to then been able to resolve through official channels. 
What was meant to be a launching of the Stockholm Appeal broke down into mutual mud-
slinging and humiliation. In a retort to Crowther, Secretary General of WPC, Jean Laffite, 
commented that “our friends in England” had been “cautioned for their wait-and-see concept”, 
which was fostered because of “isolation…for the sake of formality, and not for the sake 
action”.192 In other words, the British Peace Committee members were reluctant to be more 
active and engage with the masses not because of “the perception that people do not believe in 
the threat of war” but simply due to an “underestimation of their own forces”.193  
Tensions between the Soviets and the British would linger on for the rest of the year, 
as the British continued to demand change in how the magazine was written. At a meeting of 
the Bureau of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress in mid-August, British 
delegate and biochemist, Norman Pierre, argued that while the materials used for the Peace 
Supporters were “acceptable for conscious Polish and French readers are absolutely 
unthinkable for the British”. Accordingly, Britain needed its own content for the magazine to 
appeal to the British public. Pierre maintained that the “Peace Movement wanted to catch any 
fish on one and the same bait”194. Instead, as Pierre argued, “the Bureau should have been 
examining more deeply the intellectual environment in which the 'fish' in question is living in, 
and must use the literary 'bait' which will more likely bring success”.195 
 The scandal with the British Peace Committee also underlined a certain strategic 
dilemma for the Soviets: having near total financial control of the movement and its press 
meant that the movement’s propaganda was ineffective in mass persuasion since it was unable 
to use the ‘literary bait’ of each country. The Soviets chose financial control and ineffective 
propaganda over a potentially autonomous movement even if it potentially entailed more 
effective propaganda. The World Peace Council had been attempting since early 1950 to 
establish a funding system for the movement. In a letter to the Chairman of the Soviet Peace 
Committee, Nikolai Tikhonov, the Secretary General of the WPC, Jean Laffite, outlined a 
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method by which financial contributions were to be made. This consisted of 
"contributions…assigned depending on the size of the organization in each country and the 
contribution it has made to the international Peace Movement”.196 This was based on the 
amount of signatures collected for the Stockholm Appeal and an appeal for the conclusion of a 
peace pact between the five great powers, where $1 was donated for every 250 signatures.  
None of this ever amounted to a potential threat to Soviet control over the movement. 
Albania would contribute only $3,500, Bulgaria $23,305, China $98,331, GDR $68,284, 
Hungary $30,100, Poland $ 72,312 and Romania $44,340.197 As Soviet Bloc countries or close 
allies (i.e. China) of the Soviet Union, these countries merely rubber-stamped Soviet initiatives 
within the World Peace Council and posed no threat to Soviet control of the movement. In 
these calculations, the Soviet Union, whose entire adult population supposedly gave their 
signatures to the Stockholm Appeal, unsurprisingly retained its status as the biggest contributor, 
with $153,866, while Western counterparts, such as France and Italy, were to only contribute 
$28,000 and $34,000, respectively.198 It highlighted the financial dependence of the Western 
Peace Committees, their failure to raise funds domestically and Soviet willingness to keep the 
entire peace movement financially afloat in order to keep Western Peace Committees in step 
with Soviet foreign policy.  
 At the Stockholm session of the Standing Committee in March 1950, the French pushed 
the agenda of raising funds not merely for financing the movement but by tying it to the 
movement’s credibility in the eyes of the public. As a French delegate argued, "If it appeal[s] 
to millions of honest people all over the world it becomes a major organizational objective. If 
we succeed in its implementation - and we will achieve this- then the campaign will become a 
goal of the struggle that will determine the very existence of our Movement".199 Yet, the 
Soviets understood perfectly well that their Western counterparts wanted financial 
independence from the Soviet Union and a peace fund would have been the means to do so. 
The Soviet Union gave money to the World Peace Council but a peace fund would have been 
a separate, independent organisation that would raise money around the world, thereby 
providing the World Peace Council its own source of revenue without depending on the Soviet 
Union. The issue was brought up again between May 31st and June 1st 1950 in London at a 
meeting of the Bureau for the Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress where a 
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resolution on the peace fund was passed. Yet this seems to have been overridden by the Soviet-
dominated World Peace Council, since a peace fund would only be allowed to get off the 
ground in 1962. 
This dire financial situation could be explained by the fact that the Soviets assumed that 
they could indefinitely finance the movement as a way of compensating for their tight grip over 
it, despite calls for reform from their Western counterparts. Soviet representatives were caught 
in the middle of this and were often divided as to what approach they should take. As it turned 
out, the Soviet peace activists involved in the peace campaign included a mix of high and low 
ranking Party functionaries; those that were able to acutely observe the internal dynamics of 
the ‘peace’ movement and converse with their foreign counterparts and those who were 
narrower in their objectives. The former would call upon reforms and present the ‘human’ face 
of the Soviet Union, while the latter worked in the background towards gaining as much control 
for the Soviet leadership as possible. In this sense, the hierarchy within the Soviet delegacy 
was completely subverted, as those at the top, such as Fadeev and Ehrenburg, who could write 
directly to Molotov and Stalin, and those lower down the ranks could write only to Grigorian, 
had no noticeable success in persuading the Soviet leadership in democratising the movement. 
This dichotomy was no more so evident than the struggle between Fadeev and Trishin. 
Fadeev envisioned the peace campaign having as many non-communists as possible 
participating fully. From early on he had complained of the dominance of communists in the 
Standing Committee of World Peace Congress. Without the least bit of irony, he described the 
situation to Stalin as: 
 
“The organization of the Secretariat and apparatus of the Standing Committee 
under which only Communists work is wrong. The Secretariat of the Committee 
includes French representatives, Italian representatives, South American 
representatives, and Soviet representatives – all were communists. The Committees 
apparatus is chosen from French communists, mostly among the young people and 
resembles some youth division of the French Communist Party instead of an organ of 
the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress.  
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The selection of staff from the Soviet Union is wrong. With the current staff it 
is clear that none of them are scholars, writers, journalists, or any other active cultural 
figures. Most are mere party functionaries, specifically sent to the Committee.”200 
  
 By the time of the Stockholm session of the Standing Committee of the World Peace 
Congress on 15-19 March 1950, Fadeev had come to the conclusion that “we want to draw into 
our work independent activists, so that they are involved in practical and active work. But we, 
as a Peace Movement, have to give them more freedom so that they would feel they are part of 
our organizations as they do of the other one’s they are in.” 201  Fadeev was especially 
condemnatory of Trishin, who was sent as member of the editorial board of the journal 
Defenders of Peace. Fadeev detected in Trishin “a complete lack of understanding of the 
essence of the peace movement…treats everyone the same irrespective of rank, being chummy 
(po-panibratski) and pompously preaching to foreign delegates”. 202  
Fadeev’s frustrations were understandable. Given the task of recruiting foreign 
intellectuals for the peace campaign, Fadeev saw the lower ranking Party functionaries, such 
as Trishin, undermining his efforts. Given their bureaucratic background and a lack of contact 
with foreigners they did not understand that it was outside of etiquette to complain to high 
ranking Western representatives about trivial matters, such as overspending on food. The 
tensions were indicative of the Soviet balance of attracting prominent Westerns and attempting 
to cut down excessive waste.  
Indeed, Trishin and P.V. Guliaev (a Soviet representative at the WPC Secretariat and 
member of staff at the Foreign Commission of the Central Committee), who had been 
temporarily brought into the Secretariat, were part of the delegacy in order to ensure that Soviet 
orders were implemented. Whether Trishin’s contribution to the journal Peace Defenders was 
questionable is hard to ascertain, but there can be no doubt that he was mainly brought in to 
simply report back on the workings of his Western counterparts. Reporting on the calls of 
others in the Committee for democratisation he concluded that “the Secretariat of the WPC and 
Bureau (were) not in step with peace defenders, are not directing their work. Everything has 
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been reduced to only obtain information on national committees, with no active intermediation 
in their work for peace.”203 
Fadeev recommended that Trishin be called back and replaced with a qualified 
journalist or writer as a member of the editorial board for Defenders of Peace, while Guliaev, 
who was “known all too well as a former member of staff at Comintern” and “judging by his 
personality, is more likely an executor rather a person who sets out an initiative”, should have 
been replaced by “a cultural figure who is already famous within the Peace Movement”, 
desirably “2-3 bourgeois figures from different countries”.204  
Yet Fadeev’s recommendations for re-organising the apparatus of the Standing 
Committee of the World Peace Congress so that it did not have such an open communist 
element were completely ignored. At the Second World Peace Congress the Soviet delegacy 
were met with opposition amongst whole hosts of members in attempting to reform the 
Standing Committee of the World Peace Council. A Standing Committee consisted of a 
Congress with each delegation nominating its own representative, whereas a Peace Council did 
not have this direct representation – the council itself was to be elected and could block the 
delegates. By comparison, the Standing Committee was not elected and resembled a parliament. 
The Soviets wanted a Peace Council, which they would have been able to easily manipulate, 
since national delegates would have no control over it. Despite opposition, the reforms were 
passed at the second World Peace Congress in Warsaw, with 227 people elected to a Peace 
Council.205 However, Fadeev ominously warned that “the opposition ostensibly confirms that 
at this current stage of the Peace Movement, members are not ready to establish such a 
representative body”.206 
The origin of the peace campaign was rooted in the Soviet response to the Marshall 
Plan through the consolidation of Eastern Europe as a security buffer. As such, the major 
element in the consolidation was to contain and direct all European communist parties, and 
especially those in the West, towards the Soviet strategy of politically legitimising the Eastern 
Bloc. The Soviets did not apply an innovative strategy towards organising and mobilising a 
genuinely civic movement in the West. Instead, the old Soviet strategy of using prominent 
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public figures became the overriding pattern from one campaign to another. Yet in the first 
three years the Soviets maintained cohesion to the peace movement. Despite chastising 
Western communist parties, most notably the English, in mobilising their resources to draw in 
as much of the British public as possible, the Soviets did not face any open opposition from 
their Western counterparts. Despite the failure of the World Peace Council’s journal – mostly 
due to Soviet centralisation and too closely resembling Cominform propaganda – they were 
willing to put up with it mainly because the Soviets funded the overwhelming majority of all 
the movement’s activities and because the regime struck a balance between Soviet apparatchiks 




Signs of Revolt 
 
The Central Committee’s insistence on centralisation came with a price. It further 
strengthened the public perception that the peace campaign was a Soviet backed project, which 
only further held it back from attracting non-communists, in particular left-leaning liberals. In 
preparation for the Congress of Nations in Defence of Peace in Vienna that was to take place 
in December 1952, Frédéric Joliot Curie, as President of the World Peace Council, found 
himself trying to convince reluctant liberals to attend. The Liberal deputy in the Italian 
parliament, Giuseppe Nitti, in a correspondence with Joliot Curie, wrote that many of his 
comrades, “approach the work of the World Peace Council with a sense of caution, since it is 
strongly influenced by social and political forces and groups. They have doubts whether the 
upcoming Congress in Vienna will be an occasion for a collaborative platform that we all want 
it to be.” Nitti demanded “a guarantee” from the organizers of the Congress, since many liberal 
peace activists and supporters believe “that instead of working towards a mutual agreement 
your Movement’s opinions will be imposed on the others”.207 Accordingly, Nitti presented a 
list of rather defensive demands to be met before he and his colleagues would agree to 
participate in the congress: 
 
“1) Everyone (including the observers) is to have a say at the plenary and committee 
session. 
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2) No participant is to feel that he or she is politically or morally bound to any appeals 
or resolutions for which they did not sign up for or voted for. 
3) Within the framework of the Congress everyone is allowed to engage with whoever 
they want or gather into any group they feel like.  
4) Every participant has the freedom to make any comment to the press.”208  
 
To understand why by the end of 1952 the peace campaign was failing to attract liberals 
and centrists we must look back at the political developments that were taking place since 1949. 
It was because the campaign, as any other Soviet endeavour which dealt with public relations, 
was under such strong centralised control that it was subject to Stalin’s whims. As a result, 
instead of focusing on advocating peace, the Soviet Peace Campaign was the centre of 
(unintentionally public) political feuds with Stalin’s (perceived) enemies, among them Titoists, 
pacifists and agents of ‘American imperialism’. 
The Paris Congress in 1949 – the Soviets first real run of the peace campaign in the 
West – should have been an opportunity to gain as much mass support as possible. Soviet 
delegates felt particularly bitter towards the “reactionary pacifist and anti-Soviet formations” 
that aroused “so-called revolutionary-democratic unity from the leading Trotskyist Sartre”.209 
According to Fadeev, the pacifists put up anti-Soviet and anti-FCP posters all over Paris. The 
Soviets used the occasion to prevent the infiltration of so-called reactionary pacifists, but 
instead alienated some of their closest allies who had been trying to attract non-communists 
into the movement.210 The French representatives, and in particular the head of the French 
delegacy, Yves Farge, were adamant that everyone who was in favour of peace be allowed to 
speak. However, after Yves Farge, Jacques Hadamard and others “carried out some work with 
the pacifists, they became aware of the provocative disposition of all types [of people] within 
the pacifist movement”.211 Still, even the Soviet functionaries could not hide the fact that the 
pacifist movements were capturing some figures within intellectual circles and also had 
influence on the conduct of the famous writer and poet and member of the Preparatory 
Committee of the WPC, Louis Aragon, who had been actively trying to attract to the congress 
all organisations that declared themselves supporters of peace.212 The Soviets suspected that 
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the pacifist movement was assisted by many of Aragon’s friends, who themselves were part of 
the pacifist movement. The Soviet delegates did not understand that the intense atmosphere of 
suspicion they were creating was off-putting and frustrating to Aragon’s efforts. Fadeev, in a 
report to Stalin, could not understand why “Aragon started to get nervous and to behave with 
an extreme lack of self-control, display excessive pride, and even treat some of the Soviet 
workers in the Preparatory Committee somewhat spitefully”. There were occasions when 
Aragon would declare his refusal to work in the Preparatory Committee and had the intention 
of leaving the congress even if “… on the whole, Aragon was a very valuable member of the 
Committee and carried out enormous work on convening of the Congress”. 213  Aragon’s 
frustration could be explained by the fact that, unlike the council or the bureau, where the 
Soviet delegation was occupied by more culturally aware and tactful representatives, such as 
Ehrenburg and Tikhonov, the rank-and-file of the Soviet delegation to the Preparatory 
Committee was occupied by Soviet embassy officials and trade representatives. 
Aragon would not be the only one who found himself frustrated by the Movement’s 
power hierarchy. Jean Laffite recounted how during the London session of the Permanent 
Committee of the WPC in June 1950, Sereni expressed frustration with the Congress’ “lack of 
initiative, purely executive work, and the publishing of a journal which is of no use”. 214 
Afterwards, Sereni, as General Secretary of the Italian Peace Committee, cut all direct ties with 
the Permanent Committee of the WPC, with the Italian Secretariat Grad acting as a go-between. 
The Soviets were so preoccupied with purging the congress of anyone deviating from 
the Soviet conception of peace that even suggestions from fellow comrades on expanding the 
movement were overridden. The head of the Polish delegation to the Preparatory Committee, 
Jerzy Borejsza, suggested that ‘progressive Catholics’ be invited. Borejsza’s idea was to form 
close ties between Polish and French Catholics in order establish a united movement against 
the Vatican.215 This idea was strongly opposed by Korneichuk. The attack by the French 
government by refusing to grant visas to attendees could only contribute to the Soviets’ siege 
mentality.  
However, the occasion not only demonstrated a sense of paranoia but also a lack of 
coordination between Soviet organs to seize opportunities to expand the movement. Borejsza 
was right: K.I. Korneev, an intelligence officer by profession with the rank of colonel lieutenant, 
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was a senior advisor to the head of the First Department/Division at the Soviet embassy in 
France. In a top-secret report to the Central Committee of the CPSU, Korneev spoke of the 
potential of establishing links with progressive Catholic movements in several Western 
countries, who were “the main reason for discontent in the Vatican”. 216  This progressive 
Catholic movement purportedly “abandoned the main principles of the Catholic Church of 
supporting anti-Soviet plans of American imperialism” 217  and believed in the victory of 
communism since already “among them there are those with much yearning to study the 
writings of Marx and Lenin, with many already having read the Brief History of the CPSU(b) 
2-3 times”.218  
The anti-religious policy pursued by the Soviets within the movement was not entirely 
unjustified, at least on the surface. Vice-President of the Standing Committee of the World 
Peace Congress, Alexander Fadeev, had suspicions about US Reverend John W. Darr, who had 
been elected as one the 7 secretaries in charge of operation work to the Secretary General of 
the WPC, Jean Laffitte, in 1949.219 Fadeev’s secondary role was surveillance. At the Foreign 
Commission of the Central Committee he was shown Semyon Ignatiev’s (head of the Ministry 
for State Security) report on Darr and concurred that the findings “correspond to our own 
observations” of Darr as “unreliable and most likely a spy”.220 Fadeev suspected that Darr 
intended to disrupt the proceedings of a regional Peace Committee conference of South and 
North America that was scheduled to take place in Brazil on August 25th, 1952. In the opinion 
of P.V. Guliaev (Soviet representative at the WPC Secretariat and member of staff at the 
Foreign Commission in the CC), “during this period the US is putting pressure on [Brazilian 
President Getúlio] Vargas with the aim of preventing this conference from convening. They 
needed to stall for time in order for the conference not to take place on the scheduled date and 
it was Darr who fulfilled this function.”221  
As had been demonstrated by the Soviet conduct in the Peace Supporters journal with 
the English Peace Committee, Fadeev exemplified the Soviet belief that any given national 
committee’s failure to expand could not have possibly been the fault of Soviet policy and could 
only be a result of mismanagement, defeatism or worse, conspiracy to sabotage. Fadeev could 
                                                          
216 Ibid., 32 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid., 33. 
219 GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.152, ll.35-37- Information of the Secretariat of the WPC. 
220 RGASPI, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.1397, l.182 - Fadeev’s letter to Stalin on head of the Secretariat of the WPC 




not believe that it was “possible that with an honest American present in the Secretariat we 
would be so cut off from any American public organization”. 222  Darr’s addition into the 
Secretariat meant that “we [the Soviets] are practically cut off from the progressive circles in 
America…”.223 Fadeev’s only proof was that Darr “has consistently involved people in the 
World Peace Council who are obviously suspicious… everything that is taking place at sessions 
Darr jots down in great detail in his huge notebook…”224 Fadeev’s ‘solution’ bordered on the 
conspiratorial: Darr would “not [be] allowed [him] to leave Prague” with Guliaev and a 
Western counterpart assigned to work with Darr to prepare for the upcoming Congress in North 
and South America in order to monitor him, as it would have been possible to remove him only 
at the upcoming Viennese Congress of Nations in Defence of Peace in December 1952.225  
Yet Vyshinsky (Minister of Foreign Affairs), having heard of this, overrode Fadeev’s 
suggestion and coded a message to Guliaev at the Soviet embassy in Prague instructing him to 
fully remove Darr from the managing preparations for the congress and to conceal from him 
“the real locations of the national peace committees not just in North and South American, but 
also of all other countries.” Vyshinsky’s machinations to purge Darr required Guliaev to keep 
Darr completely in the dark on the task assigned to other WPC representatives, who were 
heading to the Bermuda islands to meet with their American counterparts to put forward a 
motion to have Darr recalled from his position as a secretary of the Peace Council as soon as 
possible and have him replaced with someone else. To what extent these extreme measures 
were justified is unknown considering that the House of Committee on Un-American Activities 
had already outed Darr as a communist “unreliable and most likely a spy” in 1951.226 Neither 
would this be the last time when the Soviets would have to watch their backs.  
In June 1954, the German Peace Council in Berlin warned the Soviet Peace Committee 
of a West German Catholic pastor, Dr. Helmut Jordan of Ratingen, who appealed to the Soviets 
for permission to visit the Soviet Union. Anyone who had the slightest taint of the Vatican was 
an enemy. Because Pastor Jordan was a specialist in oriental studies under the supervision of 
the Vatican, the German Peace Council did not support his request, as it had “reason to believe 
that this gentleman’s desires for travel are dictated not by love for peace and to be actively 
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involved in the Peace Movement”.227 The Soviet Peace Committee was all too happy to pass 
the letter on to the Foreign Ministry and await instructions. 
The Cominform, which two years previously had defined the struggle for peace 
between the capitalist West and the socialist East, was now in the midst of purging its ranks 
since Tito’s expulsion the year before. The 1949 Cominform conference which took place 
on16-19 November proceeded in the wake of one of the tensest moments in the Cold War, 
during which the Soviet Union was asserting itself militarily vis-à-vis the United States and 
politically in the Eastern Europe. By this time the Soviet Union had acquired the atomic bomb, 
paving the way for the first arms race of the Cold War.228 Speeches given by the representatives 
of socialist countries were almost completely preoccupied with the struggle against “the agents 
of Anglo-American imperialism, Titoist criminals, Catholic clandestine groups, and sabotage 
of industry, army, and Party”. The trials were a manifestation of “a massive international 
conspiracy organized by Anglo-American imperialists against the countries of People’s 
Democracies, the Soviet Union, and peace”.229 The Yugoslav government became a fascist 
conspiracy masterminded by imperialists to disrupt the socialist world. 
The term ‘fascist Tito clique’ entered the lexicon of all communist parties as the ‘peace’ 
campaign was instantly diverted towards demonising ‘Tito’s criminal regime’. Since cutting 
off ties with Yugoslavia, Stalin had sought to eliminate Tito and replace him with a hardliner. 
Air Force General Pero Popivoda and his associates, who had been involved in an attempted 
coup d'état against Tito, was now promoted through the peace campaign as “the genuine 
Yugoslavian defenders of peace, who are struggling against the Tito-Rankovic gang of fascist 
murderers serving Anglo-American warmongers.”230  The World Peace Congress’ journal, 
Peace Supporters, was now subject to the Central Committee’s foreign policy, as it was ordered 
to publish Popivoda’s article, ‘Belgrade accessories to the war-mongers of the new war’. The 
article enumerated the ‘crimes’ of the Titoist regime and concluded that “the Yugoslavian 
nations understand very well that their struggle against the fascists clique of Tito-Rankovic is 
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a part of the noble struggle of all progressive forces in all countries for a lasting and durable 
peace”231  
Yet if Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform, the ejection of its representatives 
from the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress and the imposition of an economic 
and diplomatic boycott was intended to be accepted by peace supporters in the West without 
question, then the Soviet authorities were sorely mistaken. A very public feud erupted between 
the American delegation and the Soviets and their allies by March 1950. John Rogge, a 
prominent American liberal, a contender for the Progressive Party’s vice-presidential 
nomination and a vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress, had 
steadily been deviating from the Cominform’s thesis of ‘two camps’ since the first World Peace 
Congress in Paris towards a more neutral stance. There, he had drawn hisses and boos when he 
stated that the Soviet Union should take equal blame with the United States for the present 
international tensions. Rogge told the hostile audience that the communist countries “must 
learn to live with the capitalist countries for each has its virtues and defects and each can learn 
from the other”.232  
Rogge’s complete break with the Soviet line came at the Stockholm Plenary Session of 
the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress in March 1950 during which he 
expressed his pro-Yugoslav stance. In Fadeev’s account of the Stockholm session, the Soviet 
delegacy did all they could to isolate Rogge from the rest of his American colleagues. Rogge’s 
substitute at the delegation, Albert E. Kahn, (who is characterised as a “progressive American 
writer-publicist and member of the U.S. Communist Party”) did not agree with Rogge’s 
‘liberal-bourgeoisie, double dealing position”. Rogge’s other opponent within the American 
delegation was the artist Rockwell Kent. After the session Kent told the Soviet delegation that 
he “wished to have nothing to do with Rogge” and “wouldn’t let him set foot in his house.”233 
Rogge formally confirmed his stance during a session of the Bureau for the Standing 
Committee of the World Peace Congress between May 31st and June 1st 1950 in London where 
he handed a resolution to have the Yugoslavian delegacy invited to the Second World Peace 
Congress. The British Peace Committee, which was host to the session, instantly understood 
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that the situation barred Rogge from giving his speech on the last day on the excuse that they 
“intended to have only one speaker from each country.”234 
Besides facing opposition to reform the Standing Committee, the Second World Peace 
Congress in Warsaw on November 16-22 for the Soviets seemed like a show trial, a ceremony 
of unmasking hidden enemies. Fadeev recounted that everything went well, except that 
“reactionary elements, similar to Rogge, were courting representatives of China…”.235 There 
was an attempt at splitting up the congress. The provocateur and dissenter sent (on this mission) 
was none other than Rogge, who “attempted to assemble his clique”. In this conspiracy to derail 
the congress, “he [Rogge] was working collaboratively with several of the delegacies, but did 
not manage to find many like-minded people”.236 Besides Rogge, this clique included an 
English lawyer by the name of Harvey Moore, who gave an anti-Soviet speech, and a Danish 
representative by the name Elin Appel. Rogge’s provocative speech, during which he attempted 
to “slander the Peace Movement and at the same time praise Tito’s fascist regime, was met 
with united condemnation from the Congress, and especially from the U.S. delegacy”. In his 
speech, Rogge called three times on the Chinese to join the side of Tito.  
Fadeev praised the American lawyer, H. Howard, and a representative of Yugoslavian 
émigrés, Pero Popoivoda, who defected to the Soviet Union after fleeing Yugoslavia in the 
wake of a failed coup attempt against Tito, for “unmasking [Rogge] as a paid agent of Tito”.237 
As always, the Soviet bloc countries followed suite by putting forward an overblown proposal 
to have Tito declared the world’s most wanted criminal, which was ultimately left off.238 The 
only semblance of a balanced debate within the congress came from the U.S. delegacy, which 
proved rather unpredictable. According to Fadeev, U.S. delegate Canon put forward an 
“unsuitable proposal of making distinction between indirect and direct forms of ‘aggression’”. 
He declared that “presently [we] abide by a single definition of aggression … [which is] not 
enough since there was new form of aggression: indirect interference in the affairs of other 
states”. However, attempting to be impartial, Cannon “recalled the anti-Soviet hysteria in 
imperialist countries and anti-capitalist propaganda in East European countries.”239 
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By contrast, in a thinly-veiled attack on Rogge, delegate Paul Robeson, the famous 
African-America singer and Civil Rights activist, declared, “Agents of the Yugoslavian regime 
shouldn’t be allowed to infiltrate the Peace Movement.”240 Private denunciations were also not 
uncommon. Jean Laffitte (General Secretariat of World Peace Committee) and A. Korneichuk 
(Soviet Peace Committee representative to the Bureau of the Standing Committee) thought 
Rogge should be considered for expulsion as a “paid agent of Titoist gangsters”.241  
Rogge’s name was publicly dragged through the dirt in a sarcastic article by Fadeev, 
entitled ‘Who then is this Rogge?’ The article resemble a bitter epitaph, concluding that: “As 
a petty careerist and rogue, Rogge’s work in the Peace Movement is what the Americans call 
with the dirty word ‘business’. And now out in the open he fulfils the tasks set out by his 
masters, sent here amongst the peace activists…he turned into a paid agent-advocate for the 
bloody firm of American imperialism”.242 Unsurprisingly, Rogge was not re-elected as vice-
chairman of the Standing Committee at the second World Peace Congress in November 1950 
in Warsaw. More damagingly (at least from the Soviet perspective), Rogge, now disillusioned 
with the peace campaign, was involved in convincing a key witness to implicate Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg on charges of passing on information about the atomic bomb to the Soviet 
Union.243 
At the same time as some on the left were becoming disillusioned (or driven out) the 
Soviets failed to take advantage of religious interest in the peace campaign. Rhetorically, the 
Soviet peace campaign and the Quakers’ pacifism were incompatible. One put the blame for 
the Cold War on capitalism and had a very narrow, ideologically-charged definition of what 
peace meant. The other insisted that both sides were to blame and called for all forms warfare 
to be abandoned. The Soviets saw the Quakers as another Rogge on their hands. Yet 
strategically, the failure to meet the Quakers halfway was a massive loss of opportunity that 
only highlighted Soviet inflexibility during this time.  
 When the British Peace Committee was established in 1949 it not only faced a hostile 
government and public, but competition from peace organisations that had a long established 
tradition prior to the Cold War. It was the National Peace Council, established in 1908 and 
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encompassing 40 organisations, which was dominated by Quakers, pacifists, academics and 
trade union groups. They did not make exceptions in accommodating the Soviet agenda – they 
had their own. They were friendly towards Yugoslavia and Tito, while their brochures 
highlighted the Soviet Union’s unfairness in its hostility towards Yugoslavia. The council did 
not cooperate with the British Peace Committee and saw it simply as an extension of Soviet 
influence. Yet in Great Britain the council had “a big sway, especially over the intelligentsia” 
(as acknowledged in a secret report by the Third Secretariat of the Soviet Embassy in Britain, 
P. Kuznetsov).244 Moreover, by September 1951 the British Peace Committee was thoroughly 
demoralised. J.G. Crowther, scientist and Chairman of the Committee, resigned, citing that the 
movement’s “lack(s) a militant program” and “intellectual sluggishness and lack of ideas”, 
warning that “since our Movement here in England is lacking a working class base it will turn 
into a middle-class movement and will not be able to withstand pacifism”.245 
 The Quakers, had they been won over, would have greatly expanded the social base of 
the Soviet Peace Campaign. Instead, the Soviets took Crowther’s warning to heart and viewed 
the Quaker’s with deep suspicion. Yet it was the Quakers who approached Vladimir Erofeev 
(First Counsellor of the Soviet embassy in the UK) on visiting the Soviet Union at the end of 
1950. While in preparation for their visit in late January 1951, Erofeev was instructed to find 
out the “real aims of the Quaker delegacy”.246 During the visit, the Quakers were subjected to 
the standard treatment of foreigners: surveillance and officialdom. The distrust was so deep-
rooted, that, according to the report on the Quakers’ visit to the USSR on January15-26, 
individuals from the delegation attempted to walk around the city without translators to check 
whether anybody was pursuing them and have the opportunity to walk freely around Moscow 
247 The Quakers also presented a programme strongly contrasting that of the Soviets. The 
Soviet response did not suit the Quakers, as one delegate commented that “the speeches made 
by the members of the Soviet Peace Committee are just run-of-the mill bombastic and boastful 
excerpts from Soviet propaganda. If such exercises in rhetoric continue, then we won’t get very 
far.”248  
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 Yet even after such an awkward visit the Quakers were willing to give the Soviet Peace 
Committee another chance at establishing links. From the Quakers’ perspective, Soviet 
academics insulated themselves from European colleagues. As one of the heads of the 
delegation, the professor of crystallography at UCL Kathleen Lonsdale, insisted that Soviet 
scholars be given individual invitations for a conference on crystallography, even though 
individual invitations were not usually sent out. The Academy of Science confirmed that the 
invitations were received, after which Soviet academics were sent personal telegrams and 
further individual letters. Not one among them replied. Katelyn Lonsdale “got the impression 
that they were not allowed to enter into correspondence”. 249  At the International 
Crystallography Congress held in Sweden, only 2 countries did not have representatives 
attending: the Soviet Union and Franco’s Spain. Another British delegate observed that when 
Soviet delegates attended an international conference, they did not so much partake in the work 
of the conference, as make political speeches and then leave; “(One) gets the impression that 
they come to conferences for purely propagandistic purposes.”250  
 This highlighted a permanent problem that beset Soviet delegates: most (with the 
exception of top-ranking members, such as Ehrenburg, who could communicate more freely) 
were mobilised by Soviet official discourse and were given specific directives as to what to say 
and how to say it with the aim of discovering from their Western counterparts potentially useful 
information for future propaganda and diplomatic leverage or to convince them to join the 
World Peace Council. In other words, the Soviet delegates acted as an extension of the 
propaganda wing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many of these were academics who had 
no prior training in propaganda techniques. The genuine peace organizations, such as the 
Quakers, found their interactions with the Soviet delegates puzzling, as they had been 
historically accustomed to freely criticising their governments’ foreign policy. For them, much 
of the language with which the Soviet delegates unconvincingly spoke sounded like official 
party-line discourse that simply promoted Soviet foreign policy. The experience of the Quakers 
only confirmed to Western peace movements that were historically genuine civil organisations 
that the Soviet Peace Campaign was a front for the Soviet state, which merely simulated the 
appearance of a grassroots organisation.  
 Restrictions on communications between Soviet delegates and foreign delegates were 
systematic. One of the members of the Quaker delegation after returning to England sent a 
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letter every month to those Soviet people who he had meet with in the USSR. For each of them 
he wrote 4 – 5 letters for the purpose of establishing friendly contact. He did not know whether 
those letters were received or not and did not receive a single reply. Eventually, after not 
receiving replies, most people gave up writing.251  
 However, it would be wrong to assume that such an unaccommodating position was 
held by all involved in the campaign. A. Korneichuk (Soviet Peace Committee representative 
to the Bureau of the Standing Committee), complained about the “trivial” discussions held 
between the Bureau of the Peace Council and the Quakers as “a testament to the fact that the 
heads of the Bureau have yet to put their declarations of expanding the Movement into practice” 
and suggested “that we must once again raise the question of expanding the Movement to the 
Peace Council and invite to one of its sessions representatives of various pacifist groups and 
organizations whose work corresponds to that of our own.” 
 The intransigence of the Bureau of the World Peace Council on relatively small matters 
was demonstrated by its lukewarm response to some of the Quakers’ proposals. The Quakers 
were willing to sign up to the Stockholm Appeal agreement on the condition that the statement 
declared that those who refused to sign it be excised. This was not only advantageous to the 
Quakers (as those in the Bureau would have perceived it), but would have expanded the social 
base of the campaign. Even though by the middle of 1951 the Quakers were still unwilling to 
work with the British Peace Committee, they were willing to sign the World Peace Congress’ 
appeal for the peace pact of the five great powers, provided that the clause on any country 
refusing to sign it as evidence of that country’s government having belligerent intentions be 
omitted. The Quakers considered the term “belligerent intentions” as too harsh and something 
“which would have put off many people from an otherwise good piece of document”.252  
 However, one of the Quakers’ demands went too far, challenging even the purpose of 
the peace campaign. They wanted to introduce an extra proviso into the World Peace Congress’ 
definition of aggression (established during the Warsaw session): “Aggression also constitutes 
one government’s moral support for forces or parties in another country which aim to change 
their country’s regime through the use of force’”253. Such a definition would have contradicted 
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the peace campaign itself, since, in its very nature as a tool of Stalin’s foreign policy it was 
involved in one way or another in supporting subversive elements in various countries all in 
the name of peace. 
The Soviet Peace Campaign was launched during an unprecedented time in the history 
of the Soviet Union. In the wake of World War II the Soviet Union emerged as a military and 
political superpower (nearly) on a par with the United States. Yet its hard-won prestige 
presented it with a dilemma: the political Marxist-revolutionary discourse that the Soviet Union 
had espoused up to World War II (excluding the 1930s call for peace against fascism) was 
completely inadequate in addressing the post-war political landscape. In the political deadlock 
of the first two years of post-war Europe, it was the United States that initiated the vision for 
post-war, peaceful Europe through the launching of the Marshall Plan. The Soviet Union 
required a new political discourse, one that incorporated the peace rhetoric without 
compromising the Marxist ideology or the Soviet Union’s prestige. The formative years (1947-
1952) of the ‘peace campaign’ were very much a story of how these (often-times) contradictory 
objectives clashed and coalesced as the Soviets were in the midst of establishing a peace 
movement.  
The peace campaign was a new venture for the Stalinist regime, which required 
reaching out and winning over a diverse range of groups and individuals who were either 
depoliticised or did not fully endorse the Soviet Union. The Soviets had no prior experience of 
successfully organising such a movement in the West. It therefore fell back on the old 
predisposition of purging the movement of anyone susceptible to holding un-Soviet views. 
With the Paris Conference and other incidents it isolated Catholics and the Quakers, and Rogge. 
It managed to simultaneously isolate itself from two opposing strands of the Western peace 
movement – the religious organisation and the atheist, progressive left. The World Peace 
Council, therefore, failed to even resemble a peace organisation, as during these years it 
devolved into a battleground for purging those who were not staunchly pro-Soviet and Titoists. 
This largely explains why the internal institutional dynamics of the ‘peace’ campaign 
were so wildly inconsistent. Despite the early negative public reaction to the Scientific and 
Cultural Conference for World Peace that took place in New York the Soviets were still unsure 
as to how to go about expanding the social base of the peace campaign. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, the attempts in balancing out between the rebranding of the peace campaign as 
a non-communist endeavour, and having complete control over it largely failed. For instance, 
though Molotov was sensitive in editing the Peace Defenders in attracting moderates, the 
overfunding of the journal in order to gain as much control over the editorial board resulted in 
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the overstretching of finances, so that when it came time to expand the journal in other parts of 
the world the Soviets had little resources to call upon. As a result, the Soviets resorted to 
publishing a single journal to cover a particular area, which compromised its effectiveness in 
appealing to specific audiences. Yet this clash - manifested in the constant struggle between 
the tightening and loosening of Soviet control in the course of the institutional development of 
the ‘peace campaign’ - demonstrated just how indecisive the Soviet authorities were, how, 
despite the planning of congresses, establishing councils, or publishing journals, everything 
was improvised. In essence, this was new territory for the Soviets, one in which they would 
have to learn to operate. 
 
Undermining the American-led European Project and the Biological 
Warfare Campaign 
 
By early 1951, the Soviets realised that something needed to be done about their 
Western counterparts’ dissatisfaction with the handling of the peace movement. The outbreak 
of the Korean War in June 1950 and subsequent Soviet backing of North Korea and China 
complicated matters for Westerners within the World Peace Council. Westerners saw the 
alignment, if not integration, of the World Peace Council with the United Nations as a way to 
bring the peace movement into mainstream politics and give it legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public. The outbreak of the Korean War meant that by virtue of the Soviet Union’s isolation in 
the Security Council, as a result its protracted battle in the United Nations to define aggression, 
the World Peace Council would eventually be dragged into backing the Biological Warfare 
Campaign – a propaganda misinformation campaign aimed at providing ‘proof’ of America’s 
aggression and indirectly delegitimising the United Nations in the eyes of colonial nations as a 
rubberstamp for America’s imperial ambitions. This only further isolated the World Peace 
Council from the United Nations.254 Western supporters of the movement would become more 
vocal in the wake of Stalin’s death in 1953 for greater control.  
The question of Germany’s role in Europe provided the Soviets with a temporary 
solution for manipulating and distracting their Western counterparts from their demands for 
internal reforms. The ‘German question’ – its reunification, rearmament and integration within 
Europe – was a major reason for the post-war alliance. Yet, its use by the Soviets to manipulate 
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members within its own movement demonstrated that even the most anti-war, progressive 
leftists were uncomfortable with the prospect of a reunified Germany. The Soviets caught on 
early to the potentialities of using the ‘German question’ for quashing dissent from the status 
quo within the movement. For the Soviet Peace Movement, the ‘German question’ provided 
both a propaganda opportunity and to put on a united front, something which they were never 
able to achieve in the UN. At the Paris session of the Permanent Committee of the World Peace 
Council in mid-August 1949, Fadeev recounted from private conversations with Yves Farge, 
Emmanuel d'Astier de La Vigerie and other liberal figures that even though they did not openly 
express their disapproval of the Soviet Union backing up the establishment of a German 
socialist regime, a “French nationalist stance on West Germany and on the German Democratic 
regime was apparent”.255  
The Soviet’s first real push for the German question came at the Geneva session of the 
Bureau of World Peace Council in early January 1951. Molotov’s directives not only instructed 
the Soviet delegation but practically outlined the entire outcome of the Bureau session. At the 
session, the delegation was to put forward the following viewpoints:  
 
“a) Remilitarization is the preparation for a new war as dictated by American billionaires. 
b) Remilitarization plays into the hands of warmongers.  
c) Remilitarization rules out the prospect of maintaining international peace. 
d) The struggle for peace and remilitarization are incompatible since they are mutually 
exclusive.  
e) Those who strive for peace must also strive against remilitarization. Those who strive for 
remilitarization help turn the German people into cannon fodder for American 
warmongers.”256 
  
Considering the rigid nature of this directive, but also its tautology, its pure 
sloganeering and lack of argumentation, it was surprising that the World Peace Council would 
approve this wording for its appeal for the peace pact between the five great powers. The 
‘German question’ gave the Soviets the opportunity to readdress the balance of power in the 
Soviets’ favour, since it was Molotov who approved the composition of the WPC. Quotas of 
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representatives from different organisations were worked out by the Central Committee and 
were by default pro-Soviet. One variation of this quota was 1 person representing 5 or 10 
million people. The logic of this was that if 1 person represented 5 million people then it would 
be an advantage to Western countries, such as Belgium. Instead, it was decided on 1 person per 
10 million people, so that the majority consisted of communist and third world nations, such 
as the Soviet satellites, China, and India.257 Such an aggressive move towards creating a Soviet 
‘consensus’ highlighted the fact that the Soviets were not only increasingly modelling the 
World Peace Movement on the UN, but intended to promote it as the ‘real’ UN. This had been 
borne out of frustration with the UN, of which the Soviets complained to be paralysed by a US-
dominated ‘automatic majority’. 
Practically from the very beginning the Soviets saw the peace movement as being 
independent of the U.N. During the Second World Peace Congress in Warsaw on July 19th, 
1950 a resolution was passed defining ‘aggression’ with references to “a) war of aggression b), 
any type of propaganda that calls for a war of aggression, and c) the deployment of nuclear 
weapons for aggressive wars and mass extermination”. Yet the wording of the definition of 
‘aggression’, as with other things, had to be submitted and be approved by Molotov. The initial 
version that Grigorian sent to Molotov included references to the U.N. Declaration, all of which 
Molotov would omit in his draft. The original draft also defined aggression as “any use of non-
defensive force by one state against another that is found to be in breach of the U.N. Security 
Council regulations as adopted in accordance with the UN Charter.”258 Crucially, the definition 
also included the following: “The U.N. Security Council, in accordant with the UN Charter, is 
responsible for defining ‘aggression’ and ‘aggressor’.”259 Molotov omitted these references to 
the U.N. because the Soviet’s definition of ‘aggression’ did not match those of the Security 
Council’s and the U.N. Charter’s definition.  
Having been ignored by the U.N., the peace movement’s frustration was mounting. 
There was a constant desire to not simply legitimise the peace movement but to practically 
have it subject to international law – as if to have it on the same level as the U.N. The best time 
considered for putting this forward was when the Soviet Union would have chairmanship of 
the Security Council. In a coded message Molotov instructed Malik, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Soviet ambassador to the U.N., to do everything within his powers for the 
WPC delegacy to have an opportunity to come to New York in order to hand to the Chairman 
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of the U.N. General Assembly and the Chairman of the U.N. Security Council the WPC’s 
proposal.260At the Berlin session of the World Peace Council on February 21-26 1951 it was 
decided that the WPC would send a delegation to the U.N. and demand that it review the 
various points made in the appeal of World Peace Congress and the various resolutions of 
World Peace Council and have the U.N. “return to the role that the charter prescribed it, to 
become a place of agreement between governments and not an instrument of the dominant 
group”.261 Trygve Lie, the UN Secretary General, agreed to receive the delegation on April 9th, 
1951 in Paris. However, it became clear that the delegation, by this time assembled in Paris, 
would not be possible (in addition to European delegates, it included representatives from 
China, Chile, Africa, Mexico and India). In addition, all required visas. Therefore, the meeting 
had to be abandoned (a response from the UN Secretary General was received 10 days prior to 
the scheduled meeting). Joliot-Curie, however, demanded a meeting at the UN itself, and not 
during a trip in Paris. Trygve Lie refused, explaining that he was very busy, constantly 
departing from New York and "unable to specify exactly as to when he would be able to receive 
the delegation in NY."262 However, he informed that he had studied the resolution and sent his 
written response to them. Trygve Lie's reply was relayed in a very harsh tone. While defensive 
about the UN as acting solely in the interests of peace and peaceful coexistence, Trygve Lie, 
in a thinly-veiled retort, contrasted the U.N. work with “those whose actions aim to weaken the 
UN to undermine its credibility and inflate disagreements, the presence of which is inevitable 
in the global organization [as] not true friends of peace, whatever they may say”. 263  Lie 
guaranteed that if the peace movement "honestly and consciously support the UN and you will 
get peace".264 
The World Peace Council backed off. Just two days after the scheduled meeting on 
April 10th a three-day meeting of the Secretariat of the WPC convened in Prague, where it was 
decided not to send any more queries to Trygve Lie but appeal, albeit with less stubbornness, 
to the UN Security Council so that he would receive the delegation.265 That is, instead of asking 
the Secretary General to accept a delegation of the WPC they decided to turn to the UN Security 
Council for an invitation.  
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Trygve Lie’s refusal to meet with the WPC council may not have been purely down to 
scheduling or even principles. Sensing that the meeting would be seized as a propaganda 
opportunity by the Soviets and would legitimise the peace movement by having a non-Soviet 
Secretary General accept the delegation, Trygve Lie refused to meet. This was a blow to the 
movement’s goal to be legitimised by the U.N. When the Soviets took on the presidency of the 
Security Council, the WPC had no other choice but to ‘accept’ Yakov Malik’s invitation on 
June 16th. The setback was further compounded by a further humiliation. The Soviets might 
have had the U.N. presidency, but had no say on American visas. Laffite informed Tikhanov 
to start preparing applications for U.S. visas. That same day a telegram was sent to Acheson, 
U.S. Secretary of State, and to the U.S. Embassy with a request to grant American visas to the 
delegates. In a repeat of the situation during the Paris Congress in 1949, the U.S. State 
Department refused to issue visas, which provoked further attacks on the United Nations. 
Joliot-Curie condemned the State Department for "grossly violat[ing] the rights of the President 
of the Security Council", that "the UN [was] no longer able to function normally in the United 
States."266 
Frustration at the U.N. spilled over at the Helsinki session of the Bureau of the WPC in 
July. At the session, Fadeev outlined the task of the movement on a more virtuous basis of 
“getting the UN to return to its charter (…) to explain that the UN is not fulfilling its functions 
(…) to continuously criticize and expose the United Nations".267 In the opening keynote speech, 
Joliot-Curie went both on the offensive and defensive. Responding to criticism that the appeal 
for the peace pact between the five great powers actually duplicated the UN Proclamation, he 
proclaimed that "our work does not in any way contradict the UN Charter. In fact, it is the UN 
that is not abiding by the principles of its charter." 268  Accordingly, the WPC had more 
legitimacy than the U.N. since "the task… to be the highest international body capable of 
enforcing the people's will” was entrusted to the WPC “every time agencies that are responsible 
for preserving peace cease to perform their task!"269 Joliot-Curie’s bombast would be outdone 
by the Soviets themselves. At the Third All-Union Peace Conference at the end of November 
1951, the Soviets made an appeal to the World Peace Council which called the U.N. “…an 
instrument that serves America’s imperialist diktat and more and more is losing humanity’s 
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trust”, and as a result, “many simple and honest people all over the world turn away in revulsion 
at the deceiving words and black deals taking place inside the U.N and, instead, appealing to 
an organization (..) on whose work all honest people all over the world have pinned their hopes 
on – is World Peace Council.”270  
Of all the representatives at the Helsinki session of the Bureau in July it was the Chinese 
representative, writer Emi Siao, who cut through the Soviet’s balancing act. Just three months 
earlier the Chinese and the Koreans, with the support of the Soviet Union, presented charges 
that the U.S. had used germ warfare to the U.N. Security Council, a campaign whose veracity 
had yet to be taken serious by all members of the U.N. The Soviets and their allies condemned 
the U.N. as U.S. puppet. All the presentations given by the members of the Bureau stressed 
that the commencement of negotiations on Korea would strengthen the fighters for peace. 
However, then suddenly Emi Siao took the floor and stated that the “the truce is really a victory 
of popular will, but at the same time, it is the result of the victory of the people of China and 
Korea over U.S. aggression. This last factor must be mentioned among the reasons for this first 
victory for the forces of peace.”271  
In June of 1950, North Korea crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. On June 25th 
1950, the Security Council adopted a draft resolution which concluded that the armed attack 
by the North Korean forces on the Republic of Korea constituted a “breach of the peace.” 
Stalin’s hesitancy in openly intervening in the Korean War suggested that he was less 
concerned about UN condemnation of the Soviet Union and more about the persistent 
possibility of North Korea’s attack prompting the United States to intervene and thus possibly 
dragging the USSR into the conflict.272 Stalin made it clear to Kim Il Sung that the Soviet 
Union would under no circumstances send its troops to his assistance.273 Although he approved 
the request of Terentii Shtykov (Ambassador of the Soviet Union to North Korea) on June 20th 
to allow the KPA to use Soviet ships for amphibious landings, he refused to allow Soviet 
personnel on the ships “because it may give the adversary a pretext for interference by the 
USA.” 274 When the Chinese finally decided to send their troops after all, Stalin revoked his 
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evacuation order, but placed sharp limitations on Soviet military assistance to China in order 
to minimise the risk of provoking a direct conflict with the United States. By November 1st, 
Stalin amended his orders to allow Soviet fighter planes to cover Chinese bases near the border 
and protect the bridges over the Yalu River, but he forbade them to pursue American planes 
over enemy-held territory for fear that a downed Soviet pilot could be taken prisoner and thus 
expose the Soviet presence in the war. 
Once the Korean War began the Chinese and the Koreans protested to the U.N. that 
America was engaging in biological warfare. For Stalin, this was an opportunity to discredit 
the U.N. as an enabler for American aggression and to paint America as a genocidal imperialist. 
Thus, the World Peace Council’s involvement in the campaign against the use of biological 
weapons in February 1952 was a formative experience for the organisation for all the wrong 
reasons. Unlike the Stockholm Appeal and the Peace Pact two years before, the Biological 
Warfare Campaign was completely out of its control. It was, above all, a Chinese-North Korean 
initiative, that had already been in the pipeline since May 1951. 
Even though the Stockholm Appeal and the Peace Pact were top-down campaigns 
initiated at the behest of Stalin and Molotov the World Peace Council was still allowed a degree 
of freedom in how the campaign would be operated. Most importantly, these two campaigns 
allowed the World Peace Council to propagandistically exploit calls for peace on genuine fears 
of nuclear war. By contrast, the Biological Warfare Campaign was marked by a complete 
fabrication of evidence in order to generate such fear, since prior to the campaign, the fear of 
biological warfare did not grip mass consciousness as nuclear weapons had. Even though 
members of the World Peace Council, in particular the Soviet Bloc members, made outlandish 
statements demonising the United States and its allies, the council had yet to be involved in a 
campaign built on total lies. When the US pushed back by obtaining a UN vote to investigate 
the allegations the campaign would fall apart. 
The first initiative of the Biological Warfare Campaign merely amounted to allegations 
in the hopes of stirring up controversy. On May 8th 1951, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) sent a cable to the President 
of the United Nations Security Council claiming that the United States had spread smallpox in 
Korea during the period of December 1950 to January 1951. Given that the notice failed to stir 
up the controversy that it intended it was not until 7 months later that another attempt was made 
to bring allegations of biological weapons to the UN. This time the allegations were much more 
specific and detailed. According to an official statement addressed to the UN Secretariat by 
Bak Hun Yung, North Korea's Foreign Minister, the US had dropped infected insects of several 
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kinds bearing plague, cholera and other diseases over North Korean territory on January 28th 
and 29th, and February 11th, 13th, 15th, 16th and 17th.275  
This time, however, the Chinese and North Korean governments decided to bolster their 
claims by setting up a ‘commission’ of their own to oversee investigations. It was the Chinese 
who took the initiative while the Soviets were in the background. On the Soviet side it was 
Beria who was in charge of coordinating with the Chinese and the Koreans their Biological 
Warfare Campaign. Beria’s Ministry of Internal Affairs colluded with the North Koreans in 
setting up “two false areas of the exposure” with cholera bacteria obtained from corpses in 
China. Soviet advisors helped create “an unworkable situation” by intimidating the 
international scientific commission by setting off explosions near these areas of 
investigation.276 Prior to the arrival of the World Peace Council’s organised ‘international 
scientific commission’, Beria’s Ministry of Internal Affairs advised the Military Medical 
Department of the Korean People’s Army that the US had spread smallpox. According to Lieut. 
I.V. Selivanov, an advisor to the Military Medical Department of the Korean People’s Army, 
it was the North Koreans who approached him and other Soviet advisors in late 1951 to help 
create “sites of infection” and the medical reports before the arrival of the commission since 
the Koreans felt they had yet to create such convincing sites. 277 
The push to get Soviet propaganda organs involved in the campaign would come only 
at the end of February 1952, with Andrei Gromyko, then as the acting head of the First Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, urging Stalin to take steps to publicise America’s 
resort to biological warfare in the Korean War. He suggested that the Soviet Peace Committee, 
the international Democratic Federation of Women and the World Federation of Youth protest 
against the use of biological weapons and that it be publicised in newspapers such as Pravda, 
Izvestia, Trud and Red Star. Prior to this official start of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the 
campaign, Soviet propaganda organs were not in step. A particularly revealing example of this 
was a July 6th 1950 Pravda review of the book Peace or Pestilence by Columbia University 
Professor of Microbiology Theodore Rosebury, entitled ‘Revelations of an American 
Cannibal’. 278 Upon reading the review, Sergei Striganov, then working at the US Department 
of External Affairs, wrote to a scathing letter to Boris Ponomarev (First Deputy Head of the 
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Department of Relations with foreign communist parties of the TsK VKP(b)) on how the 
Pravda review misled and took quotes out of context. The reviewer, L. Krementsov, misquoted 
Rosebury to make it seem as if he dreamt of war, when instead Rosebury intended to say that 
in the case of a third world war the consequences would be more horrible than the Second 
World War. Krementsov concluded that “the most enraging and repulsive part of the book is 
where this imperialist lackey diligently confirms his masters that he and his ‘academic 
colleagues’ are ready to kill people without hesitation”.279 
Though Rosebury was a pacifist, he nevertheless, as Striganov reminded Ponomoryov, 
was one of the founders of Congress in Defence of Peace which took place in New York in 
March 1949 and was a member of the Preparatory Committee for the ‘progressive’ US 
delegates who would attend the 2nd All-World Peace Congress. Such gross defamation was not 
only wildly inaccurate but also hurt the movement since it meant losing allies. Yet this did not 
stop the microbiologist M.N Pokrovoskaia at the Second All-Union Conference of the 
Defenders of Peace from calling Rosebury a “fascist microbiologist” and damning him as 
“deader than a corpse” that had “died alive from shame…in the eyes of all honest people”. 280 
Similarly, the World Peace Council found itself unprepared for the Biological Warfare 
Campaign. Initially, the campaign was intended to be strictly a Chinese-Korean operation with 
Soviet assistance. Problems came to a head when in March 1952 the Chinese and North Korean 
governments ignored Soviet advisors to produce more convincing evidence before going public 
with allegations. Yet, even with the preparation of false areas of contamination and with 
China’s own investigating commission issuing a report, the campaign lacked international 
credibility. The findings of these reports were presented at a special week-long session of the 
World Peace Council held in East Berlin at the beginning of July. The affair was mostly 
preaching to the converted, generating very little publicity outside of the Council. The main 
problem was believability. As a Chinese representative to the World Peace Council put it, 
China and North Korea “did not consider the International Red Cross Committee sufficiently 
free from political influence to be capable of instituting an unbiased enquiry” and neither was 
the World Health Organization, as an organ of the U.N. The Chinese, North Koreans and the 
Soviets knew that the campaign could only gain credibility if it was truly investigated by an 
international commission.281 Yet all three knew that the campaign would be wholly discredited 
if an “unbiased enquiry” were to take place. Therefore, the solution to this crisis lay in creating 
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an ‘international commission’ that would affirm the findings of the Chinese report. This was 
where the World Peace Council came in.  
For the Soviets, the World Peace Council was slow to take the initiative in organising 
an ‘international scientific commission’ to research China’s and North Korea’s allegations. In 
the past, when the Soviets wanted something from the World Peace Council they would exert 
indirect pressure on the organization. However, the biological warfare allegations put the 
Soviets in a challenging position of supporting their allies while at the same time risking its 
own credibility in the UN. Having been notified by Mao at the end of February 1952 of 
America’s supposed use of biological weapons, Stalin publicly backed the allegations at the 
UN since neither the People’s Republic of China nor North Korea belonged to the UN.  
Given the logistics involved in organising an international commission of scientists to 
get involved in the fact-finding mission, it was perhaps not surprising that the World Peace 
Council could not keep up with the rapid pace of diplomatic developments. Nevertheless, this 
did not mean that those within the organisation, particularly from the Soviet Union, did not 
understand that the campaign was in jeopardy if it continued in the direction that it did. The 
Council convened in Oslo from March 29th to April 1st for a bureau session to discuss 
propaganda put out by the World Peace Council based on Chinese and North Korean ‘evidence’. 
In a letter to Stalin at the beginning of April, Fadeev complained that upon examining various 
documents concerning America’s use of biological weapons produced during the session, he 
concluded that the “material suffers from great shortcomings”.282 Though Soviet advisors 
established that Chinese and North Korean evidence of biological warfare was flimsy, the 
World Peace Council’s own handling of this evidence further undermined the credibility of the 
campaign in the UN. As it stood, the council’s propaganda had badly mimicked what a real 
scientific investigative report would look like. Some of the weaknesses included in the WPC’s 
propaganda merely stated facts without backing them up with any proof, with same facts 
backed up by different sources, with different dates and names of the same eyewitness (as result 
of different transliteration). More glaringly, the WPC’s propaganda misreported basic facts. 
For example, lice were mentioned as the spread of cholera and very often it was reported that 
people showed symptoms of illness right after the bacteriological weapons were dropped from 
planes without taking into consideration the incubation period that had to take place for the 
disease to set in. Fadeev was acutely aware that “hostile propaganda uses such mistakes”.283  
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Proving the allegations became a top priority for the Soviet regime. Whereas Molotov’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinated past campaigns, the Central Committee now took 
control. The Chairman of Foreign Policy Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU 
(Head of The International Department of the TsK VKP(b)), Vagan Grigorian, writing to TsK 
Secretary Mikhail Suslov at the beginning of May 1952 complained how the Secretariat of the 
World Peace Council “should have by now enlarged the international campaign against 
Biological Weapons, establishment of a an international commission for fact finding on 
American aggression”.284 Thus, in Grigorian’s judgement, with the Secretariat having dealt 
‘weakly the tasks assigned to it’ it was recommended that A. Smirnov (Deputy Chairman of 
the Foreign Policy Commission at the International Department of the Central Committee, 
Deputy Head of The International Department of the TsK VKP(b)) be sent to the headquarters 
of the World Peace Council in Prague. 
With political pressure from the CC CPSU, a committee at the Prague headquarters was 
formed in order to go through a massive revision of the propaganda through late March and 
early April. Ehrenburg reported that even though the committee “sorted out the documents, 
omitting improper scientific terms… In the long term, we need to demand of our Chinese and 
Korean comrades to thoroughly edit all materials concerning the use of biological weapons by 
the Americans”. Aiming to block all future Chinese and North Korean reports from being 
publicised before careful revision and editing, Ehrenburg suggested that all documents 
intended by the Peace Council be sent to Prague only and not to London and Paris, where it 
was easier to control the flow of information. Like Fadeev, Ehrenburg understood that bad 
propaganda had helped “reactionary forces [to conduct] an energetic counteroffensive… to 
prove that the uproar surrounding the use of biological weapons in Korea and China is just a 
badly staged dramatization orchestrated by the Chinese and Korean communists”. Ehrenburg, 
like the rest of the Soviet representatives to the World Peace Council and the staff at the 
International Department of the Central Committee of CPSU had agreed that the Chinese and 
Korean reports were a liability to the campaign and that the only solution for salvaging it was 
to form a special fact-finding investigating commission. Fadeev had already outlined this in a 
letter to Stalin in early April. This commission had to include, besides the leading members of 
the Soviet Peace Committee, bacteriologists, experienced military specialists, several writers 
and journalists, and among them people who actually understood Chinese and Korean. Fadeev 
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hoped that the committee would include famous scholars, lawyers and religious figures, who 
were not part of the peace movement. It is interesting to note that Fadeev, who had yet to see 
a single shred of credible evidence of America’s use of biological weapons, genuinely believed 
in the ‘crimes’ of America and that the campaign was not a propaganda exercise but a genuine 
investigation. Fadeev’s letter demonstrated the hierarchy of those privy to information. Fadeev 
had neither up to that point participated in the falsification of evidence nor had any knowledge 
of it. Even as Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, Fadeev was both a propagandist whose 
task it was to make it more presentable to the public and a recipient of propaganda itself.  
However, the Soviets had more pressing concerns for calling on an international 
scientific commission to quickly convene and investigate the biological weapons allegations. 
On March 4th, the US responded to the allegations of biological warfare, with the US Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson categorically denying such accusations. More importantly, he 
challenged the veracity of the allegations by requesting in the United Nations an immediate 
investigation by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or the World Health 
Organization (WHO). On March 12th, the ICRC contacted the Chinese and North Koreans 
about sending a small team composed of three Swiss members, two Indians, and a Pakistani. 
The pressure on the Chinese and North Koreans was also indirectly compounded by direct 
appeals from Red Cross societies of all Soviet Bloc states to investigate “US atrocities”. 
Throughout the next six weeks the ICRC would appeal 3 more times to the Chinese and North 
Koreans to investigate their allegations. The Soviets and the Chinese seemed at a loss as to 
how to respond to the ICRC’s request. Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, Yakov Malik, 
who had introduced the bacterial warfare charges into the work of the UN Disarmament 
Commission on March 14th, rejected the ICRC’s offer. China took a less rational approach. 
Having avoided officially responding to the ICRC’s offer, China responded in its press 
throughout March and April by characterising the ICRC “as a most vicious and shameless 
accomplice and lackey of American imperialism”, whose only purpose to investigate was “to 
find out the effectiveness of the American aggressors' unparalleled, brutal crime”.285 On April 
30th, the ICRC officially called off its offer to investigate the allegations. 
From the outset, the World Peace Council’s involvement in the Biological Warfare 
campaign as a fact-finding investigative committee was tightly controlled by the Soviets. 
Consequently, it exposed the investigative committee to the dysfunctions of Soviet propaganda 
organs. In a telegram to Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee Nikolai Tikhonov, General 
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Secretary of the World Peace Council Jean Laffitt pointed out that TASS reported on May 17th 
of the arrival of WPC investigative committee to Korea and China with intention to investigate 
American the use of biological weapons, when in fact the committee was just being 
organised.286  
The committee was led by Dr. Joseph Needham, a well-known British biochemist and 
Marxist who had already participated in an investigation of Japanese use of biological weapons 
in China during World War II. Others included Elenor Andrea Andreen from Sweden, Oliver 
Mario from Italy, and Malter Jean Felix from France. Before making the trip to China and 
Korea the committee was flown to Moscow to meet with the Soviet Peace Committee to be 
briefed. The committee was given just one week – form June 11th to 18th  – go over new 
materials that Yves Farge, Chairman of the French Peace Committee, brought back with him 
after a 3-day stay in Korea. The members of the investigative team were briefed that their task 
was to prove that 1) biological weapons were used, 2) that they were dropped from planes and 
3) that it was American planes that were dropping them.287 Though most members of the 
investigative committee were pro-Soviet, from the outset they expressed scepticism about the 
mission.  
They were keenly aware that with a lack of more neutral participants, such as the heads 
of the Red Cross, the investigations would have little credibility in the eyes of the international 
community. In a report to Grigorian, Senior Secretary of the Soviet Peace Committee Kotov 
noted that the team “were treating the situation in China and Korea not as a case of biological 
warfare, but as an experiment in the use of biological weapons”. They were of the opinion that 
the works published by Chinese academics on the use of insects infected with bacteria in China 
and Korea were insufficiently scientifically substantiated. On the initiative of Andrea Andreen, 
the committee discussed what tangible evidence or other convincing proof was needed in order 
to corroborate America’s use of biological weapons. As is evident from this report, the 
prevailing mood within the committee was one of uncertainty and dispiritedness. The 
uncertainty was due to the fact that no one in the West wanted work with the committee, since 
in the current climate “not a single academic is willing put their career at risk”. 
Kotov himself expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the committee, stating that 
“the committee will not have much authority behind it since its members are not bacteriologists 
but peace activists”. This was accurate, since many on the investigative committee were chosen 
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for their political leanings rather than for being scientists. Andrea Andreen was a doctor, radical 
pacifist, member of Socialist Party, and Chairman of the Swedish Organization for Democratic 
Women, while Jean Molterr was a zoologist, and Head of Laboratory at the French Academy 
of Agriculture. They all urged the expansion of the committee and even sent telegrams to Jolie 
Curie suggesting that the chairmen of the Red Cross and the Human Rights League, as well 
bacteriologists, be included. With the Chinese and Koreans making this next to impossible and 
with no bacteriological experts to effectively analyse evidence, the head of the committee, 
Joseph Needham, nearly quit the committee before the departure to Peking. Needham declared 
that “he didn’t consider himself a member of the committee and could not take on the 
responsibility, since he was not a bacteriologist”.288 He was therefore willing only to “maintain 
contact and assist the members of the committee”. 289  
The committee’s investigation in North Korea and China took place between June 23rd 
and August 31st. In order to distinguish the investigative scientific committee’s work from the 
Chinese investigation that had been taking place since mid-March, an Emergency Session of 
the World Peace Congress took place in Berlin between the 1st and 6th of July during which the 
Chinese presented their evidence. By Kotov’s account the members of the committee, arriving 
in Moscow after their investigation, had a completely different outlook on the situation. 
Needham was apparently “proud that to be given the task of investigating the facts of America’s 
use of biological weapons in Korea”.290 He declared that after “having reviewed the evidence 
of America’s use of biological weapons against China and Korea up-close he was certain 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that the US had waged biological warfare. There was irrefutable 
evidence on the matter”. 291 
However, Andreen’s and Needham’s own account of the investigations greatly differed. 
Both had expressed a deep sense of doubt about the conditions under which they were working. 
Andreen acknowledged that "the scientific foundation of the Commission's work consisted of 
the fact that the delegates implicitly believed the Chinese and North Korean accusations and 
evidence."292 Needham was even more ambiguous, admitting that he had no actual proof that 
what the Chinese and Koreans had shown were samples of plague bacillus from the alleged 
swarms of voles contaminated by Americans, suggesting that it was “possible to maintain that 
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the whole thing was a kind of patriotic conspiracy”. 293  Needham preferred to accept the 
Chinese at their word.  
As a result, the massive report of the committee at the end of 1953 barely distinguished 
itself from the ‘evidence’ the Chinese and North Koreans were already publishing with their 
own investigative committee. Some 30 years later, Needham recounted the committee’s 
dependence on whatever Chinese and North Koreans were willing to produce as evidence, with 
the committee permitted to see “specimens of the containers that had been used and of the 
vectors as well as victims of the attacks”.294 The testimonies and reports which the committee 
accepted were all formulaic. A typical report would start off with a scenario such as: “On 26th 
March 1952 at 9 in the evening American planes … peasants hearing the noise came outside 
or saw a crater nearby with mosquitoes, lice, flies, ticks or spiders in the snow.” Essentially, 
the investigative committee were recipients of propaganda that they had to turn into ‘evidence’ 
presentable for the UN. 
On the diplomatic front, the investigative committee’s report did nothing to persuade 
the international community of America’s use of biological weapons in China and North Korea. 
Dismissing the World Peace Council’s investigative committee, the US delegates at the UN 
had been calling since July for a UN-organised investigative committee to carry out an 
investigation into the biological weapon allegations. The Security Council vote in favour of the 
resolution was ten to one with the Soviets vetoing it. In turn, the US attempted to discredit the 
allegations and delegitimise the WPC’s investigative committee by introducing a second draft 
resolution which stated that if the Chinese, North Koreans and the Soviets refused an impartial 
investigation, then charges of biological weapons must be presumed as false and, be therefore 
condemned as a fabrication and dissemination of false charges. Ultimately, the biological 
weapon campaign died with Stalin.  
As the new leaders of the Soviet Union scrambled to find a political solution to the 
Korean War in the wake of Stalin’s death on March 5th 1953, the biological weapon campaign 
was stripped of its raison d'être. A day before the US finally managed to get its proposal of 
forming an investigative committee approved by the Political Committee of the UN on April 
8th 1953, the USSR offered to withdraw its allegations of bacteriological warfare if the US 
dropped its proposal for the said investigative committee. The campaign fizzled out by the end 
of July with no clear diplomatic victory for either the Soviet Union or the US. While the US 
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managed to use the UN to delegitimise the Soviet-backed and WPC-organized investigative 
committee, China’s and North Korea’s continuing lack of cooperation made it impossible for 
the UN-organised fact-finding committee to investigate the allegation, with the President of the 
General Assembly of the UN reporting on  July 28th that the committee was unable to 
accomplish its task. Despite these failures, the Korean War and the subsequent biological 
weapons campaign allowed Stalin to move the Cold War out of Europe and into a ‘militarily’ 
safer region – a cheap war for the Soviets, with little commitment in terms of troops – and an 
opportunity to engage in a new propaganda war.  
 
 
Expanding beyond Europe and Losing Purpose after Stalin’s Death 
 
The launch of a diplomatic ‘peace offensive’ by the regime (as opposed to the one 
waged by the World Peace Council) was the first break in Soviet foreign policy after Stalin’s 
death. At the outset, Malenkov contradicted himself on the regime’s new foreign policy. On 
the one hand, “the Soviet Union has conducted and continues to conduct a consistent policy of 
the preservation and strengthening of peace… a policy proceeding from the Leninist position 
concerning the possibility of prolonged coexistence and peaceful competition between two 
different systems—the capitalist and the socialist.” A few days later, at a session of the 
Supreme Soviet, Malenkov stated that “A state interested in the preservation of peace can be 
confident, now and in the future, of the durability of the peace policy of the Soviet Union.” 
Solving the German question would continue to be at the forefront of Soviet foreign 
policy after Stalin’s death. Yet despite the fact that Molotov and his officials at the Foreign 
Ministry took German reunification seriously, their approach did not fundamentally differ from 
Stalin’s previous proposals - a reunified Germany as a demilitarised and democratic state—
with a peace treaty that would guarantee German neutrality and non-alignment in the Cold War. 
Molotov and the Foreign Ministry drafted proposals for the Presidium in early May 1953 
outlining the need for a new initiative on the German question, at the core of which was the 
call for a provisional all-German government. The East German communists were ordered to 
roll back socialist policies for a series of economic and political reforms intended to recover 
their popularity and authority. Among the measures proposed were “to put the tasks of the 
political struggle to reestablish the national unity of Germany and to conclude a peace treaty at 
the center of the attention of the broad mass of people both in the GDR and in West Germany.” 
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It was hoped that by reforming the GDR, communists in the GDR and in Western Germany 
would have a greater impact in forming a pro-Soviet left-wing government once German was 
reunified. However, protests which erupted in East Berlin on June 16th for the reinstatement of 
previous lower work quotas quickly turned into demands for the East German Government’s 
resignation. The GDR regime was overwhelmed and turned to the Soviet Union for military 
support. The protests were suppressed, but exposed the GDR’s lack of legitimacy and 
vulnerability. The Soviets for the next two years led a contradictory policy: propping up the 
GDR and pursuing German reunification. On the one hand the Soviets genuinely sought to re-
unify Germany, on the other, the GDR had to be used as a bargaining chip for negotiating a 
Soviet-approved peace. As a result, the peace offensive became expendable for the Soviets, in 
the sense that it could be used to bolster peace negotiations and maintain the status quo, which 
itself was a hindrance for genuine peace.  
The Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers on January 25th –February 18th 1954 was 
the first attempt after Stalin’s death to tie in the German question to European collective 
security. The Soviets attempted to prevent the formation of the European Defence Community 
- seeing it as a potential military threat – by proposing an alternative collective security system 
for all of Europe which would only then create favourable conditions for negotiating 
Germany’s reunification. The Soviets insisted that this system should not include the US, a 
precondition thoroughly rejected by the Western states, since from their perspective the key to 
European collective security was German integration first, collective security second. The 
failure of the Berlin Conference to solve the German question would in hindsight prove to be 
a blessing in disguise. Although 1954 and 1955 seemed at the time like a roller-coaster in 
diplomatic fortunes, it would ultimately solidify the Western Bloc.  
The Geneva Conference from April 26th to July 20th was an impetus for further Soviet 
diplomatic initiatives. Although the conference’s outcome was the Geneva Accords, which 
ended the Indochina War, it failed to deliver a resolution on the Korean War. Even with this 
failure, the Soviets realised that further diplomatic ventures, irrespective of their chances of 
success, would ultimately lead to the stabilisation of the Cold War status quo.  
Immediately after the Geneva Conference the Soviets refocused on the German 
question and collective security. On July 24th, the Soviets proposed a revised draft on European 
collective security to include a clause on economic and political cooperation and called for a 
new conference on establishing a new system of collective security, this time with US 
participation. Even though this proposal went nowhere, the Soviets were relieved when the 
French National Assembly rejected the plan for the EDC on August 30th. This was short-lived, 
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as Western states restated their demands for all-German elections and a peace treaty with 
Austria.  
It seemed as if negotiations had reached a dead-end, as both could not agree on what 
was needed to be resolved first: German reunification or European collective security. From 
October 1954 to May 1955 the European status quo would be entrenched, as both sides came 
to agree to disagree. The London-Paris Agreement on October 23rd essentially recognised the 
division of German into two separate states, recognising the sovereignty of West Germany and 
allowing it to enter NATO. With this the Soviets had accepted that German reunification was 
temporarily out of the question, but formalising the Eastern Bloc was now a distinct reality. On 
May 11th, the Eastern Bloc countries convened in Warsaw for the Conference of European 
Countries on Safeguarding European Peace and Security to conclude a multilateral Treaty of 
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, which formed the basis for the Warsaw Pact. 
Yet even as a response to the London-Paris agreement, the Soviets had not fully ruled out 
European collective security. The final article of the treaty allowed for the pact to cease if and 
when a collective security system had been achieved.  
Yet the mutual division of Europe did not mean both sides failed to diplomatically 
recognise the division of Europe as the status quo. The Warsaw Pact did not prevent four power 
negotiations resolving the Austrian question. It was Molotov’s speech to the Supreme Soviet 
in February 1955 which removed the roadblock to an Austrian peace treaty. Molotov modified 
his previous stance on an Austrian treaty by promising to withdraw all Soviet troops if Austria 
guaranteed against a new Anschluss even before a peace treaty with German was achieved. 
After four-power negotiations in Vienna a treaty on Austria was signed on 15 May. 
The Austrian treaty forced both sides to return to the question of Germany’s 
reunification. The summit on 18-23 July and a Foreign Ministers Conference on 26 October-
16 November, both in Geneva, allowed the Soviets to once again present a European collective 
security proposal but within the context of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Neither achieved 
anything as the Soviets refused and the Western states insisted on a deal for all-German 
elections. The roadblock to a European security pact would not be overcome. Yet from the 
Soviet perspective, a new proposal on Germany’s reunification allowed the further 
strengthening of the status quo in Europe because in the context of NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact, Germany’s reunification would be long and gradual and would require normalising 
relations between the GDR, the FRG and the Soviet Union. By January 1955 the Soviets had 
issued a decree declaring the state of war with Germany formally over and in June proposed 
the establishment of direct political, trade and cultural relations with the FRG and inviting West 
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German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, for talks in Moscow. In September, Adenauer visited 
Moscow to establish diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FRG. The Soviets were 
finally so comfortable by fully extricating themselves from Germany that on September 20th 
the GDR and the Soviets signed a “Treaty on Relations” in which the two states pledged 
friendship, cooperation, and continuing efforts to achieve “the reunification of Germany on a 
peaceful and democratic basis”. Equally as important, the Soviets announced the abolition of 
their High Commission in Germany and the transfer of control of all GDR borders with West 
Germany to the East Germans (including those in Berlin).  
The experience of the first half of the 1950s forced the Soviets to expand the movement 
into post-colonial countries. The Soviets’ failure to hinder West Germany’s integration into 
Western Europe and the struggles which it endured with the U.N. during the biological warfare 
campaign all pointed to the fact that the Soviet’s needed to expand the movement outside of 
Europe since the political situation in Europe had already solidified into two camps. As a result, 
the Cold War was now moving into the periphery, with the Soviets needing to take advantage 
of dissatisfaction with the U.N. felt by many post-colonial countries and offer an alternative. 
The move away from Europe was not accepted as the new political reality until Stalin’s death 
and only in 1956 during the Suez Crisis did it become apparent to all that the Cold War had 
moved to the periphery. Yet the shift towards Africa, Asia and Latin America did not mean the 
movement was going to be fundamentally reformed. In fact, just as they were looking to expand 
beyond Europe the Soviets continued to resist reforms proposed by the Western Europe 
counterparts in the wake of Stalin’s death in March 1953. 
The Soviet’s first foray into expanding the movement into Asia came during the Asia 
and Pacific Rim Peace Conference held in Beijing on October 2-12, 1952. Delegates from 
dozens of countries attended the conference, which included a number of speeches and opening 
remarks by Mao Zedong. The Soviets sent a 6-person delegation led by director of the Institute 
for World Literature, Ivan Anisimmov, to survey the political makeup of the conference. 
Anisimmov’s report to Malenkov reads like a war correspondence: “There are many 
communists. Along with progress-minded people there were Trotskyists, as well as those in 
the Indonesian and Ceylon delegation openly working for American intelligence 
(gathering).”295 This information was obtained by the Soviet delegation as soon as they arrived 
in China (most likely from the Chinese authorities). As Anisimmov comments, “We were to 
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isolate the enemy elements and unite the progressive majority of these Asian delegations.”296 
By comparison, the situation in Latin America was complicated: “advance knowledge of the 
composition of the Latin American delegations is very much lacking. Therefore, studying them 
was of great importance.”297 There were “hostile elements” who wanted to split the congress 
into Latin and Asian cliques, but thanks to the brave and heroic Soviet delegation “these efforts 
were thwarted”.298 
Anisimmov’s attempt to depict the conference in a triumphant light betrayed the 
challenges faced by the Soviets in gaining support from the delegates. Anisimmov gloated that 
with “every ensuing speech the people’s simmering resentment towards the actions of the 
American warmongers became more and more obvious” and that the pro-American delegates 
were unable to gain support, with the Chilean delegate Castelli’s calls for neutrality on the 
Korean War getting ‘snickering silence’.299 Yet, on the other hand, there was no particular 
enthusiasm for the Soviet Union amongst the delegates. The best Anisimmov could muster was 
the fact that here was not one single speech made against the USSR during either the plenary 
session or committee session, “although, no doubt, we were prepared to give them a fitting 
rebuff”. 300 The conference was not about the Soviet Union or peace but about developing 
countries feeling each other for potential alliances. The Soviets were particularly anxious about 
any alliances between China and other countries since China was the biggest ally of the Soviet 
Union at the time. Although Anisimmov noted that the “anti-imperialist charge (…) became 
the spirit of the Beijing Congress and even held under its sway those old Gandhists”301, he was 
particularly anxious about the Indian delegation, which “had agendas outside of the officially 
designated bounds”. During its meeting with the Chinese delegation the Indians “brazenly 
inquired whether a Chinese-Indian alliance could offset the Chinese-Soviet alliance”.302 The 
Indians also openly asked the Chinese delegation whether Titoist ideology had a broad base of 
support in China. From listening to the speeches delivered by the Indian delegates at the 
Congress, Anisimmov was convinced that the overall intention was to emphasize the Chinese-
Indian friendship and completely at the expense of the Soviet Union.303  
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The Soviets had no choice but to compromise in a way that they refused to in Europe. 
In comparison to Europe, where the Soviets had established networks of party branches and 
sympathisers, Africa, Asia and Latin America were foreign territories where the Soviets 
calculated they had to tread more lightly in order to appeal to the broadest groups of people, 
many of which were entering a phase of national reawakening in the wake of imperialism’s 
collapse. From studying the membership of the delegations Anisimmov concluded that success 
of the World Peace Congress to draw these groups into Soviet Peace Movement depended on 
“establish[ing] a durable progressive core, which would lead the whole of the sophisticated and 
multi-faceted mass of delegates”.304 Such an ambiguous solution only meant that the Soviets 
were willing to change the meaning of ‘peace’ to whatever best suited them for gaining support 
in the developing world. In Europe peace meant ‘negotiations’, ‘disarmament’, ‘collective 
security’, and ‘demilitarisation’, while in the developing world the Soviets had no qualms about 
making the slogan ‘struggle for peace’ synonymous with the struggle for national independence. 
It was this call that served to unite the decisive majority of the delegates through complete 
mutual understanding, irrespective of differing religious views and political convictions. The 
Soviets hoped that if “the progressive core was able to lead the nationalist-oriented delegates”, 
then it would override any potential anti-Soviet sentiments from petite bourgeoisie 
nationalists.305 As with West Germany and the EDC, the Soviets found themselves having to 
use the nationalist card with the African, Asian and Latin American countries since they 
perceived Americans as cosmopolitans who wanted to destroy the sovereignty of nations. 
Ehrenburg presented the Kremlin with an ultimatum: “Either a narrowly-defined (assembly), 
but one that is suitable for the task” or a “Broadly-defined (assembly), but one that is limited 
in its ability for the task”.306 
The ramifications of immediately integrating this new meaning of ‘peace’ within the 
peace movement for the sake of gaining support from the developing countries was not given 
much thought nor subject to any discussion with Western counterparts. As a result, the 
Congress of Peoples for Peace in Vienna on December 12-19, 1952 did not convene as the 
Third World Peace Congress since it now included not only nationalists from the Near East 
and North Africa, representing Latin American organisations with anti-American leanings, but 
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also Western European opponents of NATO, French neutralists, leftist Labourites, Dutch 
radicals, etc.  
Underneath the propaganda about its strength and expanding popularity, the Soviet 
peace campaign was facing serious problems. Despite promotion and publicity throughout 
1950, the Stockholm Appeal revealed the movement’s lack of success in garnering support. 
This in turn brought out long-held misgivings about the movement’s political orientation and 
organisation amongst the Western counterparts, in particular the Italian and British delegates. 
Yet the dividing line between those who wanted a decentralized apparatus and those who 
wanted it to be more centralised was not confined to Westerners and the Soviet Union, as both 
the French and Belgians both pushed for a more centralised leadership. In effect, this clash, 
brought about the perceived failure of the peace campaign, and led to a 5-year deadlock as to 
how the peace movement should reform. It was not until Khrushchev’s speech “On the 
Personality Cult and its Consequences” in February 1956 that this paralysis was lifted.  
Despite the triumphant proclamation of having collected 500 million signatures for the 
Stockholm Appeal, the Bureau session in Copenhagen on May 6th, 1951 was a sobering 
reminder and an admission (at least within the organisation) of the massive shortcomings of 
the Soviet peace movement: its reliance on propagandistic slogans to mask its lack of mass 
appeal in the West. Even the most enthusiastic members, such as the Belgian socialist Isabella 
Blum, had to concede that in the West the campaign did not add up to much307. Of the 500 
million signatures for the Stockholm Appeal, only 50,706,000 were from Western Europe, with 
signatures from France and Italy comprising nearly half of that number.  
The session was also noteworthy for reinforcing the divide that had occurred on the eve 
of the launch of the Stockholm Appeal on March 15th, 1951. By the beginning of 1950, tensions 
between the Soviets and their Western counterparts arose as to how the peace campaign should 
be coordinated. The Soviets envisioned the peace campaign as a national front organisation. 
That is, one mostly funded, and in effect, dominated by the Soviets from behind the scenes in 
order to give it a veneer of genuine autonomy. However, what the Soviets had yet to learn at 
this time and what their Western counterparts tried to desperately communicate to them was 
that even a hint of pro-Soviet sentiment would delegitimise the peace campaign in the eyes of 
people in the West. Even the most ardent Western communists understood this. During the 
Stockholm session of the Permanent Committee of World Peace Congress held in Stockholm 
on March 15-19, 1950 the head of the Italian delegation, socialist journalist Emilio Sereni, 
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pointed out “that the majority of those that have joined the movement do not...want to live in 
‘a Stalinist world’” as had been expressed by some, and suggested that the movement avoid 
such expressions since “dozens of millions – can join us, but will not agree to such 
expressions”.308 
Those in the West who called for less Soviet intrusion into the peace movement felt 
keenly the suspicion that fell on the movement even from those on the left. Writing to Jolie 
Curie on the then-forthcoming Congress of Nations in Defence of Peace in Vienna in December 
1952, the Liberal deputy in the Italian parliament, Giuseppe Nitti “approached the work of the 
World Peace Council with a sense of caution, since it is strongly influenced by social and 
political forces and groups”309 . Nitti demanded “a guarantee” from the organisers of the 
congress, since many liberal peace activists and supporters believe “that with your initiative 
for the Congress of Nations the World Peace Council’s views will be dominant. That, instead 
of working towards a mutual agreement your movement’s opinions will be imposed on the 
others.”310  
What is noteworthy about the internal debates on reforming the peace movement in the 
first half of the 1950s was not the lack of ideas but the reluctance on the part of the Soviets to 
go through with the obvious reforms. The Soviets failed to acknowledge even behind closed 
doors what was already widely believed: that the Soviets were the main financial contributors, 
and thus the main decision-makers in the World Peace Council. In the United States and Great 
Britain, where anti-communism was more intense in comparison to France and Italy, religious 
and pacifist organisations lambasted the World Peace Council as a front for Soviet political 
diplomacy. For instance, the National Executive Committee of the Fellowship of 
Reconciliations, an American peace movement, criticized the World Peace Council and any 
affiliated groups as “such organizations…[are] regarded as an instrument for strengthening the 
party, favouring the goals of the communist movement, as well as the foreign policy of the 
Soviet Union, including the policy of war and the ‘defence’”.311 If such an organisation was 
under the control what would be the point of raising money for it since it could fall apart or 
change in accordance with the party line?  
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The Soviet’s own evaluation of the expansion of the British peace movement in 1953 
best illustrates the dichotomy between acknowledging the real problems of mass acceptance of 
the peace campaign while at the same time refusing to provide the much-needed reforms. An 
internal report on the British movement painted a bleak picture. During the campaign for the 
peace pact between the five powers the British Peace Committee managed to collect only 1.3 
million signatures.312 It was also noted that while over the previous 3 years large groups of 
peace activists poured into the movement “in the long run the total number within the 
movement remained the same because of the permanent dropout rates of previously active 
participants”313. With broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and farmers 
were still not involved ad the movement was on the periphery.  
Yet, even when acknowledging these problems the Soviets attributed them to the 
movement’s leadership lack of organisation. The Soviets complained that there were no peace 
committees in factories, only 200-300 local organisations and groups within the British Peace 
Committee, and the almost lack of printed material, with only one newspaper, The Daily 
Worker, regularly reporting on the peace campaign. It blamed all of this on a “weak leadership” 
marred by “disunity and fragmentation”, with the work of many in the movement lacking a 
“routine nature” and focusing on a particular campaign. The leadership was chastised for “still 
not overcome(ing) its deep-rooted belief that the working class supposedly cannot be the 
vanguard in the struggle for peace and rally all sectors of the population”314 and was criticised 
in the 7th issue of the journal Peace Supporters315 . To remedy the situation the Soviets 
recommended an increase in funding and staff, particularly for the General Secretary and 
Secretary for Administration.  
To understand just how out of touch the Soviet authorities were in their assessment of 
the situation, one has to put the British Peace Committee in the context of the political and 
social landscape of early 1950s Britain. British scientist John Bernal, vice-president of the 
World Congress of the Supporters of Peace and leading figure of the British Peace Committee 
complained that the British government “managed to make the English working class its 
partner in conducting politics of war”. Therefore, the situation in England was more 
complicated than in Italy, France or Belgium, “where the American is viewed strictly as a 
foreigner”. The British authorities “managed to convince the English working class that 
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American politics is essentially Anglo-American politics… the Americans are now viewed not 
as foreigners, but as allies. To overcome this perception is currently our most important 
task.”316 
Adding to the isolation of the British Peace Committee at the end of June 1950 the 
Labour Party ordered all organisations associated with the party to cut ties with the committee, 
in effect cutting off mainstream leftist support for it. The Labour Party waged its own 
McCarthy-esque witch-hunt, urging “all genuine peace activists to isolate everywhere 
communist leaders of dangerous imperialist politics of Soviet Russia and to ‘unmask the true 
goals of this so-called campaign for peace.’”317  
In essence, the British Peace Committee was embattled and demoralised, with its 
Chairman J.G. Crowther resigning in frustration in 1951. Yet the problems facing the British 
Peace Committee, did not, as the Soviets had concluded, spring from a ‘disunited’ and ‘weak 
leadership’ or from lack of ‘routine’ work318. In fact, the opposite was true. The British 
counterparts relied too heavily on Moscow’s directives on what to do. The lack of a ‘militant 
program’ and ‘intellectual sluggishness’ for which Crowther complained was simply down to 
the fact that “once the signature campaign… finished they [the members of the English Peace 
Committee] have no specific goal to work towards”319. Yet even as late as March 1953 (after 
Stalin’s death) the Soviets applied the same generic assessment towards the British Peace 
Committee as they had years before: Funding for more publications, staffing for administration 
and standardising working hours. These bureaucratic reforms masked the real problems that 
the Soviets were unwilling to address.  
Stalin’s death on March 5th 1953 did not loosen the Soviet grip on the World Peace 
Council. The most immediate impact was purely tactical: the call for a peace pact between the 
five powers was dropped in favour of negotiations. For most members present at the Bureau 
session in Stockholm on May 5-6, 1953 the change was understood to be in line with the new 
political situation, since Stalin’s death presented an opportunity to end the Korean War that 
had been up to that point dragging on for 3 years. A call for negotiations instead of a demand 
for a peace pact was seen as part of the new conciliatory diplomacy. At the session Ilya 
Ehrenburg, journalist and vice-president of the World Peace Congress, noted that the “form of 
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negotiation is not a question of principle but method”320. Such a statement encapsulated Soviet 
thinking on the peace movement in general: reforms would not minimise Soviet control of the 
Peace Council. 
Stalin’s death did not signal a move towards democratising the peace movement. In 
fact, the post-Stalin years were marked by a sense of drift and a lack of purpose. Bound to the 
Kremlin as it had been since its inception, the Soviet Peace Campaign was forced to keep pace 
with the rapid political developments of the ensuing power struggles between the members of 
the Presidium of the Central Committee. The Malenkov-Khrushchev duumvirate that emerged 
at the end of 1953 and would last for only two years had been embroiled in a struggle against 
the stauncher Stalinists, such as Molotov. As such, the Soviet counterparts in the peace 
movement, who had relied on the Soviet leadership for instructions, could not meet the 
demands for decentralisation from their counterpart in Europe. With the ever-increasing 
dissension within the movement, Soviet figures such as Ehrenburg and Fadeev found 
themselves trying to substitute a change in rhetoric for the much-desired reforms.  
Change in the peace movement’s rhetoric was evident in early April 1953 when the 
Soviets proposed to withdraw allegations of bacteriological warfare in China and North Korea 
amidst the US’s push for establishing a UN investigative committee to substantiate the 
allegations. This was not the only setback. With the death of Stalin, the World Peace Council’s 
calls for a peace pact between the five great powers were essentially shelved. It was only in 
December of the previous year that the WPC-organised Congress of Peoples in Vienna made 
an Appeal "to immediately begin negotiations on a peace pact". The Congress also made an 
'appeal to the public', which stated that "all modern problems can be resolved as a result of 
conclusion of a peace pact. This Pact will return meaning to the UN". 321  In light of the 
humiliating withdrawal of Soviet allegations of the bacteriological warfare the Kremlin 
strategy for rhetoric now rested on backtracking on the rather aggressive insistence for the 
Western Power to sign a ‘pact’. 
In the wake of Stalin’s death the members of the Soviet Peace Movement found 
themselves at a crossroads. At a presidium meeting of the SPC at the end of March, Ehrenburg 
and Fadeev, while discussing the outcome of the Bureau of the WPC meeting that followed the 
congress in December of the previous year, acknowledged the unpopularity of the peace pact 
amongst their Western counterparts and the challenges that lay ahead in formulating and 
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implementing the new campaign slogan. While Fadeev noted that the “Communist circles 
believe [that the Pact] is still relevant … is necessary” the campaign from the Soviet perspective 
seemed like preaching to the converted since it did not appeal to “circles who believe that it is 
necessary to find some wording in connection with national security (...) to satisfy the 
neutralists”. It was therefore crucial that the new campaign had a wording demanding the 
elimination of military bases and the withdrawal of American troops, “since people [that] are 
switching to position of a neutralists… need help” and “require a system of guarantees”. 322 
 Yet for Ehrenburg, who was the most pro-Western member of the SPC, attracting non-
communists to the World Peace Council and the Peace Movement did not mean that the council 
should have to seriously accommodate these people within its upper ranks or that this was even 
desirable. By this time the council had already experimented with establishing a special 
committee solely on the basis of those most ideologically distant from communism. Even 
Western moderates such as Ehrenburg and Joliot Curie were not ready for these non-
communists, since “[they] carried on with such nonsense that even initially Joliot Curie was 
taken aback”.323 Non-communists could not be included in the council only because they had 
singed the congress’s appeal, noted Ehrenburg.  
 Fadeev and Ehrenburg had to also contend with the socio-political realities that their 
Western counterparts were facing. The SPC had toyed with the idea for Western European 
countries to withdraw from NATO, but as Fadeev noted, "the proposal… seems to them as 
communist, because, as they say, it gives them nothing in return”.324 Isabella Blum pointed out 
that most Belgians believed that their standard of living had not declined due to American 
hand-outs. They believed that the U.S. gives them material aid. Therefore, “they are worried 
about what we offer them in return”. Pietro Nenni treated the idea of a peace pact very much 
with scepticism and going so far as saying that “even cats do not believe it's real".325 The reality 
was that that the political landscape of Europe was unfolding at a rate that the Soviet Union 
(and in turn the Soviet Peace Movement) in one respect could not keep up with. Though the 
Soviet Union played a deliberate part in dividing Europe it was evident by these conversations 
that even in 1953, when the divisions had hardened and solidified into a status quo, Soviet 
propagandists could entertain that such flights of fancy might make for effective propaganda. 
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Fadeev had suggested that “it would be worth showing them [Western counterparts] that the 
Atlantic Pact pushes them into the war on their own territory, with their own hands”. 326 
 The new slogan had to avoid making references to specific countries (i.e. America) or 
“contain any aggressive points” in order to have mass appeal. In essence, counterparts in the 
West were arguing that the slogan had to adapt to the political status of a divided Europe. Just 
as Western European countries had signed the North Atlantic Treaty with the US, they argued 
that “if such a pact was signed between the USSR and the People's Democracies, [it] would 
[be] consider it as an instrument of peace” if it “reject[s] those measures, which give it a 
military nature”.327 Therefore, the solution was not to transcend the blocks but to make them 
more ‘peaceful’. The problem was that the new slogan was thought of on a purely pragmatic 
basis – to avoid seeming communist and be “acceptable for the entirety of the oscillating 
masses".328 
In Europe the change was instantaneous, with the new slogan of ‘talks and easing of 
the international situation’ being promoted throughout June and July. The agenda was 
discussed during WPC sessions in Stockholm on May 5-6 1953 and in Budapest on June 15-
20 of the same year and was followed by a promotional campaign by other peace committees 
all over the world, including a national conference in Paris on June 27-28, a National Assembly 
for Peace held in Rome on June 22-23, and a meeting of the West German Peace Committee 
in Dusseldorf on July 18-19.329 The Budapest session in June saw the WPC distance itself from 
the Bacteriological Warfare Campaign, calling the UN as the proper platform for negotiations. 
As the leftist MP Jacques Mitterrand argued, "We deplore certain actions of the UN precisely 
because we remain faithful to the UN Charter” and not to allow the “criticisms made by us in 
addressing UN, be distorted by our enemies".330 
As such, internal institutions in the middle of the hierarchy oftentimes lacked the 
experience, and were overzealous in their efforts when making their own public statements on 
international diplomacy and peace. These would oftentimes come off as inappropriate, coarse, 
clumsy or unnecessarily rude. One such instance of this was when the All-Union Council of 
Trade Unions intended to issue a statement supporting the decrees of the Central Committee 
about carrying out a campaign in the USSR in support of WPC decisions on negotiations and 
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the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Unaware of the new tone of the propaganda 
or in an attempt to what it thought it would be, the Central Committee of the All-Union Council 
of Trade Unions put out rough drafts of a statement to be approved by Suslov in which it called 
the “elimination of reactionaries in Berlin an important victory for the peace-loving forces” 
and for greater vigilance against “the attempts of reactionary circles in the U.S. with the fox 
Syngman [first president of South Korea] as the yes-man to derail the armistice in Korea”.331 
It was only after Suslov edited the text, removing any specific references and insults to the US 
and Syngman, that the statement was allowed to be published 3 weeks later at the end of 
September in the newspaper Labour (Trud).332 Though this was purely for internal promotion, 
intended for the workers of the Soviet Union and members of trade unions, it was characteristic 
of not only the Central Committee's attempts at extinguishing the passions of a few 
propagandists from the trade unions but also highlighted the inexperience of such institutions 
in keeping with the Kremlin’s ever-shifting diplomacy and the terminology required to 
communicate it effectively. 
Within the Soviet Union the institutional hierarchy and the Stakhanovite approach to 
the campaign could not be replicated in other countries for two main reasons. Firstly, the slogan 
was not particularly well thought-out. Reporting to Khrushchev on the meeting of the Bureau 
of the WPC in Vienna in September and on the Bureau and the Secretariat of the Council of 
the WPC on October 12-13, 1953 in preparation for the WPC session to be held in Vienna on 
November 23-28, I. Vinogradov (Deputy Head of the Central Committee on Relations with 
foreign communist parties) and V. Tereshkin (Head of the Foreign Policy Commission of the 
CC) noted that the "the campaign [had] not received the proper scope" because "there [was] no 
such central requirement that could provide the campaign with great determination and unite 
most of the public at large in different countries. The absence of such a requirement leads to 
the fragmentation of efforts of the movement." In other words, there was nothing which 
distinguished the new campaign from the old campaign. Whereas the Stockholm Appeal and 
the peace pact had concrete objectives - an appeal and a pact respectively - the new campaign 
for ‘negotiations’ was simply too vague.333  
Therefore, during a meeting in the Central Committee with Surkov, it was suggested to 
Ehrenburg and Tikhonov to "put forward the central issue of carrying out campaigns for the 
demand of arms reduction and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass 
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destruction [...] This would distinguish WPC's campaign in form from political campaigns on 
international issues carried out by communist parties and other democratic organizations".334 
In preparation for the November session of the WPC, Gromyko, in line with the Central 
Committee’s new ‘softer’ approach to diplomacy, edited a set of directives for the Soviet 
delegation that attempted to give the new campaign a specific object of “reduc[ing] armed 
forces and armaments and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons”. Gromyko also 
instructed the delegation to use more restrained wording at the sessions, such as "The decisions 
of the Bureau of WPC should be noted that ...", "It is essential that the Bureau of the WPC 
urges all ...", "The WPC should contribute to the discussion of participants in international 
meetings suggestions on the following question", "Support ...", "Agree to ...", "consider it 
possible ...", etc. 335 
The ‘German question’ would continue to be politically expedient after Stalin’s death, 
when there were renewed calls by Belgian, British, Canadian, French and Italian members of 
the Council to reform the movement. Five months before the vote on ratifying the EDC treaty 
in August 1954, French opponents of the treaty organised an international conference of 
“countries under threat by inclusion in the European Defence Community” on March 20-21. 
Participants included senators, deputies and political figures, among them the leaders of the 
French peace movement, such as Laurent Casanova and Gilbert de Chambray, former ministers 
and others. Also invited were supporters from the Benelux countries, Italy, Germany and 
England. The main goal of the conference was to speak out against the remilitarisation of 
Germany by its acceptance into the EDC and to propose a counter-plan. The stance of the 
chairman of the Conference, Senator Edmno Mischle, was "that the EDC would mean war and 
the inevitable final catastrophe. Just about anything but this community would be 
preferable".336 However, the positions of the speakers were not only unconstructive, but also 
unrealistic. For example, the German representative, Pastor Herbert Mohalsky, apocalyptically 
predicted that the "creation of German divisions within the EOC increases the likelihood of 
civil war in Germany. And a German civil war would inevitably transform the Cold War 
between East and West Germany into a hot war that will involve all countries."337 If some 
spoke of apocalyptic predictions then others would from a legalistic position, demanding that 
such an agreement should not have been signed, since a military build-up of Germany meant a 
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complete revision of the Atlantic Treaty. The last one was signed against a potential aggressor 
– Germany - and if it joined the organisation, then it would mean that NATO - is simply against 
the Soviet Union while France had a 1944 treaty with the Soviet Union on the avoidance of a 
revival of German militarism.  
 The Soviet Union played upon this nationalism since the conference was anti-German 
for French nationalists. Louis Vallon, deputy of Seine, spoke of the EDC as “only a curtain that 
conceals what tomorrow will be a real spectacle” where a hegemony over Europe would be 
imposed and led by “rootless technocrats who want to set up a secretariat” whose “real 
power…will merely be wielded by the U.S. government”.338 Emil Kahn, Chairman of the 
Human Rights League, called the EDC “a threat of European McCarthyism”, while 
condemning “French supporters of German remilitarization” for “wanting to create a German 
army that would be stronger than the Red Army, but weaker than the French!”339 Pietro Nenni, 
the Italian MP and winner of the Stalin Peace Prize in 1951, warned that while “anything can 
be demanded of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary”, there would be “no 
consent to an agreement in which these countries see Germany achieve reunification within a 
military block directed against them”.340 However, not everyone was against NATO and the 
US. Claude Bourdet, founder and head of France-Observateur, pointed out that the vote on the 
EDC was a result of “Molotov's proposal [being] rejected by many because it was perceived as 
being directed against 'organizations existing in Strasbourg, with the OEEC (Organisation for 
European Economic Co-operation)', it was perceived as a 'means to destroy the already partly 
existing European confederation' than to deter 'supporters of a Strasbourg Europe.'”341 
In essence, the Soviets had hoped to strengthen the ranks of the Europeans with regard 
to 3 aspects: Anti-globalization and anti-European project, anti-Americanism and nationalism, 
and anti-German sentiment and fear of revanchist German. At an Emergency Session of the 
WPC in Berlin in May, Jean Laffite laid out the choice for Europe: “either the European 
defence community is realized and Europe remains split into two mutually hostile parts, which 
will lead to a risk of war, or all the European states become associated not in order to dominate 
one over another, but with the aim of ensuring mutual security and peace throughout the whole 
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of Europe (...)".342 From the Soviets’ perspective, the peace movement’s efforts contributed to 
the failure of the ratification in the French National Assembly on August 30th 1954.  
 Yet the victory was short-lived. The failure to ratify the EDC was only a minor setback 
in the overall process of European integration. In September and October, two conference in 
London and Paris diffused fears over the ‘German question’ with the signing of the Paris 
Accords on 23 October. The accords granted full sovereignty to West Germany, lifting the 
occupation and admitting it into NATO. The Soviet response only highlighted its helplessness 
and reinforced the movement’s dependence on the Kremlin. On the eve of November 13th, 
1954, the Soviet Government appealed to all European nations with a note which stated that 
the signing in London, and then on October 23rd in Paris "of separate measures on the German 
question is a violation of existing agreements on Germany" and that the "London and Paris 
agreement unties the hands of West German militarists and revanchists to build up an army of 
half a million and unlimited weapons production”.343 The Soviets argued that what was needed 
was not to arm Germany but to establish in Europe “an environment of trust". For this they 
purposed the signing of a "pan-European treaty on collective security in Europe”.  
In a desperate bid to derail the accords, the Soviets offered to organise a meeting on 
November 29th in Moscow – a mere two weeks after issuing the appeal! A WPC session 
slavishly followed, during which nine resolutions and appeals were adopted. Chief among them 
was "for ensuring cooperation between all countries of Europe in order to organize their global 
security", wherein the London and Paris Accords were sharply condemned. The WPC 
practically mirrored the official Soviet line, urging "nations [to] offer resistance to the 
ratification” and "…demand an immediate start of negotiations between the four powers with 
the aim of Germany reunification”. 344  There and then the same 'figures of France', who 
organised the conference in Paris on March 20-21 took up an initiative for a new conference 
on December 11-12, 1954 in the same city in order to sabotage the ratification of the London 
and Paris Accords.345 This is an important turning point – make it a bit more dramatic & divide 
it up better 
The Soviet conduct throughout the first half of the 1950s demonstrates a certain lack of 
understanding about the European integration process and the type of pressure involved in 
Western European countries. Leaders of Western European countries realised that in order to 
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avoid war they needed to somehow integrate West Germany into the European project. The 
leftists, nationalists and isolationists who made up the bulk of the anti-German and anti-EDC 
force were impossible to unite against West Germany which would have meant having two 
enemies - both West Germany, and the Soviet Bloc. Integration was therefore necessary. Then, 
an idea emerged to establish on the basis of the European Economic Community a common 
market. On this basis, it would also be possible to create the so-called European defence 
community, which would include West Germany. Naturally, this frightened nationalists, anti-
Germans and anti-Americans who were afraid that if Germany was integrated it would be a 
great danger to France. Thus, temporarily their interests converged with those of the Soviets 
when the French Parliament did not vote for a European Defence Community. In essence, the 
European Defence Community treaty failed to get ratified and by default it pushed West 
Germany into NATO (which joined in May 1955).  
 The ‘German question’ reemphasised Soviet dominance over the peace movement. It 
also pointed to the Soviets’ frustration of not achieving their goals through official diplomatic 
channels and having to ever-increasingly turn to propaganda institutions. The United Nations 
in particular caused the Soviets headaches. They found themselves in the minority and unable 
to push through any proposals. For the Soviets, the peace movement legitimised their policies 
while at the same attempted to delegitimise the U.N. by presenting itself as an impartial 
organisation and the U.N. as an instrument of the American war machine.  
 
The Movement Dithers, Diplomacy Returns and Peace Comes Crashing 
Down with Hungary, 1953-1956 
 
For the Soviets, the Bureau meeting in October and the World Peace Council in 
November 1953 provided opportunities to distract reform-oriented members through divide 
and conquer tactics. Soviet anxieties of the previous 3 years on such issues as the signing of 
the Treaty of Paris in April 1951 that established the European Coal and Steel Community, the 
signing of the European Defence Community treaty in May 1952, and the London Agreement 
on German External Debt in February 1953 were channelled into the congress. The slogan of 
negotiations seemed especially ominous in light of an uprising in East Germany in mid-June 
1953 that was violently supressed with the aid of Soviet tanks. Anti-German sentiment 
permeated the congress to divide Western countries that shared Soviet anxiety over a 
potentially rearmed Germany.  
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Ehrenburg, eloquent as ever, balanced between mocking the Allies and insisting on “a 
security tripartite between Moscow, London and Paris under which the Soviet Union proposed 
to various countries nonaggression pacts and safeguards that would be provided by all 
European countries”. 346  Such a proposal required neither American involvement, nor the 
establishment of a European Union, nor a military build-up of Germany. Italian and, in 
particular, French delegates found this a much more attractive prospect than, as Petro Nenni 
put it, a “revived Holy Roman Empire of the German nation” as “an instrument for carrying 
out revenge and domination”.347 This anti-European Union sentiment drowned out the smaller 
countries, such as Belgium, who had doubts about a great power coalition providing security.  
In fact, the next two and half years witnessed the deepening of this division between 
supporters of centralisation and decentralisation. The Bureau meeting of the World Peace 
Council in Helsinki in December 1955 was the culmination of the organisational and political 
crisis that had divided the movement for some years. Given the sharp exchange of views 
between members on the future of the movement, the Bureau proceedings were never published. 
Even the Italian Peace Committee, which found a more receptive public than anywhere else in 
Western Europe with the exception of France, began to protest against the ever-increasing 
centralisation in the movement. Achille Corona, the Italian Socialist politician, speaking at the 
fourth session of the second day of the Bureau session on December 12, argued that the 
movement often did not assess international developments and its role within them correctly. 
Informing the Bureau members about his impressions from visiting certain countries in Europe 
and Asia in order to get acquainted with their national movements, Corona argued that these 
movements often adhered to such hard-line positions that it made it impossible for any 
alliance.348 The experience of the Italian movement showed that the movement should allow 
each committee to gradually form potential alliances.  
It would have been surprising for Corona and others who would be arguing for 
decentralisation throughout the three-day meeting that right after his speech the General 
Secretary of the WPC Jean Laffitte would read out a letter on behalf of Curie outlining further 
centralisation. Dressed up as reforms to address the increasing bureaucracy of the movement, 
Joliot Curie proposed to increase the power of the Secretariat. It was explained that since the 
Secretariat was the only permanent organ of the movement it should assist in carrying out 
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decisions taken jointly by the Bureau and the World Peace Council, to participate in the 
preparation and development of political decisions concerning the position of the movement. 
In addition, if circumstances required it, and if the Bureau was unable to convene, the 
Secretariat should be given the opportunity, after consultation with the Chairman and members 
of the Bureau and the National Committees, to familiarise the public with the position of the 
movement for events that would change the direction of its activities. Yet even with these 
suggestions it was “necessary…that a sufficient core in charge of the Secretariat to remain in 
place in order to ensure continuity and centralization”.349 Though Joliot Curie acknowledged 
the need for expanding the Secretariat he was unwilling to democratise the process, since 
“allowing certain national movement to appoint a representative to the Secretariat… can lead 
to ‘inflation’ of secretaries”.350 The Soviets, through Joliot Curie, while allowing the Secretary 
to be appointed with the consent of his/her national committee, would nevertheless insist that 
appointees be approved by the council. Yet, even Laffitte had to admit that his own comrades 
in the French Peace Committee raised the question of abolishing his post of General Secretary. 
Supporters of the abolition cited the fact that the leadership was unable to keep up with the 
growth of some of the national committees.351  
It was widely acknowledged that the Bureau sessions did not inspire or interest many 
members, with usually only one third of the members attending. Many were frustrated that the 
sessions did not tackle specific issues relevant to their own countries and were more of a 
formality, where long and vague reports were read. In addition, some members of the Bureau 
expressed frustration for not having proper help on specific issues of importance to their 
countries. The attitude of many Bureau members, as British representative Monica Felton 
(chairwoman of the British National Association of Women) explained, was due to the fact that 
many did not feel obligated to carry out their work as members outside of the session. Yet 
Felton also argued that many Bureau members “come back to their countries with a sense of 
dissatisfaction with their participation” because of the fragmented structure of the sessions. 
Instead of having dynamic and stimulating discussions, plenary sessions were occupied by long 
reports. This highlighted the fact that copies of reports were not sent ahead of sessions and 
neither was the agenda of the sessions drawn up in advance by the Secretariat in consultation 
with the Bureau. In essence, the Soviet structure of the peace movement did not encourage 
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coordination of work and discussions outside of the sessions, effectively making these generic 
consultative meetings that reinforced the Soviet approach.  
The national peace committees were well aware that what was needed was not, as Joliot 
Curie proposed, a Secretariat under the Chairman, but to make the Secretariat a truly executive 
body. Such an arrangement only served to divide the Secretariat, resulting in “a ‘bureau’ 
attached to the Bureau”. 352 Those members of Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Monica Felton 
(UK), William Morrow (Australia) and James Endicott (Canada) were the most vocal 
opponents of Joliot Curies’ proposal. William Wainwright, British Communist Party member 
and secretary of the British Soviet Society, was even blunter: the proposal “would contradict 
the principles under which governing bodies of the Movement still function”.353 What was 
needed was for the Secretaries to really be the leading figures and, in particular, the General 
Secretariat to speak more frequently in public. For those within the Secretariat who understood 
the difficulties the rank and file faced in attracting the public to nation peace committees there 
was now a realisation that a Soviet-controlled organisation was not only incapable of 
undertaking genuine civic mobilisation but was in fact antithetical to such mobilisation. Even 
its most ardent supporters began to see the ever-increasing centralised Soviet management of 
the Movement as a way to control its members rather than run a successful organisation. To 
them, Soviet centralisation had turned the World Peace Council into an ivory tower that merely 
simulated a civic organisation, where countless meetings lead to a dead-end.  
Isabelle Blum, who had been one of the most pro-Soviet figures in the peace movement 
by the time of the Helsinki Bureau session on December 11-13, 1955, began to seriously doubt 
the Soviet approach. While she agreed that Joliot Curie should receive all the help needed the 
proposal would “change the very nature of the post, since in this case, the Secretariat would be 
the new Chairman of the governing body of the Movement”.354 For those opposed to the Joliot 
Curie’s proposal, a major sticking point was that this centralisation would physically divide the 
movement since there would be two political centres: one in Paris with Joliot Curie as 
Chairman and head of a select group from the Secretariat and the other in Vienna where the 
rest of the Secretariat would be. As a result, the Secretariat's work would become complicated 
and would have to duplicate the work of the Secretariat of the Chairman.  
The Helsinki session, for the first time, sharply pitted Soviet representatives and those 
they backed (i.e. Laffitte and Joliot Curie) against their Western counterparts. Ehrenburg, 
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Gulyaev and Korneichuk simply could not defend the proposal and instead relied on vague 
statements, recrimination and assurances regarding the independence of the Secretariat. 
Avoiding any of the political implications of the proposal raised by the others, Gulyaev 
expressed that “members of the Bureau carefully study the various problems and took 
numerous consultations in order to achieve an increase of participants in the sessions, thereby 
increasing their responsibility and the value of their work”. He also suggested that the Bureau 
and the national movements “seek ways to engage in the work of non-active members of the 
Council and thereby making it possible for more influential members of the Council to better 
carry out their tasks”.355 For Gulyaev, the lack of success in building alliances with the major 
international non-communist organisations such as the World Federation of Friends of the 
United Nations, the Red Cross, and the World Council of Churches, was not a result of Soviet 
centralisation but of the passivity of the Secretariat. Ehrenburg tried a more diplomatic, but no 
less evasive, approach to the criticisms levelled at the proposal. He argued that there was “a 
misunderstanding in the interpretation of the nature of the proposal” and assured that the French, 
who were pro-Soviet, would not have a monopoly on the Secretariat of the Chairman, since no 
particular nationality would be represented.356 Korneichuk explained the proposal as merely 
Joliot Curie “requesting assistance so that he can strengthen his leadership as a prominent 
leader of the peace movement” which was “the duty of Bureau members”.357 Yet it must be 
noted that division was not always so clear-cut and there were exceptions. In a departure from 
his Italian comrade Achille Corona, Spano Velio called for the Bureau to “not only accept this 
request, but also thank the Chairman on behalf of members of the Bureau for the additional 
duties that he would thereby be taking upon himself”. 358  The Chinese vote of approval, 
however, was unsurprising.  
With such strong opposition, the session could have ended in deadlock. A compromise 
was reached. It was Isabelle Blum, who earlier had such strong reservations about the proposal, 
put forward the proposal that members of the Bureau inform Joliot Curie in a letter of their 
unanimous consent to the proposal to establish a secretariat under his control and express their 
gratitude to him for agreeing to make a greater contribution towards guiding the movement. In 
turn, Ehrenburg proposed that decisions about the governing bodies of the movement contained 
in the Secretariat's report be postponed until the next Bureau meeting, which would have been 
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preceded by the next session of the World Peace Council. This way both groups would avoid 
a public spill-over and continue the façade of a united front. The passing of both proposals did 
not solve anything since they cancelled each other out: Joliot Curie got his Secretariat of the 
Chairman, but any further discussions on the workings of the movement were ceased.  
 Despite these setbacks in reforms there were encouraging signs that the peace 
movement’s goals were coming to fruition. What would later become known as ‘the Thaw’ 
was already evident as early as May 1955 when Khrushchev visited Belgrade. This was an 
important first step for in re-establishing relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 
an issue that for the peace movement had been urgent since Yugoslavia’s expulsion had divided 
it. Even more promising was the Geneva Summit in July 1955. Though the summit did not lead 
to any concrete agreement it nevertheless improved communication and relations between the 
two blocs, which would be crucial for future negotiations on trade, tariffs, the arms race, 
international security and disarmament policy. More importantly, from the perspective of the 
peace movement, their slogan for negotiations between the great powers was being realised.  
Yet by the end of 1956 Soviet control of the World Peace Council and its foreign policy 
could no longer coexist within the peace movement. The epiphany for those in the West that 
the peace movement was purely a Soviet adjutant under the sway of Soviet diplomacy and 
would never transform into a genuine peace movement came at the end of the year when two 
pivotal events of the Cold War – the Hungarian uprising on October 23rd and the Suez Crisis 
on October 29th – put the peace movement to the test. Yet, the first half of 1956 was seen by 
those in the West who had been pushing for reforms of the peace movement’s leadership as an 
optimistic year. After all, having been accustomed to interference whenever Soviet diplomacy 
changed course, 1956 must have been seen by many as a new start. The inconsistencies in 
diplomacy and official rhetoric which had plagued the Soviet Union were seen by many as a 
by-product of the power struggles within the collective leadership. Beria had been executed in 
June 1953. These political developments, though not suggesting that Soviet diplomacy was to 
take a radically conciliatory direction, hinted that at least a coherent Soviet diplomacy could 
be formulated under a new ‘collective leadership’.  
Such an optimistic outlook was further bolstered in late February 1956 at the Twentieth 
Party Congress. Intended to reinforce Leninist principles of ‘collective leadership’ and ‘party 
democracy’, but in fact an attack on hard-line Stalinists, Khrushchev’s speech "On the Cult of 
Personality and Its Consequences" not only condemned Stalin’s dictatorship and the Great 
Terror as an aberration from ideals of communism but also rejected the orthodox view of war 
between the capitalist and communist worlds being inevitable. Though, not an explicit call for 
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reconciliation with the West, Khrushchev called for economic competition with the West, 
arguing that capitalism would decay from within and that world socialism would triumph 
peacefully. This competition with the West necessitated not isolation but a degree of openness 
and establishing contact with other nations.  
Even for the harshest critics within the movement these political developments 
provided a surge of optimism, a sense of renewal and willingness to re-engage with the 
movement. This was evident at a Special Session of the WPC in Stockholm on April 5-9 in 
1956. Achille Corona declared that “this thaw will melt the opposition like ice”.359 Corona was 
still critical of the direction the peace movement took, admitting that "we sought to form a split 
in the camp of our opponents rather than to unite with their organizations as a whole".360 
Although Corona called for the abandonment of “old methods of schism” he fell short of 
condemning the situation as inherent, pointing out that “the period of the Cold War and 
instigations that lead to military conflicts…was typical of the clear division between those 'for' 
and 'against’”.361 Corona came to the conclusion that a new era of international relations had 
emerged and the Cold War dichotomy was no longer relevant to the movement’s survival. 
Corona’s calls for reforms were ambitious, yet he also saw the limitations of what the 
movement could achieve. On the one hand, he proclaimed that “We [as members of] the peace 
movement, are neither diplomats, nor a great power, nor a political party”, reiterating the 
movement’s impartiality in pursuit of peace.362 On the other hand, he wanted the movement to 
admit to its past mistakes and called Social Democrats and religious leaders as natural allies in 
Europe.  
Even Soviet representatives echoed some of these sentiments. Ehrenburg called for an 
“end [to] the split in public opinion” and to “…get in touch with representatives of all parties 
of all currents that seek international cooperation and disarmament”.363 The WPC was to work 
on an equal footing with others, without imposing on anybody its principles or methods of 
work.  
Others, such as Isabella Blum, were more defensive. In a thinly veiled attack on Corona, 
Blum countered that the WPC should "avoid the mistakes of admitting to what it is not guilty 
of, and exaggerating its weaknesses” since it was tantamount to surrender. Though she agreed 
that new alliances needed to be made, Blum warned that the movement “must not confuse the 
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passion and determination of our struggle with a silly claim of monopoly in the cause of 
peace".364 Despite the fact that those in the West were still critical of the peace movement’s 
methods, the overall atmosphere was optimistic. Corona could say that "for the first time there 
are conditions for the easing of international tensions”.365 The peace movement’s objective was 
“to preserve the spirit of Geneva” since the Thaw had ushered in a new post-Cold War epoch.  
Yet by the middle of the year it had become increasingly clear that nothing was really 
moving forward in terms of reform or new tactics. A Bureau session of the World Peace 
Council that took place in Paris on June 23-25 was essentially a re-run of the same debates 
except with more division and pessimism. The French were split. Both Emmanuel d'Astier and 
Pierre Cot echoed Corona’s sentiments about the peace movement’s need to adapt to the new 
international condition or face being “perceived as a 'weapon of diplomacy of one of the two 
blocs', as an instrument for communist and progressive parties.”366 Pierre Cot outlined three 
radical changes that the movement needed to urgently make. Firstly, the uncompromising 
stance of the movement – either the ‘peaceful’ socialist bloc or the ‘warmongering’ capitalist 
bloc – put off any moderates from joining. Cot argued that for many outsiders the movement 
came off as presumptuous by implying that it was the only legitimate peace movement. 
Secondly, the movement needed to shake off its reputation of being a Soviet-front organisation 
in order to attract a broader section of society. For Cot and Corona, the movement was in denial 
of its assumption that it could not function and remain independent of the communist parties. 
This was reinforced by the fact that the Chairman and Secretary General, as well as most of the 
members of the secretariat and national leaders were all communists. Cot noted that the 
movement could not be considered independent, since in 95% of cases it took a position similar 
to that of Soviet diplomacy.367 Thirdly, not only was the top leadership of the movement 
advised to bring in non-communist members within its ranks, but the structure of the leadership 
itself needed to be decentralised, since “the composition of the WPC in no way corresponds to 
the scope of movement”.368 
Yet it was Joliot Curie, as Chairman of the WPC, and as a French representative, who 
was the most resistant. Impervious to the sense of optimism that had spread through the WPC 
and Bureau members in the wake of the Geneva Summit, he warned the others they "cannot 
fall into euphoria”, since the key to its effectiveness is “mobilization… despite the efforts of 
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diplomats”.369 Joliot Curie was completely out of touch with the rest of the peace movement. 
At the meeting, Ehrenburg and Korneichuk provided a softer version of Joliot Curie’s stance. 
Ehrenburg, who had two months earlier supported the expansion of the movement, was now 
backtracking. He confirmed Cot’s and Corona’s claims that the communist members in the 
leadership hierarchy simply could not grasp that non-communists amongst their ranks would 
be able to run the movement as successfully. For Ehrenburg, the solution was to let the WPC 
solve its own problems. Accordingly, the WPC should first “provide greater freedom and 
initiative and for our national and regional movements”.370 Although he admitted that the 
hierarchy of the leadership chocked off all imitative at the bottom, that on “its own the WPC 
is narrower than the movement; the Bureau is narrower than the WPC, and the Secretariat even 
narrower”. He was unwilling to put the blame on communist control, euphemistically noting 
that “the closer [one gets to] the leadership, the more there is a kind of an invalid political 
selection”.371 Hence, what was needed was a reorganisation of the Bureau and the Secretariat. 
For Ehrenburg, the reorganization reorganisation of one would automatically correct the other. 
Korneichuk blandly concurred, "I agree with some of the statements… regarding the 
reorganization of our methods and structures" and offered a token gesture of having the Soviet 
delegation removed from the Secretariat “if it [was] found to be necessary”.372 
Although two opposing sides could be observed, other members exhibited a sense of 
exhaustion and defensiveness. Italian politician Celeste Negarville complained how "today it 
is more difficult to mobilize the masses than it was during the Cold War." Isabella Blum in a 
thinly-veiled criticism of the Soviet Union’s hypocritical propaganda of a war-mongering West, 
suggested that “It would be easier to establish communication with organizations opposing war, 
if it could be proved to the Movement that the question of military service by convictions would, 
with the help of our friends from the USSR and China, also be raised in these two 
countries."373Australian feminist and human rights activist, Jessie Street, complained that the 
WPC’s propaganda was at a disadvantage when coming up against harsh economic realities. 
The WPC’s call for a reduction in armaments did not take into account the negative impact it 
would have on mass employment, since many countries had massive weapons industries.  
 In hindsight, the Bureau meetings at the end of April and June were a disaster for the 
peace movement because they failed to take it in a new, bold and unified direction. For those 
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in the West who faced the harsh realities of selling the movement at home these meetings were 
the last test and the last straw to see if the Soviets and their supporters were serious in making 
the necessary changes for the movement to have broader appeal outside of communist and 
socialist circles. The meetings were seen as an opportunity to reverse the centralisation and the 
further domination of communists and communist sympathisers that had culminated in the 
Helsinki decision to centralise the Secretariat. Isabella Blum exemplified this sense of 
disillusionment among Western WPC members. Up to 1956 she appeared to be one of the most 
ardent supporters of the WPC, irrespective of the direction it was going in. In a conversation 
with the Soviet ambassador to Belgium, V. Avilov, Belgian artist and pacifist, Baron Allard, 
spoke with Blum at the end of March about the state of the peace movement. In a conversation 
with Blum, Nenni "spoke very disparagingly of the Peace Council as an organization that 
fulfilled in its time the necessary task, but is now outdated and dying".374 Blum agreed with 
this and stated that she too was intending to leave the Secretariat of the Council, as she did not 
like to "waste time." Allard himself believed that "the body [peace movement] had very much 
outgrown the head [Peace Council], and that at the present stage of international relations, 
which presents an opening for great new opportunities for developing the Movement, its 
leadership is clearly unable to cope with the situation because they do not understand it"375.  
Even the Soviets had to acknowledge this. In a report on the state of the World Peace 
Council, Soviet Peace Committee aide, O.N. Bykov, pointed out that the Chairman Joliot Curie 
and his Office in Paris had almost no contact with the Secretariat in Vienna. In addition, the 
Office, consisting of the chosen Secretariats, “operated virtually without the Chairman 
himself”.376 As a result, all of the work of the Office was conducted by a small team of French 
staff (despite Ehrenburg’s assurances!) led by the Vice-Chairman Roge Meir. Meir found 
himself often in conflict with the Secretariat in Vienna, who accused him of abusing power. 
Bykov’s defence of Meir as simply “acting on behalf of the Chairman” belied the 
predisposition the Soviets had for giving power to the French and the French’s subservience to 
the Soviets, both of which the rest of the Secretariat tried and failed to avoid.377 In any case, 
Bykov noted that "almost all secretaries, with a sense of bitter regret, note that lately the 
Chairman devotes too little time to the peace movement."378 Joliot Curie, who was grieving 
from the death of his wife, Irène Joliot Curie, since March 1956 was also elected as a member 
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of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party. The peace movement would not be 
his top priority, which meant he was unsuitable for the Chairman position.  
The failure of the April Bureau session to resolve these issues turned the then up-
coming June session into a crucial last test in the eyes of Western WPC members for the Soviets 
to take their calls for radical reform seriously. In a second conversation with Avilov on June 
12th – just 12 days prior to the Bureau session in Paris - Allard expressed his conviction that 
the Soviet Union had lost interest in the movement. Blum, Allard revealed, intended to leave 
the Peace Council, as "there is nothing to do now”, with “the Peace Council… simply dragging 
out its existence, waiting for the end."379 Despite Ehrenburg’s assurance at the Bureau session 
in Helsinki in December 1955 that no nationality would have precedence in the Secretariat, 
Allard complained even though the Peace Council “need[ed] to be to preserved at all costs” the 
leadership needed to be replaced, “especially the French, [who are] useless organizers."380 Yet 
Allard also echoed the dilemma many in the West had: despite the fact that they wanted more 
non-communists within the ranks of the leadership and a policy of Soviet non-intervention, 
they could overlook the fact that from its inception the peace movement was a Soviet 
undertaking. Ideally, the Western members wanted to maintain links with their Soviet 
counterparts and receive financial backing from the Soviet Union, but simultaneously have the 
movement formulate its own initiative even if it meant criticising the Soviet Union’s foreign 
policy. As Allard acknowledged: “if there is no centre, which the USSR was, then it all 
collapses".381  
Yet Allard’s view, besides highlighting the frustrations of Western WPC members, 
reinforced the hard reality of the peace movement: it was a Soviet propaganda institution and 
instrument of ‘soft power’ to be utilised whenever Soviet diplomacy required it. For all intents 
and purposes, during the latter half of 1956 the Soviet Union would find itself looking inward 
to deal with the unintended political consequences of Khrushchev’s ‘Cult of Personality’ 
speech and the Thaw. Khrushchev’s speech was interpreted by Soviet Bloc states as a sign of 
the Soviet Union loosening its grip over their countries to allow for a more independent course 
of local and national socialism. The Polish protests were based upon such a misconception. 
Just as the Bureau session in Paris was taking place, a protest of 100,000 people in Poznań, 
Poland was being brutally crushed with 400 tanks and 10,000 soldiers. The source of discontent 
was wages and rising taxation among workers at the Joseph Stalin Metal Industries factory, of 
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all places. A delegation of workers was sent to Warsaw on June 23rd to meet with the Minister 
of Machine Industry to reach a compromise. On June 27th the delegation was notified by the 
Minister of Machine Industry that promises that made several concessions would be withdrawn. 
Strikes started the next morning and would only be crushed on June 30th. In the aftermath, 600 
were wounded and 57-100 people were killed, including a 13-year old boy, Romek 
Strzałkowski, who would become a national martyr. This was not how the Soviets envisioned 
the Thaw, but neither would they hesitate to use force if they felt their bloc was crumbling. The 
crushing of the Polish protests did not deter other Soviet bloc countries from attempting to 
loosen the Kremlin’s grip.  
In late October two events put the peace movement in a difficult position – one in the 
Soviet Bloc and the other in the Middle East. In comparison to the Polish Uprising, the 
Hungarian Uprising on October 23rd was much more damaging to the peace movement’s 
credibility from the Western perspective. Whereas the Polish Uprising lasted only 4 days the 
Hungarian Uprising would only be crushed after 18 days. Yet more importantly, and unlike the 
Polish Uprising, the Soviets decided to invade Hungary. What started off as a student protest 
inspired by the Polish Uprising on June 23rd, with a list of sixteen points calling an end to Soviet 
domination over Hungary, gave way to a nation-wide revolt that resulted in the collapse of the 
Soviet-backed government and the establishment of a new government made up of hastily 
formed workers councils. This new government disbanded the State Security Police, intended 
to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and promised to hold free elections. In reaction to these 
events the Soviets initially declared a willingness to negotiate only to invade the country on 
November 4th. By November 10th, when the revolt was crushed, Hungarian casualties amounted 
to 2,500, with 200,000 refugees forced to flee. 
 The Soviets found themselves alienated and discredited from their own movement. At 
the 45th Conference of the Executive Committee and a session of the Council of the 
Interparliamentary Assembly, both hosted in Bangkok on November 10-24, the Soviet 
delegation met with a very cold reception after the Hungarian Uprising. In a secret report to 
the Central Committee, the Head of the Soviet Parliamentary Group K.A. Gubin wrote that 
apart from participants from Asia and the socialist countries, the Soviet delegation was faced 
with real obstruction. The French and British delegations initially refused to meet Soviets and 
when they did, the meeting took place informally at the apartment of a staff member of the 
French Embassy, where the embassy delegate, Devaux, "compared the actions of the Soviet 
troops with those of the Nazis". In addition, the head of the French delegation, E. Faure spoke 
of Soviet ‘terror’ in Budapest and declared that this caused "irreparable damage to the prestige 
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of the Soviet Union".382 The head of the British delegation, Stoddart-Scott, spoke of Soviet 
‘colonialism’, of how "we reject the colonies while you restore them in new forms in Eastern 
Europe".383 Even the Soviet’s allies spoke out against the invasion, as head of the Polish 
delegation S. Zolkiewski argued that "the USSR has really undermined its prestige and military 
action in Hungary was a serious mistake, as it has aroused bitterness among the Hungarians 
and indignation of public opinion in Europe."384 The Soviet found themselves pariahs among 
their allies.  
 What should have been at least a start to a reconciliation turned to further humiliation 
for both the Soviets and their allies. At a WPC meeting in Helsinki on November 20th, the 
Soviets negotiated for the council to adopt a mild(er) resolution on Hungary. For Hungary itself, 
the peace movement was virtually destroyed. The Soviet delegation managed to convince the 
WPC to pass the new resolution by promising to “take any steps to alleviate the situation in 
Hungary in respect to the role of the Soviet military intervention”.385 Ehrenburg felt a particular 
pressure in trying to convince the Soviet regime to alleviate the situation. In a letter to the 
Presidium of the Central Committee, Ehrenburg outlined the urgency of the situation, pleading 
that "if the Soviet Peace Committee is not given a chance to demonstrate its peaceful initiative 
in a particular issue, then it will accelerate the collapse of the global movement."386 After 
Helsinki, another meeting took place in Moscow between the Soviets and the Hungarian Peace 
Committee. In Moscow, they declared that "in the current conditions the peace movement is in 
deep crisis. The Hungarian Peace Council as such [has] actually collapsed.” 387  It was 
thoroughly delegitimised in Hungary and could only be rebuilt from the beginning again.  
 Ehrenburg’s letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee was sent in desperation 
over the deteriorating situation of the peace movement and ahead of a Paris session of the WPC 
in December. The pressure on the Soviets by the end of 1956 was such that Ehrenburg and 
other Soviet representatives could no longer simply represent Soviet interests and hinder 
reforms within the World Peace Council. The letter was uncharacteristically blunt in describing 
the dire situation and presenting the alternatives the peace movement realistically had. 
Ehrenburg argued that in order to preserve the movement within the existing framework it was 
“now necessary to change our tactics and, through mutual concessions, find a platform that has 
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up to now primarily served the peace policy of the Soviet Union but can in this or that question 
quite clearly differentiate from the Soviet diplomacy line."388 The peace movement’s rhetoric 
would now have to apply to the Soviet Union itself, as Western counterparts “will insist on a 
clear mention of Hungary as a state affected by the failure of collective European security or 
rejection of universal agreements to withdraw troops from foreign territories”.389 Ehrenburg 
laid out three options: 
 
“The Movement can be frozen. That is, not convene any of the governing bodies till 
some a relaxation of tensions. In this case, it makes no sense to go to the Paris meeting. 
However, it is necessary to take into account that it is impossible to be sure that the 
Movement will be able to be revived afterwards." 
"The Movement can remain as it is. In this case, it is necessary to clearly state that for 
the foreseeable future it will shrink and in Western countries it will become exclusively 
communist. (...) " 
"We can finally choose the third solution and begin to reorganize the Movement on a 
more flexible basis, but for this we need to have an answer from the CPSU Central 
Committee before departing to Paris.”390 
 
The members of the Presidium of the CC were not impressed with Ehrenburg’s 
suggestions. As with the Polish and Hungarian demands there would be no compromises. The 
peace movement would fundamentally stay the same. The best the Soviets could give by way 
of concessions was to rather cynically present the Hungarian Peace Committee propaganda 
with "gift materials" worth 100 thousand roubles in January 1957 as support after the events of 
1956.391 
The gesture was symbolic of the fact that the Soviet regime had no longer regarded the peace 
campaign as a crucial element for legitimising the Eastern Bloc. The Hungarians did not receive 
help from the West in their revolution because the configuration of relations with the Soviet 
Union – in the nuclear age – was too critically important to disrupt fundamentally, and because 
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Khrushchev was too willing, if unpredictable, an interlocutor to ignore for long. By April 1957, 
Soviet officials were openly saying that the diplomatic situation was ‘settling down’.392 
The normalisation of diplomacy between the Soviet Union and Britain had been 
gradually taking place in parallel with the Soviet Peace Campaign after Stalin’s death. De-
Stalinisation had made a growing network of contacts possible in diplomacy, politics, culture, 
academia, the professions and everyday life. These contacts were so crucial that they would 
easily survive the crisis of de-Stalinisation of November 1956, and indeed subsequent crises.393 
Indeed, the Presidium of the Central Committee’s reluctance to decentralise the peace 
campaign to allow it evolve into a genuine mass movement stemmed from the fact that after 
Stalin’s death it became increasingly apparent that scientific, economic and cultural exchanges 
between the Soviet Union and the United States were more effective in normalising relations, 
and in turn, solidifying the East-West status quo in Europe which the Soviets so desired over 
the peace campaign’s diplomatic assault.  
As early as January 1954, American businessmen began to travel to the Soviet Union 
to establish contacts with their industrial counterparts. After Stalin’s death, small groups from 
both sides were soon making visits. The following year a number of ‘reciprocal visits’ on both 
sides took place, with American figures from the steel, agricultural, housing and electrification 
industries visiting the Soviet Union and Soviet delegates visiting in September and October.394 
During these two years, both the West and especially the Soviet Union began to understand the 
value of these exchanges in normalising relations. This normalisation of relations rested on the 
understanding that neither would exploit indirect conflicts, such as the Suez Crisis, or internal 
crises, such as the Soviet invasion of Hungary, to destabilise the status quo. These strengthened 
links were institutionally de-Stalinised in the USSR immediately following the Suez–Budapest 
diplomatic breakdown: the State Committee for Cultural Ties (GKKS) was formed, and VOKS 
(the Stalin-era organisation for promoting cultural ties abroad) was replaced with the Union of 
Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.395 At the British 
end, the process took place before the secret speech in 1956, with the formation of the Soviet 
Relations Committee of the British Council. In 1955, the committee was involved in the 
arrangements of 18 visits from the Soviet Union to Britain. These visits ranged from large 
delegations of doctors to trips by single scholars and by 1956 the number of such visits totalled 
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29.396 In the context of this new diplomatic development, the peace campaign was becoming 
increasingly irrelevant. 
This was in marked contrast to the Second World Peace Congress in 1950 which was 
intended to take place in Sheffield but forced to convene in Warsaw when the British 
Government cancelled visas that had been granted and refuse to leave land non-visa delegates. 
Subsequently, the Cabinet decided to exclude about half of the Soviet ‘support’ staff 
accompanying the delegation, granting only 10 of the remaining 40 visa applications and 
refusing entry to over half of the delegates that did not require visas. The Government 
interpreted the WPC’s Stockholm Appeal for the abolition of atomic weapons as a Soviet tool 
for manipulating the British public. From the British Government’s perspective, the peace 
campaign exploited Western freedom of speech to persuade the public to sign a disingenuous 
appeal that supported Soviet foreign policy and potentially compromised Britain’s security by 
binding it to Soviet demands.397  
After Stalin’s death, the Soviets realised that opening official diplomatic channels was 
much more conducive to gaining legitimacy from the West than conducting an intrusive 
campaign aimed at putting public pressure on Western governments. The thawing in relations 
did not culminate with a new peace campaign but old-fashioned diplomacy: Between April 18th 
and 27th 1956, Nikita Khrushchev, first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
and Nikolai Bulganin, chairman of the Council of Ministers, led a delegation to Britain to 
discuss frankly the European status quo. As Mark B. Smith has argued, “the visit had most of 
the trappings of a state visit and all of the punch of candid talks between the two countries’ 
most powerful politicians. It was a historic conjuncture that symbolised the new ‘transnational’ 
reality: the powerful array of links that shot through the iron curtain after Stalin’s death.”398 
These links – in culture, science, education, trade, technology and politics – ensured not only 
the peaceful coexistence of the Soviet Union and Britain, but also made possible the sustainable 
international system of the post-Stalin Cold War.  
The immediate challenges to Soviet-West relations in late October 1956 following the 
Suez Crisis, which threatened to pit Great Britain against the Soviet Union in the wake of the 
former’s invasion of Egypt, and the Soviet invasion Hungary, which threatened the East-West 
status quo in Europe, was a litmus test of whether cultural exchanges could sustain the new 
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dialogue between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The immediate response on both sides 
to the near simultaneous crises suggested that the goodwill built over the previous 2 years 
would break down. The Soviet Relations Committee of the British Council held a special 
meeting on November 6th and cancelled an imminent visit by the Sadler’s Wells Ballet to 
Moscow, “[i]n view of public opinion in this country, which strongly condemns the renewed 
suppression by Soviet forces of Hungarian liberty and independence”. The committee agreed 
to boycott an upcoming reception at the Soviet Embassy, and arranged for other postponements 
and abandonments. In response, the Minister of Culture, Nikolai Mikhailov, circulated a neo-
Stalinist note in January 1957 decrying the fact that “modern bourgeois propaganda is exerting 
a noticeable influence on the artistic intelligentsia”.399 Despite these setbacks, there was soon 
desire to re-institute contact. On February 21st, the Soviet Relations Committee noted that the 
Foreign Secretary had requested “a cautious resumption of officially-sponsored Anglo-Soviet 
contacts”, though for the time being these should be “unobtrusive”. By April, the Foreign 
Office had setup arrangements for a full resumption of cultural relations. In June, this process 
was effectively formalised. The Soviet Peace Campaign was now essentially obsolete. It had 
fulfilled its mission: not of mobilising Western public against their own governments’ foreign 
policy and increasing communist influence, but of keeping Western communists from 
potentially destabilising the post-war status quo in order to give the Soviet regime diplomatic 
manoeuvrability to the division of Europe into two stable blocs.  
For the Soviet regime the invasion of Hungary in November 1956 vindicated two things. 
Firstly, by not supporting the Hungarian Uprising, the West had come to recognise and accept 
the division of Europe into two blocs as the post-war status quo. Secondly, cultural exchanges 
and the normalisation of diplomatic ties was much more effective in making the West come 
around to the idea of this new status quo than any ‘peace offensive’. The Hungarian crisis 
confirmed for different reasons for both the Soviets and their Western counterparts that the 
peace campaign was no longer a top priority.  
 
 
*  * * 
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The origins of the peace campaign were rooted in the two most pivotal moments of the 
early Cold War period: The collapse of the Alliance system and the rise of the Eastern and 
Western blocs. For Stalin, the aim of the peace campaign was to mobilise the Western masses 
to put pressure on Western governments to ensure that the transition from the collapse of the 
Alliance to the Iron Curtain did not escalate into a new military conflict between the former 
allies.  
Yet, the very nature of the peace campaign precluded it from ever reaching the Western 
masses in the way Stalin had hoped for. Firstly, the peace campaign was explicitly anti-Western 
(and anti-American in particular) and anti-capitalist in its rhetoric. Its main function was to 
spread the idea in the West that it was the Western capitalist governments which were the 
source of tensions in Europe after the war. This propaganda could never effectively counter 
Western propaganda on the Soviet Union’s takeover of Eastern Europe, which meant that the 
campaign’s lack of political neutrality linked it firmly with the Soviet Union – something which 
the World Peace Council would not be able to shake off neither internally nor publically. 
Secondly, despite having emerged as one of the two great powers, the Soviets failed to 
effectively modernise their propaganda techniques to effectively capitalise on their hard-won 
prestige. The organisational and rhetorical elements that made up the Comintern’s Popular 
Front policy against the rise of fascism throughout the 1930s were essential adopted by its 
successor, the Cominform. Despite its aim of creating a grass-roots spontaneous network of 
organisations, it exhibited all of the ideological and bureaucratically centralised predispositions 
of the Cominform. There was none of the spontaneity and inclusivity that characterised a 
genuine peace movement – a fact picked upon very quickly in the West. Instead, in 1947 a 
blatantly pro-Soviet, anti-Western ‘open letter’ from Soviet literary figures sparked off three 
successive conferences, each one validating the next. The World Congress of Intellectuals in 
Defence of Peace in August 1948 in Wroclaw snowballed into the Scientific and Cultural 
Conference for World Peace in March 1949 in New York, which then led to the World Peace 
Congress in April 1949 in Paris and Prague simultaneously. The congress established the 
World Committee, which would then transform into the World Peace Council the year after, 
during the Second World Peace Congress in Warsaw.  
During these formative years, the congresses and conferences demonstrated the 
contradictions in Soviet aims. On the one hand, each successive conference and congress 
purged any undesirable elements from the ranks of the movement and kept those who whole- 
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heartedly submitted to Soviet dominance, such Frederic Joliot-Curie, Jean Laffitte, Cheretti, 
Sereni, Isabella Blume and Paul Robeson. At the same time, the peace campaign still retained 
the rhetoric of an all-inclusive grass-roots organisation aimed at all strata of society. Yet by the 
time of the First World Peace Congress the movement had solidified into another Soviet-
backed intelligentsia front, with the congress consisting of scholars, professors, writers and 
white-collar professionals, such as engineers, lawyers and doctors. 
While the Soviets had no qualms about purging the movement of real or imagined 
enemies, such as John Rogge, Titoist ‘infiltrators’ or Catholic Papal spies, the rest of the 
movement temporarily tolerated with Soviet dominance because it was the Soviets who 
financed it. Yet increasingly, Soviet control of the movement and its aim to expand it beyond 
the communists and the far-left intelligentsia began to clash with each other. While the 
Stockholm Appeal in March 1950 and the peace pact between the five great powers in 
November 1950 received a massive amount of signatures, the vast majority of these came from 
the Soviet Bloc countries, in particular China and the Soviet Union. Internally, the Soviets 
could not understand that their domination and centralisation of the movement could have 
contributed to the Western perception that the movement was a tool of the Soviet Union! The 
Soviets instead turned their frustration on the communist parties that dominated the national 
peace committees in the West and roundly criticising them for their supposed lack of effort and 
organisational skill. Likewise, Soviet funding of the magazine Peace Supporters ensured that 
it would never evolve beyond Cominform propaganda. In essence, it demoralised Western 
communists and left them to implement the Soviet-dominated peace campaign and suffer the 
social and political consequences of an indifferent and hostile public and press.  
As Western communists became vocal about adapting their peace committees to their 
respective countries, such as pushing through for a peace fund independent of Soviet funding, 
it became increasingly apparent that the peace campaign was an integral part of Soviet foreign 
policy. As Stalin became increasingly frustrated with the US-dominated United Nations, the 
Stockholm Appeal and the peace pact between the five great powers were employed to present 
the World Peace Council as an alternative to the United Nations. This culminated with the Bio-
Warfare Campaign, in which Western scientists were organised as part of a fact-finding 
mission to prove America’s use of biological weapons in Korea and China. The campaign 
failed in its objective and eventually died out as the United Nations intended to investigate the 
findings.  
After Stalin’s death in March 1953, Soviet foreign policy refocused on European 
collective security and the question of Germany’s reunification. This shift caused it to lose 
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direction and purpose. Khrushchev’s leadership meant that the World Peace Council was 
entangled in the ever-rapidly evolving diplomacy that would continue for the next three years: 
the back-and-forth proposals and counter proposals between the Soviets and the West, the 
Berlin Conference in January 1954, the Geneva Summit and the Geneva Conference in May 
1955 and October 1955. More importantly, the Soviets realised that the stabilisation of the 
Western and Eastern blocs could only be achieved through diplomacy and not the peace 
campaign. In April 1956, Khrushchev further strengthened this approach so that when a 
potential diplomatic breakdown occurred during the Suez Crisis and the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary in October it became apparent to the Soviets that the peace campaign, viewed by 
Western governments as a destabilising force, could be a threat to Soviet diplomatic efforts. It, 
therefore, could not be allowed to reform and fulfil its function, at least as Western communists 

























The Internal Soviet Peace Campaign 
   
The Soviet Peace Committee: Bureaucracy of Peace 
 
Because the peace campaign had its roots in the Soviet response to the escalating 
tensions in post-war Europe, the internal version of the campaign mirrored its international 
counterpart with a crucial exception: Unlike the World Peace Council, the Soviet Peace 
Campaign did not contain divergent and clashing views, which meant that the campaign was 
controlled and orchestrated from the top much more tightly. The early history of the ‘struggle 
for peace’ begins with its institutionalisation in the wake of the World Peace Congress in 1949. 
Grigorian and Shepilov characterised this as “practical steps intended for consolidating the 
gains made by the Congress”400. In practice this meant organising the Soviet Peace Committee 
very much in the same manner as the World Congress of Intellectuals in Defence of Peace that 
took place in Wroclaw in 1948. Molotov ordered that the intelligentsia convene in Moscow, 
Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Tashkent and Baku and that the Soviet delegates of the World Peace 
Congress make speeches. In essence, this solidified the Soviet Peace Committee’s place in the 
pecking order: along with the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformbiuro) and the Committee 
for Radio Broadcasting (Radiokomitet), the SPC (and the republic and regional offshoots that 
revolved around it) would be a vehicle for propagandising the message of the World Peace 
Congress and (later) the World Peace Council. The impetus of the establishing the Soviet Peace 
Committee was to maintain links with the World Peace Congress and the national committees 
of countries represented at the congress. 
 Equally important, the peace campaign was to capture the war-weary mood of the 
nation through its institutionalisation, centralisation and instrumentalisation. From the outset, 
the peace campaign was not about Soviet citizens coming together but of Party institutions 
congregating on the Kremlin’s call. Yet to balance this out, most of the organisations called 
upon were the closest things to ‘civic’ organisations that the Soviet Union had. In accordance 
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with the draft resolution of the Central Committee of CPSU, the Soviet Peace Committee would 
be established at a meeting of representatives from the trade unions, women’s organisations, 
youth organisations, academic organisations and other social organisations that had 
participated at the World Peace Congress. The Chairman of the SPC would be Fadeev.401 
At the end of August 1949, Moscow hosted the first All-Union Peace Conference, with 
1200 delegates in attendance, including 76 deputies of the Supreme Soviet, 139 deputies of 
federal and autonomous republics, 26 Heroes of the Soviet Union, 105 Heroes of Socialist 
Labour, 190 Laureates of Stalin’s Prize and 1,034 decorated soldiers. The conference elected 
the Soviet Peace Committee consisting of 70 members, including poet Nikolai Tikhonov as 
Chairman, writers Alexander Fadeev, Alexander Korneichuck, Konstantin Simonov and 
Aleksei Surkov, academics Sergei Vavilov and Boris Grekov, film director Sergei Girasimov, 
and representatives of youth organisations including Nikolai Mikhailov (who was the first 
Secretary of TsK of Komsomol). Trade unions and women’s organisations also took part. As 
part of wider propaganda campaign, a film titled ‘Peace will defeat War’ about the work of the 
All-Union peace supporters was prepared.402 
Yet in one way the Soviet Peace Committee did reflect its Western counterparts: like 
other national peace committees, the Soviet Peace Committee gave more prominence to the 
intelligentsia. There were 70 delegates representing the Union of Soviet Writers, 20 
representing the Union of Soviet Composers, 10 representing the Union of Soviet Architects, 
50 representing the USSR Academy of Sciences, 20 representing the Academy of Medical 
Sciences, 10 from the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, 10 from the 
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, 10 from the Academy of Arts, 20 from the Academies of 
Soviet Republics, 25 from Moscow State University, 15 from Leningrad State University, as 
well as 100 from the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Women, 100 from the Anti-Fascist 
Committee of Soviet Youth, 340 from the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, 130 
from the kolkhozes, 10 from the Slavic Committee, 10 from the All-Union Society for the 
dissemination of political and scientific knowledge (in 1963 renamed the All-Union Society 
"Knowledge"), 15 from the Centre for Cooperative Unions (Tsentrosoiuz), 4 from the Russian 
Orthodox Church and 100 by personal invitation.403 Although more than half of the delegates 
were represented by so-called “public”, “non-governmental” organisations such as the Anti-
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Fascist Committee of Soviet Women, the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth, All-Union 
Central Council of Trade Unions etc., election of 74 members for the Soviet Peace Committee 
at the All-Union Conference resulted in a majority of cultural and political elites, with 20 
writers, 16 academics, 21 from the nomenclature, 4 film directors, 2 actors, a composer and 10 
kolkhoz workers.404 While the republican and local peace committees would be dominated by 
everyday people, the Soviet Peace Committee was intended as the face of the Soviet Union to 
its Western counterparts and as such, included ordinary people only as a token of its supposed 
inclusivity.  
Grigorian, Malenkov and Molotov all presided over the Soviet Peace Committee and 
its relations with the World Peace Congress and (later) with the World Peace Council and all 
aspects of representation of international affairs in the country. All three edited a speech that 
was to be given by the Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and SPC 
member, V. Kuznetsov, at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the Stockholm 
Appeal in June 1950. Over six versions of the speech were edited by Grigorian, Malenkov and 
Molotov before it could be approved. Molotov’s drafts are especially noteworthy. He excised 
whole sections from the text pertaining to the merit of the Standing Committee of the World 
Peace Congress (i.e. “the main authority of the international community”, “the spokesman of 
the hopes and aspirations of millions or regular people who yearn for peace”, “the voice of all 
peace-loving humanity’s conscience”), instructing Kuznetsov not to praise the committee.405 
Molotov’s reasoning might have been that given the Standing Committees 76 country 
membership and no guarantee of a Soviet majority it would, therefore, have been prudent not 
to praise the organisation since at any given time it might turn anti-Soviet. 
The All-Union Peace Conference, the republic and local peace committees, however, 
were under Malenkov’s control. Even though it was Grigorian and Shepilov who prepared the 
Central Committee resolutions on the All-Union Peace Conference, including the agenda, the 
makeup of the Presidium of the conference, the programme and who would be speaking and 
the budget, it was Malenkov, as Secretary of the Central Committee, who approved everything. 
For example, SPC’s response to the invitation from the Standing Committee to the International 
Peace Awards had to be approved by Malenkov and even plans of action for preparation and 
carrying out in the Soviet Union on International Day for the struggle for peace on October 2nd, 
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1949.406 The choice of Malenkov to rule over the domestic peace campaign reflected Stalin’s 
post-war mind-set to hinder any potential civic activity that could have arisen as the Soviet 
regime was in the middle of re-consolidating its political grip over the country. By 1952, Stalin 
increasingly withdrew from the business of the Communist Party Secretariat, leaving the task 
of supervising the Soviet Communist Party entirely to Malenkov407. 
Malenkov’s background in the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, which was 
responsible for the central administration of the party, and the Organization Bureau (Orgburo), 
which oversaw the work of local party committees, shaped the Soviet peace movement into a 
highly-centralised organisation completely dependent on the Kremlin with a strong hierarchical 
structure, but one that understood that resources needed to be used for pragmatic purposes. 
Working within a meagre budget and relying on other institutions for hand-outs, the Peace 
Committee faced “unsolved organizational questions in comparison to other organizations”.408 
The Soviet Peace Committee was intended to be an umbrella organisation that brought together 
members from other “public organisations”. As such, it needed a large staff to make it work. 
Grigorian’s letter to Malenkov highlighted the Soviet Peace Committee’s lack of status among 
other organisations. The Soviet Peace Committee had less staff than the Slavic Committee, 
which had 70 staff or the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth that had 59 staff409 since the 
latter two had been formed nearly a decade earlier at the start of the war. The Peace Committee 
still had no separate space for prestige ceremonial purposes, such as meetings with foreign 
delegations, nor any qualified translators.  
Mikhail Kotov, Executive Secretary of the SPC, reiterated the SPC’s need for assistance 
in his budget plan to the Central Committee for 1950. Out of the 3.1 million roubles required 
for the top-ranking positions of the SPC, such as the Executive Secretary and the permanent 
representatives of the SPC to the World Committee of Peace Supporters, 3,000 and 4,000 robles 
would be paid, respectively. Out of 33 posts, only 5 were executive posts – Executive Secretary, 
his deputy, permanent representatives to WCPS, permanent representative of the SPC to the 
journal ‘Peace Supporters’, and Chairman of the SPC. The rest were assistants, translators, 
maintenance staff (including street sweepers, 2 cleaners, doormen, guards) and the head of the 
secret service department. Yet none of this was enough to convince the Central Committee to 
fund the Peace Committee in accordance with Kotov’s suggestions. The resolution passed by 
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the Council of Ministers in April 1950 allocated only a little more than half of the 3.1 million 
Kotov had asked for. For compensation the resolution called for State Supplies of the USSR 
(Gossnab) to allocate two ‘Pobeda’ automobiles and 80,000 roubles worth of furniture for the 
Soviet Peace Committee’s offices and the Ministry of Trade to supply to the Soviet Peace 
Committee’s offices 200 metres of upholstery material, 100 metres of silk, 100 metres of satin 
and 3 radio sets.  
Throughout 1950 the Soviet Peace Committee continued to barely function. Tikhonov, 
as Chairman, in hopes of improving the situation outlined the dire situation to Molotov. The 
SPC still had only three full-time members of staff, no library, and requests to have phones 
installed were rejected. Furthermore, it did not have its own headquarters (with the Slavic 
Committee letting them use a room at 10, Kropotkinskaia Street). The SPC also did not have 
adequate transportation (relying on a single ‘unusable car’), no reviewers, no translators, and 
no furniture.410 However, Grigorian found it inappropriate to “acknowledge this increase of 
staff and budget at this time”.411 
The mix of centralisation, underfunding and friction and dependence with other 
propaganda institutions had a detrimental effect on the Soviet Peace Committee’s visits abroad 
and its hosting of counterparts in the Soviet Union. Members of the SPC, usually well-known 
scholars, writers and artists, would be sent in groups to different countries and often 
complained that the funding scheme for trips abroad was not even enough to cover the 
minimum living costs. For example, a group of SPC representatives going abroad could not 
even afford a standard room in a hotel. Prominent Soviet figures found themselves struggling 
as they could only afford the cheapest third-rate rooms. They all received a meagre sum of 23 
roubles for each day and 11.80 roubles for hotels, prescribed sums that were nowhere near 
enough to cover even standard type rooms.412 For example, Simonov and Kovalevskii ran out 
of money and the SPC requested from Molotov to give a directive to the Finance Ministry to 
send Simonov and Kovalevskii $200. On March 21st 1950, Molotov sent this request to 
Grigorian to help out. Even for such an insignificant issue, a hearing at the Secretariat of TsK 
on March 10th 1950 had to take place.413 Under the existing paying scheme, scientists and 
cultural figures found themselves in a tight financial position when abroad. It was suggested 
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that the allowance to cover living expenses should be raised by 25% and for allowance 
accommodations to be increased to cover ‘actual cost’.414 
Soviet delegates abroad were forced to contend not only with barely getting by but also 
having to follow a rigid regime when interacting with counterparts in the West. Molotov’s 
archives contain 24 memos to Stalin on the resolution for the convening of the Second WPC 
with Molotov’s corrections. The Second World Peace Congress was organised in a similar 
fashion: a Special Resolution by the TsK with Molotov’s secretariat drawing up lists of all 
Soviet delegates grouped in various categories. Five rebuff speeches by Soviet delegates were 
prepared “because of the possibility of speeches being presented at the congress that include 
charges against the Soviet Union on several issues (‘the iron curtain’, ‘economic discrimination’ 
and ‘escalation of the Korean situation’)”. 415  As a result, many Soviet Peace Committee 
delegates seemed cold and aloof to their Western counterparts. Even after Stalin’s death Soviet 
delegations appeared to be ineffective. The logic of staging speeches for purely propaganda 
reasons continued to dominate. Undertaking preparations for the World Peace Assembly in 
Helsinki in 1955, Ehrenburg devised a system of topics and subtopics. There were 16 topics 
and each one was assigned to a member of the Soviet delegation, who was given a theme 
according to their specialisation. A maximum of 4 speeches were allowed to be read by each 
delegation and Ehrenburg decided to prepare two speeches on general topics. These speeches 
would be distributed in the following way: “one would speak with positive denunciation (sic!) 
against preparation for war, and the other with a negative”.416 That is, if other delegates accused 
the Soviet Union of preparing for war a speech would be prepared to counter the accusation by 
arguing that Soviet preparations (and only Soviet) were for defensive measures, unlike 
NATO’s. Then there would be two speeches on the big issues (i.e. disarmament and the 
prohibition of atomic weapons and security in Europe). The idea was that since the Soviets 
could not control the process they needed to prepare speakers who would either appear with 
counter-propaganda in case anyone spoke out against the Soviet Union or those who would 
speak out with positive propaganda. Since the course of the assembly could not be predicted it 
was decided that what speeches would and would not be given during the course of the 
assembly. 417 
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Most Soviet delegations, in John Bernal’s (Vice Chairman of the WPC) opinion, “carry 
themselves with an aristocratic manner; in their composition are very few ordinary people, 
workers, peasants, rank and file intellectuals”.418 Typically, many delegates who went abroad 
did not dare to act independently, kept silent and spoke bureaucratically before an audience - 
lively, interesting speeches rarely happened. Russian delegations going abroad did not engage 
with representatives of various local social circles.419 Even other Russian delegates, those more 
attuned to the etiquette of their Western counterparts, understood this. Commenting on the 
inefficiency of the Soviet Peace Committee in establishing cordial links with their Western 
counterparts (subtly critiquing the committee’s lack of initiative), Ehrenburg’s admitted that 
"Western members of the movement are increasingly saying that the performances of Soviet 
Peace Committee and its leaders 'invariably carry the official state character.’"420 Even for pro-
Soviet peace activists, Soviet delegates increasingly resembled the official mouthpiece of the 
Soviet Union. At a meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Peace Committee at the end of May 
1955 ahead of the World Peace Assembly, Ehrenburg noted how glad he was that all delegates 
would be accommodated in private homes since it would make it impossible for Soviet 
delegates to be in constant contact with each other and compel them to talk with other 
delegations. Ehrenburg even went so far as suggesting that Soviet delegates should be 
prohibited from lunching and dining separately from other members of the assembly, as “this 
is the practice of the three congresses and we ought to live like everybody and eat with 
everyone".421  
 As someone who understood the Soviet Peace Committee’s predicament, this was a 
source of frustration for Ehrenburg. He came to the conclusion that if Soviet delegates were to 
be convincing there would need to be a degree of independence of the Soviet Peace Committee 
from other Soviet propaganda institutions. The committee raised the issue of condemning any 
Soviet newspaper article or book published overly harsh in tone to show that “we fight for 
peace”, but was not able to implement it. For the Kremlin, the Soviet Peace Committee was 
never meant to question the Soviet Union’s foreign policy but merely frame it in a more subtle 
way. Soviet delegates could not divorce themselves from this task or question Soviet foreign 
policy as this would undermine the raison d'etre of the Soviet Peace Campaign.  
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Compounding financial pressure was the fact that Soviet delegates, besides having to 
read speeches towing the Party line, were ordered to act as observers of their Western 
counterparts. After their trips they had to write reports. The SPC’s briefings to the Central 
Committee resembled intelligence reports. These reports minutely recounted the conversations 
of foreign visitors, their personalities, their opinions of other delegates, their views on the 
internal problems of the peace movements and the political situation in their respective 
countries. Establishing links with other national peace committees also gave access to Soviet 
diplomats working abroad to gather intelligence on their ‘allies’ and ‘friends’, since there was 
a high degree of cooperation between the Soviet Peace Committee and Soviet diplomats abroad. 
For example, secretary of the Soviet embassy in Sweden, Georgii Farafonov, and TASS 
correspondent in Stockholm Anisimov would update the Central Committee about their 
conversations with the Secretary of the Swedish Peace Committee, Per-Olov Zennström. The 
report includes a 3-page profile of all the members of the Swedish Peace Committee, rating 
their political outlooks, and in some cases even their familial connections.422 These reports sent 
to the TsK were carefully reviewed. This is not only shown by the (mandatory) signatures of 
those who read them, but also by the markings/underlining in the text – especially on specific 
details.  
SPC secret reports to the TsK were regular and systematic. The reports were 
accompanied by cover letters – either of Tikhonov or Kotov – and were not only compiled by 
Ministry of State Security agents working in embassies or as TASS correspondents, but also 
by wholly respectable cultural and academic figures. For instance, in the briefing of the 
academician Alexander Oparin, who was head of the SPC delegation to Finland during the 
festivities in commemoration of the ‘relay for peace’ in the spring of 1950, the SPC delegation 
meeting with heads of the Finnish Peace Committee and Finnish MPs was described. The 6-
page report recounted in great detail the conversations which took place. During a visit to 
Helsinki University in which they saw the chancellor, Professor V. Kiparsky was also in 
attendance as a translator. Oparin notes of Kiparsky, “that even though he is head of the Russian 
Institute (at the University) and despite his glibness it is doubtful he would be a close friend of 
the USSR”.423 Oparin regretted that he was only shown around the humanities departments at 
the university and was not allowed to visit the bio-chemical institute, where he would “have 
liked to get acquainted with the facilities”. Yet he was only able to access the botanical garden 
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and only after repeated requests.424 To their counterparts in the West, Soviet Peace Committee 
delegates seemed detached and unconvincing in their demeanour. Undoubtedly, the Soviet 
delegates’ dual tasks of performing the Soviet script in speeches and gathering intelligence 
negatively affected social interaction with their Western comrades. 
The Soviet Peace Committee found itself in limbo as a result of the regimes harsh 
regulations regarding tourism. Ahead of the World Peace Assembly in Helsinki, the Soviet 
Peace Committee was keen that it had to address the difficulties their Western counterparts 
faced trying to get into the Soviet Union. As Ehrenburg noted in 1955, "the Austrians will very 
keenly raise the question of the cost of tourist trips. They have already mentioned that a 5-day 
trip to Prague from Vienna is at a cost equal to a trip 3-week around the Mediterranean Sea. 
They consider this a humiliating ban on tourism." 425 Ehrenburg bemoaned that the high cost 
of tourist trips “opens doors for all kinds of people with special tasks and makes it impossible 
for those from whom we would have much more benefit”.426 The committee could not arrange 
hotel accommodations for a large number of tourists and was practically unable to widely 
conduct foreign tourism in the Soviet Union. It would only be two years later that the Kremlin 
decided to relax visa restrictions and prices during the 1957 Moscow World Festival of Youth 
and Students.  
Cultural exchanges highlighted not only the tight control under which the Soviet Peace 
Committee found itself but also the organisation’s rather undefined place among other 
institutions that promoted the Soviet Union. Moscow could not decide whether the Soviet 
Peace Committee was merely a propaganda organisation or a vehicle for cultural exchange as 
well. Because Soviet delegates were promoting the Soviet Union through propaganda and, in 
effect, encouraging cultural exchange with their Western counterparts to reinforce the Soviet 
gestures of ‘peaceful coexistence’, the Soviet Peace Committee’s work would overlap with 
other institutions, such as Introurist and VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with 
Foreign Countries), that dealt with tourism and cultural contacts. Yet the Soviet Peace 
Committee neither had the personnel, the resources, nor the institutional clout to undertake any 
activities related to tourism. For example, Charlotta Bass, a member of the US Communist 
Party, head of the Congress of American Women, editor and publisher of a “progressive negro 
newspaper”, Californian Eagle (which had been published in Los Angeles since 1879), visited 
the Soviet Union in September 1950. She was only shown the most attractive places. She was 
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taken to a factory, an assembly line, child and medical institutions, and schools for teacher 
training. She was welcomed everywhere with hospitality. However, she got the impression that 
everything looked good only when it was prepared in advance. She visited a factory, 
accommodations, a day-care centre and a kindergarten. Yet, as a report to the TsK (written by 
the translator who accompanied Charlotta Bass) attests: “she persistently asked to see where 
workers lived, which no one was prepared for. In the front entranceway of the tenement 
building where she was taken it was unbelievably dirty, almost resembling a toilet. The second 
tenement building shown was cleaner, but all apartments were shown, even those that weren’t 
clean.”427  
As they were ordered to do so abroad, Soviet Peace Committee members used these 
opportunities to create profiles of their guests. The meetings between SPC and their foreign 
counterparts were recorded as secret verbatim records and sent to the TsK. These reports had 
an interrogative feel about them, with the conversations consisting of brief questions and 
lengthy responses from the foreign visitors. This was evident in Charlotta Bass’ verbatim, with 
such questions being posed as: How did the Congress of American Women organise its work? 
Who are the members of the Congress in California? Are women’s organisations linked with 
the Communist Party?428  
1953 would prove to be a particularly busy year for receiving foreign delegates. The 
Soviet Peace Committee received 30 delegations from 16 countries, a total of 173 people. This 
included people from India, China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Burma, Australia, Mongolia, Brazil, 
Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Sweden, Norway and West Germany. Of them, 39 were WPC 
members, 11 state and 38 public figures, 33 writers, 7 artists and 35 members of parliament.429 
Considering that most of the foreign delegates were not ordinary people but usually prominent 
cultural or political figures it was doubly important that these visits made a positive impression 
in case delegates were to publicise their visits in their home press. With such a wide variety of 
foreign visitors it was impossible for the Soviet Peace Committee to coordinate the excursions 
to a degree which the Soviet regime expected since many visitors wanted to see the Soviet 
Union beyond Moscow and Leningrad. Each year, the Soviet Peace Committee presented to 
the Central Committee multipage lists of destinations and establishments where it was possible 
to take foreign delegations on tourist excursions. It was only after the approval of the Central 
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Committee of the CPSU and regional and territorial Party committees that foreign delegations 
were sent invitations. 430  Tikhonov complained of local organisations “not systematically 
instructing heads of enterprises, institutions and collective on the nature of the discussions with 
the delegations and other events related to visiting foreigners." 431  By then the Soviet 
Committee was wary of organising excursions for Western counterparts as the process was 
burdened by red tape and a lack of cooperation with other political bodies.  
Mere requests became massive operations. For example, in July 1953 two 
representatives from Vietnam at the World Peace Council, Ngun Juan Thong and Tran Dai 
Ngiya, appealed to the SPC with a request to arrange for them to visit the construction of 
Moscow State University and a tour of Moscow River. Turning to Suslov, Tikhonov spoke of 
the Vietnamese delegates’ ‘objectives’.432 Yet even with the Central Committee’s approval, the 
Soviet Peace Committee could not rely on other institutions for these tourist excursions. As 
foreign delegates had come to feel that their visits were staged many began refusing to come 
to the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Peace Committee, by the fact that, they considered 
it a political organisation and preferred to visit via VOKS. Even the head of the Soviet Peace 
Committee saw the organisation as a hindrance to attracting prominent foreign cultural and 
political figures. For example, in late November 1955 at a session of the Presidium of the SPC, 
members discussed delicate issue of inviting an American delegation to the Soviet Union to 
commemorate Benjamin Franklin’s 250th anniversary without having the Soviet Peace 
Committee to issue the invitation.433 Ehrenburg suggested that the American Peace Committee 
issue the invitation, since an invitation “from our Committee won’t get us anywhere and will 
just be another pointless gesture”.434 The operetta actress Evdokia Lebedeva dismissed the idea 
of any peace committee and suggested the literary journal Friendship of Nations while 
Tikhonov and others suggested VOKS and the Academy of Science. 
When things did not go according to plan the Central Committee scolded the Peace 
Committee for these failings. What should have been a useful tool for promoting the Soviet 
Union’s ‘peace agenda’ to foreigners became a logistical nightmare for the Peace Committee, 
as gradually the Soviet Peace Committee became a passive actor in organising ‘peace 
nomenclature’ tourism. It became politically expedient to evade responsibility by blaming 
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those below, such as the First Secretary of the Regional Party Committee. A Brazilian 
delegation visiting the Soviet Union in 1953 exemplified this situation. While all expressed 
admiration for what they saw, there was also frustration. For example, the head of the 
delegation, General José Pessoa Cavalcanti complained that he was not given a plan of the city 
and that in the visits to Kharkov and Kiev his requests to visit workers apartments and prisons 
were not met. A tourist excursion was a rare opportunity to get a sense of the extent to which 
Soviet propaganda corresponded to actual Soviet reality. The Soviets were well aware that 
foreign delegates would not only contrast the Soviet Peace Committee’s speeches to Soviet life, 
but would also come in contact with ordinary people indoctrinated by domestic Soviet 
propaganda. It was therefore understandable why the Soviet’s wanted to have as much control 
over what their guests saw and who they came in contact with.  
It was deeply embarrassing to bring un-indoctrinated Westerners to witness 
indoctrinated Soviets spouting the superiority of the system not least of all because it 
undermined the committee’s effort to present their campaign (and by extension most Soviet 
campaigns) in a sincere and honest light independent of official propaganda. For the Western 
observer, when these carefully coordinated trips showed the slightest sign of breaking down 
they revealed a rather surreal situation. The Brazilian delegation came across such a situation. 
General Cavalcanti observed that the Soviet people dressed rather poorly, and it was rather 
ironic when a representative of management for a silk-weaving combiner named Shcherbakov, 
proclaimed that silk had ceased to be a luxury item and was being snapped up like hot cakes 
by the lowest paid strata of the population. Cavalcanti also noted the huge queues at the 
department store Centre Mostorg, how crammed the buses and trolleybuses were, and the large 
number of dilapidated wooden houses in Moscow. He was particularly unhappy when visiting 
factories as his questions about the number of workers, products manufactured, work 
programme, and on the area occupied by the company were not answered.435  
The (seeming) complacency of Soviet citizens to a foreign observer was a result of the 
domestic propaganda strategy that the Soviet regime hoped would boost the country’s moral. 
In its own work the Soviet Peace Committee played a balancing act between its objectives 
abroad and at home. Abroad, the Soviet Peace Committee’s propaganda promoted anti-
Americanism by scaremongering Western masses of the prospect of a third World War. At 
home, anti-Americanism was intended to boost official Soviet patriotism and the threat of war 
offset by the military prowess of the Red Army. Thus, it was up to the Soviet Peace Committee 
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that the World Peace Council’s magazine, with its ever changing title (from Peace Supporters 
to Peace to In Defence of Peace), was appropriately censored and that it convincingly portrayed 
to its Western target audience and to the Soviet people the possibilities of nuclear war. In 
essence, the WPC magazine could not undermine domestic Soviet propaganda efforts of 
portraying the Soviet people as brave and defiant, full of bravado and without fear of a new 
war.  
Molotov was in charge of censorship of the magazine Peace Defenders for domestic 
consumption. In an attempt to shore up support for the signature collection campaign for the 
Stockholm Appeal to ban nuclear weapons in early 1950, the French editors of the magazine 
decided to publish a special edition with a free brochure with every copy ‘I Want to Understand 
the Atomic Question’. The brochure described in gruesome detail the outcome of nuclear 
bombardment, citing the accounts and stories of eyewitness of the atomic bombing in Japan. 
In a letter to Molotov on the matter, Grigorian dismissed the brochure having “well-worn 
sensationalistic elements and contains unnecessary details which might give off the wrong 
impression about atomic bombs.”436 The clash between French and Soviet editors was not 
resolved even when the magazine had undergone a name change in the beginning of 1951. In 
issue 4 of the now-titled Peace magazine the French once again published a nuclear war-
themed piece deemed inappropriate by Moscow for the Soviet audience by Pierre Boucard (a 
French physicist) entitled ‘Is it Really Possible to Protect Oneself from an Atomic Bomb?’. In 
what was for the Russian publisher a direct contradiction of Soviet domestic propaganda, 
Boucard stated that “the underestimation of the dangers of nuclear weapons is one of the 
methods of continuing of the Cold War”. As he had done before, Grigorian dismissed the article 
as “intended for those readers abroad who still need clarification on the dangers of war through 
well-known scare tactics. It goes without saying, that the Soviet people do not require this”.437 
Such articles were not encouraged in the Soviet Union, since they were considered 
“demoralizing’ and “disarming” for Soviet people.  
Yet by 1952 the Soviets had lost interest in the magazine, by now called In Defence of 
Peace. Nikolai Tikhonov and P. A. Vishniakov, the editor of the Russian edition, appealed to 
the Central Committee of the CPSU to have the circulation of the journal increased from 30,000 
to 40,000, only to have it rejected. It was inexpedient to increase the print run since the 
magazine was prioritised for foreign readers and was intended “for top-level workers at the 
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peace committee”.438 Of the 30,000 copies, only 20,000 went to the USSR and another 10,000 
to People’s Democracies. This circulation provided copies to all Soviet Peace Committees and 
“met the demands of the Soviet readers”. Yet this explanation glossed over serious problems 
that the Soviet Peace Committee faced in adapting the World Peace Council’s magazine to a 
Soviet audience. These problems had less to do with the Party’s mingling and censorship and 
more to do with a lack of financial support to diversify the magazine and develop national spin-
offs that could be aimed at the domestic audience of each country. 
The magazine Supporters of Peace was the first national publication of the peace 
movement. It was assumed that it would be the first step in establishing an extensive series of 
magazines for the movement’s audience. However, it proved to make little headway for the 
movement's propaganda. Looking back at the magazine’s development 5 years later, 
Vishniakov, explained to the Soviet Peace Committee why the magazine failed to attract a large 
audience in the Soviet Union and in other European countries for that matter. The main obstacle 
for the magazine was not Soviet but French dominance over the magazine’s content. 
Vishniakov argued that “at the beginning this arrangement …was necessary” in order “to 
support the system, it was necessary to establish authority for the main edition, and it was 
necessary to faithfully reproduce”.439 However, this necessity “has long ago disappeared”.440 
The French dominance over the magazine meant French content took up most of the pages, 
which hardly made it appealing to an international audience. The task of the Soviet editors was 
to simply translate the articles. Such a passive role “did almost nothing to attract the broader 
Soviet society, Soviet writers, economists, and athletes to participate in the political dilemmas” 
that would have given the Russian edition of the magazine mass appeal. 
 Part of the problem was not only the predominance of French themes but also the 
writing style. From the French editors’ perspective, the magazine was written to attract “those 
groups of intellectuals who need to be convinced”.441 It was therefore impossible for both 
Soviet and French articles to be included in a single edition of the magazine since both were 
accustomed to and preoccupied with writing for their respective domestic audience. Soviet 
writers did not have to write in a neutral tone since they did not have to compete with other 
ideas. Likewise, Soviet articles could not be submitted to French editors without extensive 
editing to make them appealing to the French masses. As Ehrenburg argued, through his hands 
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passed more than one hundred articles, of which more than 70 or 80 were sent out. 
“Unfortunately, we have few people who are currently capable of writing for abroad. 'Etude 
Sovietique' had success in France, because the French journalists working there received our 
articles and completely reworked them. For example, one article on gastronomy, began as 
follows: ‘Under the leadership of the party and government ...’ and ended on ‘the triumph of 
the socialist system’".442 Senior editors would give specific topics and order 5 articles, accept 
3 of them, but none of them would be printed. Often, when the issue was discussed in the World 
Peace Council, Soviet delegates would complain about the purely French character of the 
magazine, but the French would say, "Give different materials, arrange a Swedish or Danish 
article - we are happy to publish them”.443 The solution, as Vishniakov argued, should have 
been to decentralise all the editions and exchange materials between all countries when it was 
required. This would have given the magazine impetus to develop a national identity instead 
of merely translating content catered to the French public.444  
The Central Committee’s handling of the magazine hinted at a lack foresight on the 
difficulties it would encounter by publishing one magazine for different countries. The Central 
Committee wanted a magazine that would unite the “world’s peaceful forces” under Soviet 
slogans. Instead, it ended up with a journal that was completely unusable for the Soviet internal 
audience as this audience had fundamentally different perceptions of the world, the dangers of 
nuclear weapons and political reality. 
 From this perspective, we can see that some other problems that the Soviet Peace 
Committee encountered were the result of this. By not clearly stating the aims of the peace 
campaign many Soviet people did not understand what the campaign was actually for and what 
the committee was responsible for. This was because the peace propaganda was superfluous 
for the Soviet audience, in which case it was perceived as an organisation for abroad. Poet and 
Deputy Chairman, Alexei Surkov, outlined a rather passive role for the committee in which 
“agitating the Soviet people about peace is not our task” and by “taking advantage of the great 
interest towards our country… use parallel channels to establish links and contacts”. Surkov 
believed that the Soviet Peace Committee in its domestic practices would not be “substituting 
the World Peace Council”.445 In essence, the Soviet Peace Committee would take its directives 
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from the World Peace Council (supposedly independent of the Soviet influence!) and would 
merely be a channel for establishing networks “…wherever and whichever way possible”.  
This was neither politically feasible nor practical by Moscow’s understanding of the 
Soviet Peace Committee as primarily a propaganda institution cloaked in civic garb. The 
public’s perception of the SPC was altogether different. Many thought it was a charity 
organisation. By March 1951 the SPC was receiving up to 500 letters a month, many of which 
asked for help or assistance. An example of this was Ivan Kazeka – a disabled war veteran of 
the Great Patriotic War and defender of Sevastopol. Turning to the SPC, he wrote “Before the 
war I was a combine operator. But now no one is willing to hire me. I have seizures during 
which I temporarily lose my eyesight. I need to go for treatment, but have no money and the 
District Social Welfare Department is unwilling to help me. My pension can’t cover my 
expenses. Help me to cover expenses for the sanatorium. I will be grateful for this and so will 
my children, whom I have to raise.” 
 The SPC was flabbergasted by such responses and could only reply in a very formal, 
rigid tone: “we warmly welcome your patriotic spirit. We share your righteous anger towards 
the bloody gangs of aggressors who are attempting to start a new world war”. A copy of the 
disabled war veteran’s letter (which included a request for a sanatorium voucher) was sent to 
the Krasnodar Party Regional Committee. The Krasnodar Regional Party Committee Secretary, 
Nikolai Ignatov, sent a copy of this correspondence to Suslov, who then complained to 
Grigorian that the SPC was taking on work for which it was not responsible.446 The SPC’s 
attempts at ridding itself of handling such requests were chastised by the Foreign Department 
of the TsK since Party organs also did not want to deal with such issues.447 
 Yet in another way the SPC was successful in mobilising Soviet society. The anti-
imperialist, anti-American speeches given all over the country by republic, regional and local 
committees served to legitimise and articulate the official political peace discourse. Just 
between January and March alone, 700 letters were received by the SPC outlining solutions for 
‘peace’. Suggestions from letters included arranging an international tribunal to “expose and 
punish the warmongers”, posting a list of the “warmongers in order to condemn their actions 
and sentence them as enemies of the people”, building an International Peace Palace and 
creating a Peace Fund in order to arrange a cash lottery and fundraising for child victims of the 
war in Korea.448 However, to a degree these proposals also highlighted the impracticality of 
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this mobilisation since, given the SPC’s lack of resources and political independence, none of 
the suggestions, even the more feasible ones, such as building a Peace Palace, would come into 





Performing Peace: Soviet Commedia dell'Pacem 
About how Klim Petrovich spoke at a meeting for defence of peace 
by Alexander Galich 
 
You can ask my wife, Dashka, 
You can ask her sister, Klavka 
Well, I didn’t have a drop of drink, 
Only just - a little – to cure a hangover! 
 
I spent Sunday well-mannered, 
I washed and took a steam bath, 
And for dinner, as my family gathered, 
We started to joke and tell tales! 
 
I only took a hundred grams to start me up 
(Well, not more than one hundred, I swear on my life!) 
Then I see – a car pulls up to the house, 
And I see - it has an obcom [Oblast Party Committee] licence 
plate! 
 
Well, I'm on the porch – who is this guest, 
Who did they bring, not a Czech? 
And there - assistant, pen pusher 
"Get in” - he says – “let's go!" 
 
Well, if they are calling on me, 
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Then let’s go! 
In the Palace of Culture a morning session is taking place 
In defence of peace! 




Well, I sit on the assistant’s lap, 
He hands me a piece of paper 
I’m not going to argue here. 
"Get acquainted” - he says on the way 
“With your outstanding speech!" 
 
Okay – I thought – you drive a bargain, 
Well I am an expert in such readings, thank God! 
We arrived, come up to the stage, 
And sit on the side out of courtesy. 
 
Then I see the Chairman wink at me: 
Signalling, “make your working class presence felt!” 
I head to the centre of the stage, 
And not reading mechanically, like a woodpecker, 
I speak slowly and sternly: 
 
"Israeli” – I say – “militarism 
Is known all over the world! 
As a mother” - I say – “and as a woman 
I Demand them to justice!” 
 
“For all the years that I have been a widow, 
All happiness has passed me by, 
But I stand ready 
For peace! 





Right then my jaw dropped, 
After all, such blunders happen! - 
This son of a bitch, punk 
Had mixed up the [speech] papers in a hurry! 
 
And I don’t know - to continue or stop, 
In the hall, there seems to be no laugher or howl ... 
The First (secretary), too, I see makes no faces, 
And nods his head in approval! 
 
Well, I gave a quick glance – as they say 
(Thank God everything always looks the same!) 
And as I finished - 
Everyone applauded simultaneously, 
The First (secretary), too - personally – clapped. 
 
Afterwards he invited me to his fiefdom 
And he said in front of his entourage: 
"Well, brother, you gave a good working class thrashing! 
You summed up the international situation very correctly!"... 
Such was a story!449 
 
To understand how by the 1960s the Soviet Peace Campaign had become a tired, boring 
and empty ritual, as Russian poet and dissident Alexander Galich so aptly described, one has 
to look at its formative years, during which the ritual and linguistic elements were solidified. 
From its inception in 1949, the All-Union Conference and the Soviet Peace Committee, with 
its Republic, Oblast, and local offshoots, was organised like clockwork with the sole purpose 
of staging a tightly choreographed meeting in which the speakers and audience performed 
                                                          




something akin to Commedia dell’arte: everyone turned into a ‘type’ and parroted clichés about 
the Soviet Union’s ‘peacefulness’ while denouncing the ‘aggressive’ West.  
In the first ten years of the peace movement in the Soviet Union, Moscow was the centre 
of all initiatives. The domestic Soviet Peace Campaign served as a vehicle to legitimise the 
Kremlin’s peace campaign abroad. The annual All-Union Peace Conferences, which brought 
representatives from all republic peace committees, directed all the peace campaigns in the 
country without any input from republic, regional or local peace committees. The First All-
Union Peace Conference, organised on August 25-27 1949 at the House of Columns, praised 
the work of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress, with delegates pledging to 
"…accept the obligation to fully support and develop the propaganda and organizational work 
of the Standing Committee to rally all forces fighting for peace and against war”. The Second 
All-Union Conference was organised on October 16-18 1950 to express its solidarity for the 
Standing Committee’s (of the World Peace Congress) Stockholm Appeal to “ban all atomic 
weapons, reduce all kinds of weapons provided under effective supervision, the condemnation 
of armed aggression and interference in the internal affairs of states”. The conference also 
elected 65 delegates to the Second World Congress to “declare that the Soviet people are ready 
to join hands with all peace supporters to fight for the prevention of the threat of war”.  
The Third All-Union Conference was held in Moscow on November 28-29 1951, to 
discuss and praise (a ritual by this point) the results of the signature collection campaign for 
the World Peace Council’s call for peace pact between the great powers (France, Great Britain, 
US, USSR and China). The Fourth All-Union Conference was held on December 2-4 1952 to 
praise the World Peace Council’s and the Soviet Peace Committee’s campaign against the use 
of bacterial warfare in the Korean War. As Timothy Johnston450 and Geoffrey Roberts451 have 
argued, with the onset of the Korean War in late June 1950, the meetings organised on republic, 
regional and local levels to promote the Stockholm Appeal became an opportunity for the 
regime to gain public approval on its stance on the Korean conflict. As focus shifted from 
banning nuclear weapons, the Soviet press and those making speeches at the meeting focused 
on the Korean War and denouncing American involvement, which reflected the official 
stance.452 Finally, the Fifth All-Union conference was organised in March 1955 to coincide 
with the Soviet Peace Committee’s signature collection campaign under the Standing 
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Committee of the World Peace Council call against the “threat of a nuclear war· that was made 
during the Viennese bureau session of the World Peace Council in January 1955. 
Even though the campaign for the Stockholm Appeal failed to make the intended impact 
in the West, with most of its 500 million signatures coming mainly from China, the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc,453 in the Soviet Union the campaign was a propaganda success. 
By presenting America’s involvement in the Korean War as aggressive the Stockholm Appeal 
signature campaign convinced the public of the Soviet Union’s moral justification of attaining 
its own atomic bomb without contradicting or compromising its rhetoric of the ‘Struggle for 
Peace’. For the Soviet people, the Korean War simultaneously presented the Soviet regime as 
the guarantor of peace and right for having the atomic bomb because it only strengthened Soviet 
resolve for peace against aggressive capitalist nations. As Johnston argues, “the language of 
strength for peace enabled the USSR to reverse its anti-nuclear stance and declare the Soviet 
acquisition of the bomb as a 'victory in the cause of peace'”.454 However, the campaign also 
highlighted the public aversion to war that, for the Soviet regime, bordered uncomfortably on 
pacifism. As “comments and questions of a number of speakers at local events demonstrated a 
concern that US meddling would spark a wider conflict”.455 Anxiety about whether the Soviet 
Union would be dragged into the war dominated many of the discussions at the meetings. 
The first meeting of the WPC was held in Berlin in February 1951. At that meeting the 
council decided on a new petition campaign: the call for a peace pact between the five great 
powers. Such a pact had been a Soviet aim since September 1949 and had featured in the 
resolutions of the peace movement, but not as a central demand. In February 1951, however, 
Stalin gave an interview in which he highlighted the demand for a great power peace pact. The 
Politburo’s instructions to Fadeev and Ehrenburg reflected the new priority attached to this 
demand. During the next two years 600 million signatures were collected – 100 million more 
than the Stockholm Appeal - but it was hard-going. In May 1951 Ehrenburg reported to 
Molotov that the campaign had been slow to develop in the capitalist countries. Many more 
such reports followed. Even the Soviets found it difficult to mobilise domestic support around 
the issue and had to give specific and detailed campaign instructions to all regional party 
organisations. Of the 600 million signatures collected, nearly 500 million were from China and 
the USSR. 
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It was only in September 1951 and in accordance with the decision of the plenum of 
the Soviet Peace Committee on August 28th, 1951, that the first republic and autonomous region 
Peace Conferences took place. The conferences elected members to the national territorial and 
regional peace committees.  
Before the start of the signature-collection campaign on behalf of the World Peace 
Council’s appeal for concluding a peace pact between the five great powers at the end of August 
1951, the Party Central Committee UCP sent out letters to the Central Committees of the 
Communist Party at the republic, regional (Oblast), city and local (Raion) level to undertake 
the campaign “under systematic management by party organizations and with mass political 
activity which target the widest strata of society”. 456  The drive to have the entire Soviet 
population endorse the peace pact was genuinely all-encompassing, and included not merely 
the civilian population but the armed forces as well. Writing to Malenkov, Defence Minister 
Vasilevsky commented how the “campaign is proceeding in an orderly fashion thanks to the 
work of servicemen”.457 In a report by the Russian Navy, 93% to 100% of the Navy’s rank and 
file supposedly signed the petition, while in the army 90% to 99% signed up.458 Apparently, 
by the 31st of October (coincidentally when the campaign for signatures had finished) 100% of 
the navy signed the petition.459 This was not down to propagandistic considerations, since 
depicting the Soviet armed forces as peace loving would have run counter to projecting Soviet 
military strength at home and abroad and subsequent Soviet propaganda on the success of the 
signature collection campaign did not go into the detail on who actually gave their signature. 
The decision to include the Soviet military in the campaign was down to the fact that 4-5 
million Soviets were in the military.  
 The first peace conferences in the regions and republics took place in the second half 
of September 1951 and were timed ahead of III All-Union Peace Conference (November 27-
29 1951). Complete systematisation and strict signature collection deadlines prevented the 
campaign from becoming a genuine civic event instead of a purely bureaucratic procedure 
where everything was measured in numbers and quotas. On the one hand, the peace movement 
took on the facade and grassroots approaches of civil society. On the other hand, the Kremlin 
did everything in its power to eliminate any genuine local initiatives by having everything 
carefully choreographed to only simulate civil society. Peace committee organisers at the 
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republic, regional and local level very much understood that the peace conference had to be 
all-inclusive, with every strata of Soviet society well represented. For example, the Kazakhstan 
Peace Conference held in Alma-Ata on September 20-21, 1951 consisted of 464 delegates - 
which included 334 workers, farmers, engineers and technicians, 12 scientists, 18 teachers, 4 
writers, 95 Party and Komsomol-union workers, and 1 “servant of the Muslim religion”.460 
Among the delegates there were 31 Heroes of Socialist Labour, 1 Hero of the Soviet Union, 9 
recipients of the Stalin Prize, 363 who were awarded orders and medals, 10 deputies of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 49 deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR, 169 
deputies of local councils, and 169 women.461 
The success of the signature campaign could be attributed less to the enthusiasm of 
Soviet citizens and more to the wide reach that the Peace Committees had at their disposal all 
over the country. For example, the Karelian Autonomous Republic had 23 regional, 2 urban 
and 1,167 local committees to promote the struggle for peace in factories, collective farms and 
schools. In these committees worked 6,784 persons (48.2% women, 64.2% non-Party)462. 
Within the span of 2 weeks after the WPC’s call for the Peace Pact on September 17th, 1951 
153,339 Karelo-Finnish SSR people signed up.463  
Moscow and the Moscow region, as the centre of the country, exemplified the powerful 
reach of the Peace Committees. To promote the signature collection there were 385,750 
agitators and speakers (including in 210,397 people Moscow City) who gave 722,079 talks and 
read 26,190 speeches in factories, collective farms and educational institutions. These were 
attended by 9,992,428 people (including in Moscow – 370,225 discussions and 9,894 reports - 
5,282,390 people attended).464 Such numbers do not necessarily point to a civic initiative taken 
up by Soviet citizens as much as a ubiquitous organisation able to penetrate all parts of society.  
Stalin’s death in March 1953 did little to change the overall structure of the Peace 
Committees in the Soviet Union. Although Georgy Malenkov, as the new Soviet Prime 
Minister, emphasised the USSR’s commitment to peaceful coexistence, the only change that 
was to come was a new campaign. On March 13-15 1953 the WPC Bureau convened in Prague 
to discuss the follow-up to the Vienna congress. The congress had established a broad-based 
commission to issue a direct appeal to each of the five great powers to negotiate a peace pact. 
This commission was scheduled to meet in Vienna on March 16-17 during the Bureau’s 
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discussions As Fadeev subsequently reported to Molotov, doubts were expressed by some 
members, including Nenni, about the viability of continuing the peace pact campaign. When 
the commission met, however, it issued an appeal to each of the great powers to begin 
discussions about a peace pact. At the same time, it called more generally for negotiations to 
resolve international disputes. The need for a broad campaign was raised by Nenni and 
supported by Ehrenburg, who referred to Malenkov’s remarks to the Supreme Soviet. On May 
5-6 the WPC Bureau met again, this time in Stockholm, to discuss perspectives for the 
forthcoming plenary meeting of the WPC in Budapest in June. Ehrenburg made another 
important intervention when he pointed out that the peace pact campaign had been launched at 
the height of the Cold War. Since then the international atmosphere had improved and a general 
campaign for negotiations now had a real chance of success. The conclusion of a peace pact, 
he suggested, was not the immediate issue but would represent the culmination of a campaign 
for negotiations. In effect, this signalled the end of the WPC’s campaign for a five-power peace 
pact.  
Stalin’s death saw no let-up in Kremlin’s control. An All-Union meeting of 120 
representatives of regional, provincial and national Peace Committees held on August 31st 1953 
saw the heads of the committees spoon-fed the most minute instructions in conducting the 
campaign for negotiations. The national Peace Committees were instructed as to the sites, dates, 
the number of attendees, the agenda, how to approve the WPC’s new slogan and as to who 
should be giving speeches at these plenums. After the plenums, meetings were to be held in the 
first half of September in the largest factories, collective farms and schools. Despite giving a 
veneer of ‘grassroots’ campaigning by encouraging ordinary people, workers, farmers, 
intellectuals, women and youth to make statements in support of the campaign, the top-down 
power dynamic of the campaign was nevertheless reinforced, since the bulk of the time was 
dedicated to speeches given by heads of the local Party branch, the Soviets and the trade 
unionists. The meeting reinforced the fact that the leadership of the entire campaign was to be 
exercised by the local Party organisations and that the Peace Committee had to carry out all its 
work in accordance and consultation with the Party organisations. It is rather ironic then, given 
such formalisation and the highly coordinated nature of the meetings that bordered on the 
ritualistic, that M. Kotov (Executive Secretary of the Soviet Peace Committee) in his keynote 
177 
 
speech called for a spirit of spontaneity by not “limit[ing] this important event to a campaign 
approach".465  
Soviet promotion of the new campaign for negotiations, just as for previous campaigns, 
operated like a clockwork system in which the Soviet Peace Committee kept track of all 
activities. By September 1953 Moscow and its regions alone held 1,434 meetings and 3,250 
papers and lectures were given with an attendance of 539,000 people, while within the span of 
15 days in early August at a single factory, 70 papers were (supposedly) presented and more 
than 3,000 discussions on the WPC’s new course of action took place. The Dissemination of 
Political and Scientific Knowledge Society (Znanie), a propaganda institution established in 
1947 but officially designated as an educational organisation, was responsible for arranging 
22,000 lectures throughout the country in 1953 alone. Such a Stakhanovite approach to the 
campaign, in which quota numbers of attendees, of lectures given, and of meetings taking place 
were to be meet or surpassed, completely disregarded anything to do with the quality of 
propaganda or its effectiveness. What mattered crucially was not to disturb the top-down 
hierarchy of the propaganda institutions in its aim of disseminating the peace propaganda as 
far as possible. 
Because the All-Union Peace Conferences were the most prominent and prestigious 
events within the hierarchy of the domestic peace campaign in the Soviet campaign they 
usually established the discursive canon for the republic, regional and local conferences and 
meetings. Playwright and novelist Leonid Leonov’s speech at the I All-Union Peace 
Conference in 1949 encapsulates this discursive cannon. This discourse, like much of Cold 
War discourse, contained five constraining factors: the history of superpower relations, 
domestic political concerns, the status of both the domestic and world economies, present 
diplomatic negotiations, and the ever-present possibility of military engagement.466 As Robert 
L. Scott, argues, “these five factors are endemic to the very nature of post-World War II life. 
Each impinges on the other in a constantly changing mosaic of relationships.”  
Starting off with the doom scenario that almost echoes the opening of Marx’s Das 
Capital, Leonov paints an ominous picture in which "a belligerent large-capitalist clique under 
the guise of slander and disinformation, under the shriek for the so-called 'United States of 
Europe', is carrying out at rapid pace the most shameless expansion” in which “evil gold is 
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being poured on the unhealed wounds of Western Europe and where “sharp military alliances 
are directed against the Soviet nation and its people, because we are a major and reliable 
bulwark of peace, an island of hope against the dusk gathering over the world."467 In one sense, 
Leonov’s depiction of the Cold War was deliberately depoliticised and de-ideologised in order 
to communicate ‘the struggle for peace’ in a more direct, emotional tone. This was not merely 
a battle between communism and capitalism, but a battle between a ‘belligerent’, ‘evil’, ‘insane’ 
and ‘greedy vile lords of capital’ against the ‘bulwark of peace’468 who are ‘marching’ towards 
‘tomorrow’s communist society’.469 This was a battle between the ‘young’ and the ‘doomed 
old’, between ‘a poison’, 470‘senile hostility’ and a ‘young country’.471 Aware of “their total 
social worthlessness”, and their obsoleteness, but “unwilling to respectably and voluntarily 
leave the stage of history”, these capitalists resorted to ‘intrigues’ and ‘conspiracy’472 to derail 
peace, but this was impossible not only because starting a nuclear would ‘like a Ping-Pong’473 
but also because ‘handful of gangsters’ were up against ‘avalanche’, a ‘volcanic force’, 
‘working class giants’ and the ‘majority of mankind’.474 
Such apocalyptic siege mentality was reinforced by other high-ranking members of the 
Soviet Peace Committee. During the promotion of the biological warfare propaganda campaign 
against the US in 1951, Ehrenburg referred to Americans as ‘madmen’475, while Konstantin 
Fedin spoke of how “an American teacher asked his students a question: What do they want to 
be in 10 years? 40% of students responded that, in their opinion, in 10 years they will no longer 
be alive”.476  For Fedin, America was employing a “sinister method of corrupting human 
consciousness”, turning its children into ‘neurotics’ and, in effect, “is systematically preparing 
for the death of its nation and is preparing death for all nations on earth”.477 At the I Stavropol 
Regional Peace Conference in September 1951, writer and three times Stalin Prize laureate 
Semyon Babayevsky spoke of MacArthur, Churchill and Dallas as “unleashed dogs” and “are 
two-legged beasts reared and trained by the aggressive forces of Wall Street, who cannot live 
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without war”.478 Tikhonov, echoing the paranoia of show trials, warned of “dark forces, sowers 
of anxiety and masters of provocation, blackmail and threats”, that are “ready to sprinkle 
peaceful slogans, lofty words about peace, culture and freedom in their speeches so that some 
may believe that…have been reborn and changed for the better”.479 But behind the sweet words 
of the blissfully smiling masks “you can easily unravel the familiar grin of imperialists - the 
enemies of peace and freedom”.480  
What this discursive canon demonstrated was how the Soviet Peace Committee erased 
distinction between metaphorical and literal, when “we stop talking about one thing in terms 
of another and begin treating distinct terms as virtual identities, as if one were the other”. 481 
Such ‘literalized metaphors’ were useful for the Peace Campaign because they vividly 
amplified war anxieties into a siege mentality but also emphasise Soviet military might. 
Inherent in this discursive canon were two potentially contradictory metaphorical 
concepts – maintaining peace and showing strength. Peace rhetoric had to emphasise peace 
without compromising on the Marxist goal of liberating the world’s working class from 
capitalism, destroying imperialism and ultimately achieving communism.482 The meetings at 
the local level played a large part in legitimising the Kremlin’s message. In order to be as 
persuasive as possible it was important to reinforce the character and relationship of speaker 
and audience. In this case, it meant cutting out the middle-man – no Party functionary, no local 
politician, and no professional agitator – and letting the ordinary people give speeches to 
ordinary people. By largely avoiding any state presence in these meetings, the Kremlin 
intended for ordinary people to propagandise each other. It was not simply enough to have 
ordinary people reiterating the official Soviet line to other ordinary people on a weekly, 
monthly and yearly basis. By retelling the same peace narrative over and over again, local, 
regional, national and All-Union peace meetings became rituals during which the rhetoric of 
peace eventually became a reality that all participants believed in. For those who attended these 
almost day-to-day rituals of peace rhetoric and reality, the perception of reality began to blur.483 
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Through the ritualisation of the peace campaign the ‘rhetoric of reality’ could at least re-
orientate the post-war trauma towards strengthening the regime.  
From this ritualised peace rhetoric a scripted narrative emerged, one that required all 
participants to play a part in. All the major textual devices of the speeches given at regional 
peace committees were reproduced from each other. They were all based on instructional 
brochures issued by the Soviet Peace Committee, which provided the same facts contained 
from one report to another report and in the same rhetorical style. So much so, that the speakers 
at the plenary session in Petrozavodsk, for instance, would say the same things as the speaker 
in Khabarovsk and the speakers in Tallinn would say the same things as the speaker in 
Dushanbe. The basic structure of a chairman’s opening speech would start off with describing 
the capitalist machinations for world domination by starting a new World War. This would be 
followed up by describing the unstoppable gathering of the peace movement all over the world. 
At the Amur Region Peace Committee in September 1953, the Chairman would speak of how 
“In England, the Peace Committee called on the population to demand from the government ...", 
how millions of Italians "expressed their anger ...", how "popular movements are increasingly 
growing in Europe ...", "In the Netherlands and Colombia there are increasing demands for 
returning soldiers from Korea ...", or how "In Japan, there are organized struggles against 
military bases and remilitarisation of the country ...". 484 
The final part of the opening address would usually transition to how the “enemies of 
peace” attempt “resorting to [military] adventures” and “derailing the peace settlement” but 
would be encountered by the determination of the ordinary people to defend peace and prevent 
a new war. The most important element of this last section would be to highlight that "at the 
forefront of peoples fighting for peace, is the great Soviet people, firmly and confidently 
marching towards communism."485  
Not only was this an opportunity to highlight the Soviet regime’s diplomatic initiatives, 
but crucially, it provided a transition from Soviet foreign policy to internal domestic policy and 
onto local achievements. In fact, the transition from foreign to domestic to local was intended 
to be seamless in order to highlight the importance of the Soviet regime towards peace. As 
Chairman Amur claimed, "the best evidence of the peacefulness of the Soviet Union is its 
internal policies, which are aimed towards a steady increase of national well-being."486 This 
would often lead into local achievements, where workers of any region reportedly fulfilled the 
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quotas by a particular percentage, and “exceeded the collective commitment towards the supply 
of grain and other agricultural crops” host by a particular percentage.487 In essence, the opening 
speech by the Chairman highlighted the fact that even though this was a ritual that was slightly 
adjusted each time in response to Cold War developments one aspect crucial aspect remained 
constant: a ‘social contract’, of sorts, expressed in the peace rhetoric in which the Soviet people 
were touted as the ‘vanguard’ of the peace campaign in exchange for granting the regime 
legitimacy of its foreign and domestic policy and accepting the hardships of daily life by 
pledging to fulfil the economic plans imposed by the regime.  
As a prelude to the next part of the ritual the Chairman would finish off by touting the 
Soviet people with such slogans as: "The Soviet people as never before is one and monolithic. 
The Peace Camp is unbeatable. It is a powerful obstacle to the forces of aggression." Any anti-
Soviet propaganda was going to be ineffective since the regime believed that "no matter how 
much the corrupt liars of the imperialist camp overstrain, they will not be able to conceal the 
truth about the successes of the USSR and its policy of peace ...". 488 It was the "determination 
and will of the Soviet peoples of the Soviet nurtures confidence in the vanguard of the struggle 
for peace and for the peaceful settlement of international problems for democracy and 
socialism".489  
The Chairman’s opening speech served as a call for the ordinary people to reaffirm their 
allegiance to Stalin and the Soviet regime by mirroring his speech during the “discussions”. 
The Secretary the Regional Committee of Trade Unions of the Amur region would usually talk 
about how well the workers live in the USSR and how bad they live in the capitalist countries, 
how "at this time, when millions are unemployed in the capitalist countries, where poverty and 
hunger dominate and people, where the elderly and mothers are dying, workers are employed 
in the defence industry, while the consumer goods sector is going through an unprecedented 
decline, with high rising costs of basic necessities … our country got rid of poverty and 
oppression ...".490 This would be followed by a story about the Party and government's regard 
for the workers of the region (republic) who "in response to the tremendous care and assistance" 
work like Stakhanovites and…will fight even more vigorously for the early implementation of 
the fifth five-year plan within three years and will thereby contribute to the cause of peace."491  
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Any professional, be it teacher, lecturer, artist, director of the local drama theatre or 
doctor was expected to fit their occupation within the strict confines of peace rhetoric even if 
the statements expressed were awkwardly irrelevant. For example, a milkmaid from the 
kolkhoz 'The way of Ilyich' in the Amur region pledged that "the collective of our District 
Committee, responding to the Party and government's concerns, are taking measures to ensure 
that the cattle have a well-fed and warm in winter. The collective farm 'Dawn of the East' 
fulfilled the plan for mowing hay and packing silage by 100%."492 An excavator from Amur 
proclaimed that miners of the northern section of the town of Rudny concluded on August 23rd 
a nine month plan of coal mining and were already working towards October,  having “took up 
socialist obligations of fulfilling the annual plan of coal mining for the 36th anniversary of the 
October Revolution. This will be our best contribution to the peace and security of nations".493 
In an attempt to be as inclusive as possible the meeting put forth people to speak who really 
had not much to say except recount the achievements in their field and try to tenuously link it 
with ‘peace’. A factory director at the Tyumen Peace Committee Plenum in September 1953 
spoke of how the WPC's declaration has “met a warm response in the hearts of millions ... our 
factory team decided to redouble their efforts in the socialist competition for early 
implementation of the annual plan." As a result “the best people of our factory… perform 250-
300% of the norm every day."494 A foreman of a locomotive depot from Tyumen tried to argue 
that "[By] saving on fuel and increasing [the number of] heavy convoys our transport workers 
help the cause of peace. With the reduction of plain locomotives under repair we are helping 
to strengthen our economy. The labour of all of our locomotive depot workers plays a part in 
the cause of peace."495 Even the head of oil production in Baku pledged support for the foreign 
and domestic policies of the Soviet government. 496 
Teachers would often remind people of the trauma incurred by women and children 
during the war. A teacher proclaimed, "War! Such a hated word! Mothers and fathers do not 
want their sons and daughters to perish in a war that the Anglo-American imperialists are 
unleashing. What is the most priceless thing for a mother? Her child. Children – are most 
priceless for the Soviet state. A joyful feeling overcomes every Soviet citizen, when he sees 
healthy and vigorous youth. Young people are our future, our hope."497 Teachers, however, 
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were not confined to mere sentimentalism. At an Altai Peace Committee Plenum in September 
1953, a teacher gave a speech bordering on paranoid discourse. Speaking in simplified 
language, as if talking to children, she proclaimed, "We are used to translating all international 
events in the language of peace or war. If we read or hear that the U.S. Secretary of State Dallas 
concludes an agreement with Syngman Rhee [President of South Korea] on mutual security, 
or that the American representative of the majority at the UN rejected an offer to participate in 
the political conferences for the conclusion of peace in Korea or India, or that Adenauer won 
in West Germany and so forth, we then say: 'This is war'. And if we hear about the visit to the 
USSR government delegation of the GDR, China, Korea, or impassioned speech of Comrade 
Vyshinskii at a UN meeting on inviting China to participate in the Assembly or of the atomic 
bomb tests in the USSR and so on, then we say 'this is peace, because we intend to use the 
enormous destructive power of the atomic bomb for peaceful purposes'."498 
Medical professionals tended to emphasise the traumas of the war. The chairman of the 
health care workers union, speaking at the Azerbaijan Plenum Peace Committee proclaimed 
that “the tear stains on the eyes of widows and orphans have not even dried yet … from the 
wounds inflicted by Hitler's fascism…”.499 And yet comments made by women, doctors or 
Komsomol members never fully devolved into total victimhood or a genuine show of grief 
since the memory of war trauma had to be firmly balanced with the rhetoric of strength. 
Because these were highly staged rituals where each speaker represented an archetype of his 
occupation and pledged their allegiance to the regime the peace rhetoric could not allow for 
any discourse which contradicted the Soviet Union as a peaceful and at the same time fearless 
and strong nation, even grief for the injured and the dead that hinted at the country’s military 
weakness, unpreparedness and incompetence during the war. Doctors also reflected the Party’s 
official foreign policy and attempted to link it with their profession. The Chief Doctor of the 
Altai Regional Hospital would speak of a conspiracy of health care professionals who 
collaborated “with the warmongers” and who “unleashed bacteriological war in China and 
Korea”." 500  This would serve to contrast Western healthcare with Soviet, which was 
“completely different” since “our health workers are fighting for the health of the Soviet man." 
In fact, Soviet abundance allowed for “an open and broad network of maternity hospitals and 
free medicine… many American women [who] do not have the right to give birth because they 
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have nothing to pay for a stay in hospital."501 For such achievements the people were to be 
thankful to the regime. The Secretary of the Komsomol Tyumen municipal committee 
reminded the audience that "From day to day our Party and Soviet Government care for our 
young men and women, as we built recreation centres, schools, colleges, and stadiums” and to 
let the “U.S. imperialists rage and toss, … as the future belongs to communism."502 
 Those from the art world had no qualms of touting Soviet art over Western art. The 
director of the local theatre in Altai dismissed Western-serving “nefarious purposes” and 
touting Soviet art as the “most humane, the most progressive”.503 An artist practically repeated 
the same, condemning Western art “as languishing in senility and corruption” where 
“progressive cultural figures…are deprived of such a noble, beautiful and meaningful service 
to the people” as Soviet art504, while a poet vowed to convince all “how it was all terrible and 
hopeless before the revolution and how everything changed now” with “a caring Party [that 
builds] hundreds of schools, colleges, new villages, roads, bridges, and power stations”.505 
 For those participating in these Peace Committee meetings the ritual functioned on a 
subconscious and conscious level without any contradiction. That is, it was a propaganda 
exercise in the traditional sense, with simplistic language of demonisation (anti-Americanism) 
and idolisation (the Soviet Union as the hope and future of all mankind) aimed to persuade, but 
at the same the participants of the meetings were fully aware that it was a propaganda exercise 
aimed at them and, furthermore, had no qualms about it being as such. For example, at the 
extended minutes of the extended Plenum session of the Krasnoyarsk Regional Peace 
Committee Polyakov, the Chairman of the Management Board of the Krasnoyarsk branch of 
the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge insisted that “it is 
necessary to embed even more deeply in the consciousness of the Soviet people the idea of the 
struggle for peace and the strengthening of our socialist state, for the successful building of 
communism”. 506  The logic was that economic recovery was essential in maintaining the 
regime’s hold on power and that the economy could only recover when the Soviet people gave 
a pledge to fulfil the economic plans as a contribution to peace. Therefore, the rituals of the 
Peace Committees all over the country were essential in reinforcing time and time again the 
circular logic of peace rhetoric, that the Soviet regime = peace = economic development = 
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achieving communism. This logic worked from both ends: the Soviet regime is by definition 
peaceful (in domestic and foreign policy) and peace brings about economic development which 
will lead to communism. Conversely, the logic dictated that achieving communism would only 
come through economic development that comes only with peace, of which the Soviet regime 
was a guarantor.  
 The last part of the ritual required reflecting back everything that was spoken to them. 
This came in the form of resolutions passed at the end of the meetings in which it would be 
announced that "the people of Azerbaijan together with all the peoples of the Soviet Union 
warmly welcome the achievement of the armistice in Korea ..." , "All people of goodwill are 
encouraged ...", "The people of Azerbaijan, like all Soviet people warmly welcomes and 
endorses this call ...", "The people of Azerbaijan, like all Soviet people, express their outrage 
at the provocative actions of the U.S. government ...", "Workers of Azerbaijan fully share the 
Soviet Government's proposals aimed at peaceful ...", and "The Azerbaijan Republican Peace 
Committee is confident that all citizens of the Republic unanimously respond to the call ...”.507 
 From the Stockholm Appeal in 1950 to the Peace Pact in 1951 to the campaign for 
negotiations that the Kremlin initiated, centralised, and established the parameters of discourse 
on which the Peace Movement would come to rely on. As Timothy Johnston has argued, the 
domestic success of the Peace Movement domestically argues, the Peace Campaigns were “a 
vital platform from which a new, early Cold War vision of the world was communicated to the 
population of the USSR’.508 However, given the highly organised nature of the campaigns 
where genuine civic grassroots activity was nearly impossible, Soviet citizens, intentionally or 
unintentionally, played their part in a ritual. As has been demonstrated, in is not the case that 
participants in the peace campaigns “creatively re-appropriated them as a platform for the 
articulation of their personal grief from the past war and their pacifist sentiments”, as Johnston 
argues.509  Even though the success of the 'Struggle for Peace' derived from the fact that 
different individuals were able to project different meanings onto the word 'peace', from 
whichever way they looked at it invariably it demanded the same thing: the Soviet people’s 
devotion to the state.  
In the first decade of the Cold War it was crucial for the Soviet regime to create a sense 
of political inclusivity for the Soviet people. The Peace Campaign served as platform that 
combined civic activism and political rhetoric. As Durham Hollander has argued, “the 
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insistence on activism is important… [since] people may be successfully socialized to the 
political order, it is necessary to continually reinforce earlier learning in order to keep them 
from slipping into apathy”. 510  The speakers and the audience in the meetings “jointly 
participate[d] in a kind of political ritual which include[d] certain patterns of speech and the 
acknowledgement of unifying symbols…with [the] audience ha[ving] a good idea of how it is 
supposed to respond to it”.511 The ritualisation of the peace campaign, with its demand for strict 
conformity of expressions and clichés, not only served to “demonstrate to the world how 
‘democratic’ the system is, but it keeps people primed for rapid mobilization in the event of 
crisis”.512 This was crucial, since neither Stalin nor the Soviet people knew if war could be 
completely avoided during the first ten years of the Cold War. It was during this time that 
“[Peace] Activism becomes a sort of substitute for revolutionary fervour in a non-revolutionary 
epoch”.513  
 
The Peace Propaganda Industry 
 
Just as the struggle for peace on the international arena was aimed at achieving the 
regime’s foreign policy objectives, Soviet art, in its service to the cause of peace, was created 
exclusively for domestic consumption. It was a huge industry of novels, poems, plays, 
films, paintings, posters and cartoons, as well as songs and even works of high classical 
music. Images associated with the struggle for peace watched over Soviet people from the 
walls of Moscow metro stations, the bas-reliefs of houses, objects of everyday life and 
even postage stamps.  
In fact, the theme of the struggle for peace occupied a key place in Soviet post-war art. 
To grasp its status, one simply needs look at just how generously the Stalin Prize was given 
out for works in various art forms on the theme of the struggle for peace: 
in music - in the genre of large instrumental and vocal works (Sergei Prokofiev's 
oratorio "On Guard for Peace", 1950), in the genre of small musical song forms on peace (A. 
Novikov’s 1947 "Hymn of Democratic Youth of the world"; Seraphim Tulikov’s 1950 song 
"We are for peace"; M. Starokodomsky’s 1951 children’s song "Under the Banner of Peace");  
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in painting and drawing (Fyodor Reshetnikov’s 1950 painting "For Peace"; Boris 
Efimov’s 1949 political cartoons; Boris Prorokov’s 1949 series of drawings "Here it is, the 
United States”, the 1951 illustrations "Truman Tanks to the bottom!" and "American 
gendarmes in Japan "; Kukryniksy’s 1950 series of "warmongers” drawings), in sculpture 
(Vera Mukhina’s 1950 sculptural group "We Demand peace ");  
in film - for feature films (Mikhail Romm’s 1947 "The Russian Question" and 1950 
"Secret Mission", Grigory Alexandrov’s 1949 "Meeting on the Elbe"; Michael Kalatozov’s 
1950 “Conspiracy of the Doomed") and documentaries ("On Guard peace ", 1948; "Youth of 
the World ", 1949); 
in literature - for novels ("The Tempest" by Ilya Ehrenburg, 1947; "The Struggle for 
Peace" Fedor Panferov, 1947; "Guarantee of Peace" Vadim Sobko, 1950; "The Yugoslav 
Tragedy" Orest Maltsev, 1951; "The Storm over Rome" Dmitry Eremin, 1951), in the field of 
poetry (Konstantin Simonov for the collection of poems "Friends and Enemies", 1948; Mikhail 
Bazhanov for a cycle of poems, "The British experience", 1948; Andrew Malyshko for a 
collection of poems "In the Blue Sea," 1950; Alexei Surkov for the collection "World - the 
World ", 1950; Nikolai Tikhonov for the collection of poems "Two Streams" and "At the 
Second World Congress of the World", 1951); 
in the field of drama (Konstantin Simonov for the play “The Russian Question” in 1946 
and “Someone Else's Shadow”, 1949; Nicholai Wirta for the play "Conspiracy of the doomed", 
1948; V. Lyubimova for the play "Snow", 1948; Boris Lavrenev for the play "Voice of 
America", 1949).514 
 
The reasons for such growth and direct support for internal propaganda production in 
all genres and types of art and literature were of a political and representational nature. The 
point is that the Soviet movement’s struggle for peace was promoted as "coming from below", 
and from the Soviet Peace Committee among the so-called "civic organizations". The fact that 
"public" and governmental organisations were in total harmony was explained in official Soviet 
discourse as to the very nature of Soviet public organisations. It was declared that "the 
international work of Soviet public organisations is an important part of the entire foreign 
policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state." Moreover, one of the features of the political system 
of the socialist countries lay in the fact that "due to the nature of their social and political system, 
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social forces are active here (in contrast to the capitalist countries) in organic unity with the 
governments, all public institutions, including foreign, that contribute to the effectiveness of 
foreign policy in general."515 The same can be said about Soviet art, which is also "in an organic 
unity with the government and all state agencies." 
But, of course, the role of the Soviet peace movement was not only to constantly and 
entirely conform to the official point of view, but also to send signals to the West that the Soviet 
regime did not want to communicate through official channels. In the context of a limited set 
of channels of communication with the West a specific role was assigned for culture in active 
involvement in the struggle for peace. Through the use of cultural problems of mobilisation, 
promotion, explaining the changing international agenda of the USSR and the expression of 
those positions that could not be expressed formally were solved simultaneously. Stalin had 
felt the need for such a platform since the very beginning of the Cold War. His choice was the 
Literary Gazette, where he put Konstantin Simonov - poet, playwright and journalist, an active 
participant in the "struggle for peace” – in charge. On July 31st, 1947 Orgburo adopted a 
resolution ‘On the ‘Literary Gazette’. Simonov recalled how this new project was discussed 
with Stalin. "All our newspapers - said Stalin - one way or another are official newspapers, but 
the Literary Gazette - as the newspaper of the Writers' Union - may raise issues informally, 
including those that we cannot or do not want to officially put forward”.516 The ‘Literary 
Gazette’, as an unofficial paper, “may on some issues be to the left of us and sharply diverge 
on the question with the officially expressed view ...".517 The circulation of the newspaper was 
raised tenfold. This, of course, did not mean that Literary Gazette could express some parallel 
unofficial position, but it could do it in a less restrained form.  
The form itself is especially important, because the ‘art’ being considered here was part 
of an overall propaganda effort and was outside of diplomatic formalities. That was how Stalin 
understood the problem: in his view, the Literary Gazette was supposed to become something 
like the voice of the Union of Writers – an "NGO", a sign of "civil society". To Stalin, to be 
outside the "official expressed point of view" presented an advantage to the regime, to the 
extent that he needed such an informal point of view: "It is possible that we will sometimes be 
criticized in the ‘Literary Gazette’ for this, but it should not be afraid, and despite criticism, it 
must continue to go about its own business”, as "the Foreign Ministry about its own, so the 
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‘Literary Gazette’ - its own", Stalin concluded.518 In this political puppet theatre the Literary 
Gazette was assigned to the same broad category as other "social organizations" (i.e., the Soviet 
Peace Committee). Since the scope of diplomacy was shrouded in state secrecy, and in addition, 
the population could not read between the lines of diplomatic conventions, art and print were 
almost the only sources from which information could be obtained. Since the message was 
always the same, with just a change in the mobilisation of specific initiatives, arts and printing 
reproduced the same "peace discourse", but only in a different tone - for different audiences. 
Already by September 20th - less than two months after Orgburo’s resolution - the 
Literary Gazette was featuring Boris Gorbatov’s feuilleton "Harry Truman", in which the US 
president was compared with the "little corporal from Munich." About the same time, other 
newspapers published official reports on the speech to the UN deputy by Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Vyshinsky, "For peace and friendship among nations and against the 
instigators of a new war," where the United States and Britain were accused of disrupting the 
work to ban nuclear weapons. In all subsequent issues of the Literary Gazette anti-Western 
articles were printed in a special ‘warmongers’ column which “exposes the true colours” of 
Eisenhower, Bevin and Marshall. Ehrenburg condemned western culture and Leonov asserted 
that the new Soviet patriotism should extend to the whole of Eastern Europe.519 
Soviet poets depicted a world split "into two parts: / In to a world of good and all 
possible evils / light and darkness/ Happiness and unhappiness, / in a fairness and arbitrariness" 
(Veronica Tushnova, "To the Daughters").520 It was poetry that fed off of images of war, 
replacing the Germans for Americans and portraying them as fascists. This image was as broad 
as possible and covered essentially all of Soviet Union’s enemies, who were marked as 
‘warmongers’. That is how Viktor Bershadsky wrote about them in his poem "The meeting in 
Novorossiysk": "It was clear with doubt / That Hitler was in Padisha Persia / And in Greece, 
among the chitons. // He was met in Indonesia, - / He walked with English machine-gun. / Into 
Paris, at the plenary session / He pretended to be a diplomat. / Resettling to George, / He 
lynched the average black man, / Then started an orgy in a cafe / Just as in old Munich, at 
home ... ". Western politics in all their manifestations were branded as Nazism: "Let him now 
be called Marshall. / Kennan or Harriman - / No matter what costumes he now wears, / We are 
difficult to deceive. / The Fascist will not hide under the mask ...".521  
                                                          
518 Ibid., 135. 
519 See: A.V. Fateev, Obraz vraga v sovetskoi propagande. 1945-1954 (Moskva: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 
1999), 84-86. 
520 Poety mira v bor'be za mir. Sbornik stikhov (Moskva: GIKhL, 1951), 266. 
521 Oktiabr' 8 (1949), 217. 
190 
 
Just as the Nazis had been depicted in Soviet poetry during the war, the new 
"warmongers" were also suspected of criminal intentions against the Soviet Union: "In Athens, 
Vietnam, Korea, China / Hills and valleys flooded with blood, / They now dream after our 
homeland/ To smash, turn into a wasteland and ruins; / Burn down and savagely rob cities / 
With bombs killing babies in cradles"- wrote Anastas Ventslova in a poem "Close ranks!”.522 
And just as the image of children suffering and crying out for revenge is a favourite of war 
propaganda, in poetry it is the struggle for peace. The image of a fragile child, protected by the 
delegates of the World Peace Congress was depicted by the Chairman of the Soviet Peace 
Committee and poet Nikolai Tikhonov: "And in the charms of radiance and delicateness / It’s 
not just young life that triumphs / All future in the image of the child / Stands and asks for him 
to be defended" (‘In the name of the best joys in the world’).523 
Soviet poetry became a real outlet for official propaganda. What could not be voiced at 
the official level could be voiced here. The war for peace had ceased to be a metaphor here. 
Thus, it is here that the ‘army of peace’ was mobilised for a real war for peace: “"Peace!"- the 
rafter beams whisper at the construction site / "Peace!" – rustle the trees in the garden, / 
"Peace!" - I hear all adverbs. / For such a desire for humanity, / If need be, I'll go to war" (Ivan 
Baukov, ‘I need peace for this’524). The demonisation of the enemies of peace reached a degree 
of hysteria, such as in Sergei Smirnov’s poem, ‘On behalf of the fathers and mothers’: they are 
"darting around ... / casting a spell of bacillus plague ... / threaten us with bullets, gas, poison," 
"for the bomb they to harness the atom, / they want to get their hands on the whole world, / 
Under the flag, like zebra - striped / Bring death all continents".525  
They were opposed by "all honest people" (it was particularly to this audience which 
Soviet peace activists appealed to) and those who did not understand where the world was 
going under the "ruling classes" of America. Addressing them, Alexei Surkov exclaimed: 
"Before the President and officers / throw you in the battle, like food for the raven / Rise, 
America’s real owners, / Give them a soldierly, angry: NO" (Alexei Surkov, ‘To the American 
soldier’).526 
Visual messages also carried the same content and were divided into two types - the 
hero-pathetique and caricature satire. The former depicted "progressive people" in different 
countries, which the Soviet people were meant to identify themselves with. This is clearly seen 
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in Boris Prorokov’s "Truman’s Tanks to the Bottom!" where the "will of the people" 
materialises in a powerful rush capable of displacing a tank. Vera Mukhina’s sculpture "We 
Demand Peace", on the other hand, a group of people following a mother with a child are 
depicted as disabled and wounded: a disabled war veteran who lost an arm and a Korean mother 
with a dead child in her arms. Yet their postures suggest determination, anger and strength, as 
if to confirm that they want peace, but without asking for it. 
 This very style was visible in many Soviet posters, where the theme of the struggle for 
peace is almost always expressed with the mother and child motif. The child’s welfare is 
provided by the Soviet Army’s power and its mother’s care, who are engaged in defending 
peace. In fact, what is visualised here was what was shown on the endless rallies in defence of 
peace, where "ordinary Soviet women" spoke out with condemnation against "warmongers". 
Finally, the last type of propaganda visual was dedicated to the warmongers, who were 
portrayed as pathetic pygmies, while "people of goodwill", who the Soviet people were meant 
to identify with, were, on the other hand, giants. This image served posters and countless 
cartoons. These were firstly used as so-called "visual aids" during demonstrations and rallies. 
This very dramatisation of peace propaganda made it way into novels, plays and films. 
Thus, Ilya Ehrenburg’s novel "The Storm" (1947) and "The Ninth Wave" (1951-1952) 
described a pre-war Europe which pandered to Hitler in unleashing the war and the post-war 
world of the "The Ninth Wave" in which popular outrage prevents the imperialists from 
unleashing a new war. The same theme is developed in the Nicholas Shpanov’s novels 
‘Conspirators’ (1949) and ‘Mongers’ (1951), where the titles themselves directly hint at the 
content and message of these novels. These were endless conspiracy theories, disguised in the 
form of novels, where history and modernity served an imperialist conspiracy against the 
Soviet Union. These propaganda tasks, which were widely deployed in the post-war years, 
were conformed to in plays such as Konstantin Simonov’s ‘The Russian Question’ (1946), 
Vadim Kozhevnikov and Joseph Prut’s ‘The Fate of Reginald Davis' (1947), Nicole Virty’s 
‘Conspiracy of the Doomed’ (1948), Nicholas Pogodin’s ‘Missouri Waltz’ (1949), Boris 
Lavrenev’s ‘Voice of America’ (1949), Brothers Tur’s ‘Behind the Walls of the Embassy’ 
(1949), Georgi Mdivani’s ‘People of Good Will’ (1950), Leo Scheinin’s ‘In the Middle of the 
Century’ (1950 ), and others. The plays ‘Great Strength’ (Boris Romashov, 1946-1947), ‘The 
Court of Honor’ (the "Law of honor", Alexander Stein, 1948) and ‘Someone Else's Shadow’ 
(Konstantin Simonov, 1949) described the intrigues of US intelligence, which aimed at getting 
its hands on the research and development of Soviet scientists to create weapons of mass 
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destruction. They fit into the political campaign against cosmopolitanism, which proceeded 
throughout the post-war years.  
In these novels and plays, not only was the Soviet point of view on the present expanded 
on, but it was also fictionalised and dramatised. Presented in an accessible way, they were 
easily assimilated by the mass of readers and viewers. Yet above all, movies could convey a 
message to the widest possible audience. It was not by chance that the most relevant plays, 
from the regime’s point of view, were filmed and would become popular films. The first of 
these films was Mikhail Romm’s "Russian question", based on the play by Konstantin Simonov 
(1947), which tackled the main propaganda task: to prove to Soviet audiences that the United 
States was seeking war with the Soviet Union, led by financial and industrial circles, and was 
trying to prove that it is not them (the Americans), but the Russians who wanted war, and 
therefore, representing a real threat to peace. To do this, a major publisher hired journalist 
Harry Smith on a mission - to go to the Soviet Union and to write a book about the Russian 
attitude to war. The fact that he is given this task is no accident. Smith was in Russia in 1942 
and watched the heroism of the Soviet people in the Battle of Stalingrad and in the same year 
published a book in which he wrote about the Soviet Union in glowing terms. As readers trusted 
Harry Smith, and his previous book was such a great success, readers would trust him (in 
accordance to the plans of the current warmongers) if he would now tell them that the Russians 
want war. But Harry Smith is an honest and brave man. He writes the truth, and on the question 
"Do the Russians want war?" he answers with an unequivocal "No!" It costs his marriage, home, 
and career, but he does not give up and in the final monologue, appealing to “the ordinary 
people of America," states that ‘America's enemies’ are not in Russia, but in the Pentagon and 
on Wall Street. 
Just as the rest of ‘artistic propaganda’ that addressed Soviet audiences, films, such as 
‘The Russian Question", Grigory Alexandrov’s 1948 ‘Meeting on the Elbe’, Mikhail Romm’s 
1950 ‘Secret Mission’, Abraham Room’s 1953 ‘The Silver Dust’, and Alexander Dovzhenko’s 
1951 ‘Goodbye, America!’ not only depicted a world divided into two, but also strengthened 
the deep distrust of the new "strategic enemy", suspecting it of trying to start a war. The film 
‘Goodbye, America!’ tells the story about an American defector who works at the US Embassy 
in Moscow and cannot bear the prevailing atmosphere of espionage there. The US ambassador 
tells his staff: "Peace – this is a small window of time allotted to us in connection with the 
preparation of a new war, which must assert all over the world the American way of life". The 
film "The Silver Dust" describes how American scientist, Steele, invents a powerful new 
weapon of mass destruction - the deadly radioactive silver-grey dust - and the struggle that 
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ensues for Steele’s invention between two military-industrial giant trusts involving gangsters. 
As noted by Peter Kenez, "The postwar Soviet regime did not hold purge trials. As those 
murderous spectacles disappeared from public life, so did the fixation on spies, saboteurs and 
internal enemies of various sort [...] The ‘enemy’, so very important both for good drama and 
also for the cohesion of Soviet order, was now almost always foreign. In those post-war films 
that were made as a contribution to various Soviet propaganda campaigns, the Soviet hero 
always defeated a foreign enemy."527 
The main feature of the post-war enemy was that he was a "warmonger". Even in those 
films that were not devoted to the present, but were about history, the main goal was to depict 
yesterday's allies as eternal enemies of Russia. So, the film "Secret Mission" showed Soviet 
audiences that even during the war Americans and the British had a treacherous policy of 
separate negotiations with the Nazis to direct them against the Soviet Union, and historical 
films such as Vsevolod Pudovkin’s 1946 ‘Admiral Nakhimov’ and Mikhail Romm’s 1953 
‘Admiral Ushakov’ spoke of how in the 18th and 19th century the British provoked war against 
Russia. This historisation of the struggle for peace was an important part of the post-war ‘peace 
propaganda’. 
Another important aspect of this propaganda was the glorification of the fighters for 
peace. In the Soviet Union an entire mythology of the heroic peace fighters was created. Among 
them were mostly, of course, "ordinary people" - dockers, who refused to unload American 
weapons in Europe, and women, laying down on railway tracks to stop trains carrying weapons. 
For example, Mirdza Kempe’s poem, ‘The Ballad of Raymond Dien’ tells the story of a French 
communist who lies on train tracks to stop a train loaded with weapons headed for the war in 
Vietnam. Her example was followed by other women. This event was widely reported in the 
Soviet press: "The train flies by, howling and whistling, / Yet her will is unbending. / And the 
conscience of France - Raymond Dien / lies on the train’s path. // Hundreds of beautiful women, 
like her. / Lie down with Raymond nearby. / The locomotive stands still ... the driver stunned 
/ This obstruction unprecedented". But this is the whole of France: "In vain, raging, screaming 
officer / soldier pushing for punishment. / "Do not touch them! - soldiers shout at each other. - 
/ All of France is now like this!"". Dien’s feat was captured not only in poetry, but also in music 
- in Sergei Prokofiev's oratorio "On Guard for Peace", where it was discussed in a separate part 
of the "war on war". 
                                                          




A special place in this heroic pantheon was occupied by public figures and leaders of 
the peace movement. Above all, of course, was its permanent leader, Frederic Joliot Curie. The 
peak of the campaign for the glorification of Joliot Curie had been reached in 1951. On the 
occasion of Joliot Curie being awarded the Stalin Peace Prize on July 7th, 1951, in the Soviet 
Union a book by B.G. Kuznetsov, “Frederic Joliot-Curie - a scientist and fighter for peace”, 
was published and concluded with the following: "The image of Stalin and his scientific work, 
his leadership in the building of communism, his wisdom - a guiding beacon for Joliot-Curie, 
as well as for all progressive people of the world. In Stalin's works, the French scientist finds 
the most fruitful path towards scientific research and the social struggle. The Award named 
after the great luminary of science, the great standard-bearer of the world, crowns the work of 
Joliot-Curie, showing the historical significance of his life, creativity and struggle".528 
After this, the canonisation of Joliot Curie began to increase. Among the many articles 
and books, there was a children's story by Julia Annenkov, ‘Truth Travels without Visas’ (first 
edition in 1954, Detgiz Publishing). The second, much more complete edition was published 
in the same publishing house in the series 'School Library' in 1960. The second edition was 
twice as large as the first. Joliot Curie’s life was depicted rather imaginatively for children. 
This was how Joliot Curie’s visa denial for the II World Congress in the UK was dramatised. 
As it was known, the II Peace Congress was intended to be held in 1950 in Sheffield, but the 
British government did not issue visas and at the "last minute" it had to be moved to Warsaw. 
 His visa was annulled on arrival in England: "No more than two dozen passengers 
received permission to enter. What to do? Would the Congress really go through? Hundreds of 
people are already on their way to England. Arguing with the police, is, of course, useless, as 
is as to send a telegram to Mr. Attlee. Joliot approached Laffite:  
 
- The Congress needs to urgently be moved to another country. We will try to do this.  
At the handrails stood two English sailors.  
- Have you seen Tom? - One of them asked, pointing to the shore. 
- No, I didn't see anything.  
- But I did ... Now over Dover an iron curtain has descended. That person there that standing 
by the deckhouse - that is Joliot-Curie. During the war, he sent us a precious stock of heavy water for 
the production of nuclear energy. And now Mr. Attlee is not letting him enter England. What a shame!  
- And the Congress will not be taking place?  
                                                          




- I do not know. How will they travel without a visa?  
Joliot-Curie heard this conversation. He came up to the sailors and said  
- Give the British sailors and dockers a message, and all those who want peace: The Congress 
will certainly take place. I assure you! The truth travels without visas!"529 
 
At this time in Prague there was a group of delegates at the congress, including Yves 
Farge (chairman of the French Peace Committee), Ehrenburg and other members of the 
Committee. News of Joliot Curie not being allowed into England reached Prague immediately. 
But where he was detained?  
 
"Yves Farge was on the phone. He appealed directly to the French telephone operators. Do they 
know of the peace movement? Well, of course! Had they heard about Joliot-Curie? Who in France has 
not heard of the person whom Maurice Thorez named as the glory of science!  
And rushed through the telephone lines of the northern coast of France alarming calls: 'Where 
is Joliot-Curie?' 'Is Joliot-Curie in your city?' 'Hello, Le Havre?' 'Hello, Boulogne? "'Hello, Dieppe ',' 
Hello, Dunkirk?'' 530 After three hours, Joliot-Curie was found. There and then over the phone the 
committee meeting took place where "on the proposal of the Polish partisans of peace it was decided 
that the congress would be relocated to Warsaw."531  
 
Later, Ehrenburg would talk about Joliot Curie in the book as "like all other members 
of Congress who were redirected to Brussels and from there to Prague. The Czechoslovak 
government organized a Brussels-Prague airlift across Europe and throughout three days 
airplanes transferred about a thousand delegates. And in the capital of Czechoslovakia 
locomotives were already standing under steam. Gaining speed, the trains rushed to Warsaw. 
At each station, a huge crowd of people welcomed the messengers." In Warsaw "three thousand 
Polish workers, architects and artists working around the clock, prepared for the meetings of 
the Congress a huge building for the publishing house 'House the Polish Word'." The Congress 
opened on November 18th. 
This was all pure mythology. However, as is clear from the Koreneichuk's 
correspondence with the CC five months prior to these events, the Congress would not be 
taking place in England and began to be prepared in Warsaw. Joliot Curie's trip was pure 
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provocation. It was because everything was done in advance that everything was managed so 
quickly. 
Joliot Curie’s biography was based on the conventions of hagiography. Like a true saint, 
he was born into a heroic family. His biography, published in the most popular USSR 
biographical series "Life of Remarkable People", beginning with a chapter 'Son of a 
Communard': the Communist Joliot-Curie was the son of a Paris Commune hero: "When from 
the Père Lachaise Cemetery crackling shots of the Versaillais could already be heard gunning 
down the members of the Paris Commune, the last scattered groups of Communards were still 
waging fierce battles in the streets of revolutionary Paris. Among them was Henri Joliot", father 
of the future President of the World Peace Council.532 
Ehrenburg took part in the creation of the Soviet mythology of Joliot Curie. In his book 
on Joliot Curie, written after his death in 1958, Ehrenburg began with a description of Joliot 
Curie's funeral. He describes how he was buried with all-state honours and that when ministers 
departed and the guards had left, Joliot Curie's friends and comrades, peace supporters, students, 
workers, housewives – “the common people of France' gathered in a suburb of Paris near the 
cemetery: "The French nation knew that it had lost a protector, friend, a scientist famous 
throughout the world, and a friend, loved one, one of its own, who had been with the people 
through the triumphs as well as tribulations." According to Ehrenburg, gratitude to Joliot-Curie 
was immense: "American physicists honoured the memory of the great scientist. Negros of 
South Africa singed with crosses instead of signatures under the words love and grief. In Hosei 
University in Japan students carried flowers to the portrait of Joliot-Curie, and in Bombay a 
mourning assembly was held. Streets were named after Joliot-Curie Street in Soviet towns and 
a fishing schooner in Norway''.533 
In Eugene Gulak’s poem "Soldiers of Peace" Joliot Curie’s life is described as a chain 
of heroic events: "... He sees the night. Defeated Paris. / Interrogation by the Gestapo, 
excessively long: / "... We know everything, talk truthfully. / That you are a secret agent of the 
Comintern ... "// The scientist keeps silent, slightly squinting his eyes, / Calmly crumples frayed 
gloves. / The fascist doesn’t realize: before him is a soldier / supplying explosives to the 
underground fighters." At the end of the poem the legendary founder and first chairman of the 
World Peace Council is portrayed as the incarnation of the struggle for peace: "And now, ten 
years later, / When bankers threaten us with war again / As the joy of life, like freedom of light, 
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/ In our midst came Curie, a soldier of peace. // His call: - ‘Down with war, friends! / All over 
the world people echo this ... / And off the shore and into the leaden waves / tanks and guns 
are thrown into the sea."534  
Daniel Khrabrovitsky’s 1952 play ‘Citizen of France’ depicts the great French physicist 
Professor Frederic Dumont Teri, who worked in the field of nuclear energy. At the centre of 
the play was his journey from scientist to active fighter for peace. Frederic Joliot Curie served 
as the hero prototype for the play. The depiction of the hero’s life in the play completely 
coincides with the facts of Joliot Curie’s political biography (a member of the French 
Communist Party since 1942, member of the Central Committee of the French Communist 
Party in 1956). The play covers the period from 1934 to 1951. In fact, it is a hagiography of 
Joliot Curie. The play was widely performed in theatres in Moscow, Leningrad and the 
provinces. The hero was depicted as a staunch communist and uttered angry monologues 
condemning American "warmongers." 
Not only Curie, but his deputy - Eugenie Cotton, a prominent activist in the peace 
struggle - also becomes the object of Soviet poetry. In Konstantin Tyulipin’s poem "Eugenie 
Cotton" her heroic behaviour is portrayed as model behaviour for peace fighters: "I can see it 
in the partisan ranks / Going to France to fight, / At the women's congress when / entering 
victorious from courtroom / leading millions behind her". In the end she becomes a generalised 
heroic image: "There are many such brave Cottons, / One can encounter them in any country / 
The wider the peace front. / The narrower the road to war ... // And all for whom a son or a 
brother is dear / So that no tears are to be shed later on / They stand in the same row, / Where 
the Stalin Prize winner is fighting / Our friend - Eugenie Cotton."535  
The propaganda production considered here was important since because of it the 
"discourse of peace" received aural and visual expression. It was precisely around the 
discursive practices of the "rituals of peace" was formed and the world of Soviet "visual 
agitation," mass media, official ideological speech, of the poster and the slogan-banner, and of 
mass propaganda literature and visual art were developed. It is through this that "convergence" 
between high politics and the people was able to take place. So that as a result, the "simple 
Soviet man" began to speak the words of peace struggle poetry and look at the world through 
the prism of what he saw on the screen. So thanks to Soviet propaganda art the above-
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Internalisation:  Consuming Peace  
 
The internalisation of peace rhetoric by the Soviet population was the culmination of 
the entire ‘Peace Campaign’. By the end of the first decade of the Cold War the numerous 
never-ending cycles of campaigns, the regional Peace Committee meetings and the barrage of 
peace-themed literature, art, music and film transformed the Peace Movement’s rhetoric into a 
ritual and epic-narrative to such an extent that it seeped into mass consciousness. As people 
expressed their support for the Peace Movement (which by extension legitimised Soviet foreign 
policy) they did so within linguistic confines and conventions of official propaganda that 
blurred the lines between the public and the regime. Historians have debated as to the extent to 
which internalisation was truly genuine. Stephen Kotkin has argued that the Soviet people 
learned to ‘speak Bolshevik’ (whether Marxist-Leninist in the 1930s or the peace rhetoric of 
the post-war years) as an adaptive measure – an “obligatory language for self-identification 
and as such, the barometer of one's political allegiance to the cause”.536 Whether one believed 
the rhetoric was not necessary as long as individuals conformed to the rhetoric. By contrast, 
Jochen Hellbeck and Igal Halfin have taken on the idea that people did not simply ‘adopt’ the 
language or adopt a mask to conform to public expectations but in fact engaged with the 
ideological propaganda to extract and personalise elements to create a new identity.537  
The image of “millions of little people, the cogs in the great state machine”538 which 
Stalin conjured at the reception for the victory parade on June 24th, 1945 had by 1951 come to 
reality, as many would self-identify themselves as such. Many of the letters Pravda received 
from ordinary people giving their blessing to the 1951 All-World Peace Congress had people 
address themselves as ‘simple Soviet person’, ‘small person’ and an ‘ordinary citizen’, whose 
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voice was one with the ‘the entire working masses of the world’ in the struggle for peace against 
the “greed of Wall street, the Marshall Plan of the Churchills, the insatiable appetite of fascist 
executioners”.539 In these letters, K. Ivanov, a furniture factory worker, P. Sapezko, a pensioner, 
and an S. Shneivas, a retired factory worker and war invalid all highlighted their post-war 
struggles and a determination to carry on. Yet, as Jochen Hellbeck has noted, Soviet people did 
not link their struggles and determination to individualist purposes, but to an “urge to write 
themselves into their social political order”.540 Just as it had done so in the 1920s and 1930s, 
the regime attempted to refashion Soviet identity during the post-war years along a narrative 
in which the Soviet Union was at the forefront in the struggle for peace, with “ordinary working 
people” all over the world joining in. 
P.N. Uspensky’s letter exemplifies this seamless transition from pre-war revolutionary 
identity to post-war peace identity. As disabled war veteran who “twice had to defend [his] 
homeland, first, in the Civil War against the Whites, the hirelings of the Entente; the second, 
against the Nazi invaders”, Uspensky transformed from a Bolshevik fighter to a peace fighter, 
as part of the “progressive forces straining to repel the madmen from the camp of the American 
imperialists who want to ignite a third world war”.541 For the regime to receive such letters it 
provided confirmation that the propaganda was being effectively internalised, as the letter 
provided a mirror image of the propaganda rhetoric reflecting back to the regime. Just as peace 
propaganda called on people to contribute to the various campaigns and restate their trust in 
the Party’s ability to guarantee peace, the people responded in kind: “As long as we have a 
glimmer of life and passionate heart beats, we will find the strength to help our people, its 
government and the Bolshevik Party in the great struggle for peace and brotherhood among 
peoples".542 The Peace Campaign succeeded in blurring in people’s minds the distinction 
between the nation and the Party. This is not to suggest that ideology was simply replaced by 
patriotism after the war, but with the nominally grassroots nature of the Peace Movement, 
Marxist-Leninist ideology fused with patriotism to create a new rhetoric of peace that was 
simultaneously defensive and confident.  
Instead, the new peace rhetoric was so successfully internalised precisely because it 
was not dogmatic and personalised in accordance with the subjective experiences of a particular 
person. Joachen Helbeck, argues, that “much of the logic of the revolutionary master narratives 
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of transformation was provided and reproduced by Soviet citizens who kept rationalizing 
unfathomable state policies”.543 As many attempted to make sense of the Cold War and Stalin’s 
harsh social and economic policies, they could graft their experience on this peace rhetoric. 
Consider the case of I.T. Bushkov, an “ordinary citizen…a former factory worker at the 
Dynamo factory” and now a war invalid. And yet with the Peace Movement and its 
“multimillion mass of simple people” Bushkov found a renewed sense of purpose in expressing 
a rather contradictory mix of anti-war sentiment, war trauma, patriotism and bravado on top of 
apocalyptic imagery: “We declare to the aggressors: ‘do not touch us, we do not want war’. 
But if it does happen, and you should manage to deceive your nation and impose a war, then 
they will be met with a holy war in every city – a new Stalingrad. We love our motherland”. 
544 The internalisation of the peace rhetoric reconciled anti-war sentiment with bluster and war 
trauma with patriotism that blurred the distinction between private and official sanctioned 
public sentiment, which was, of course, the intended result.  
This contradictory mix of the apocalyptic and the confident was found in many letters 
and poems that people sent. It had the particular function of redirecting people’s everyday 
frustration away from criticising the Soviet regime (and in effect Stalin) and pouring all their 
anxieties about the future onto the West (in particular the US) while praising Stalin (and in 
effect the regime). For example, an Ivan Karpovich Skuparev from Moscow sent a telegram on 
his own behalf and on behalf of the III World Peace Congress beseeching “To not live as we 
wish, but as humanity demands of life, which God has created and which Stalin is advancing 
forward. There will be no end to the proletariat forces."545 Zhanet Nikolaev Vitvizkoy, a 64-
years-old retired category 2 invalid from Penza exemplified just how much the peace rhetoric 
could refocus people’s frustration without any contradiction or tension: "Long live peace 
throughout planet Earth! Our great genius, dear I.V. Stalin, is conducting the globally difficult 
peaceful Bolshevik policy for the people of all nationalities - Stalin is with the people 
everywhere. And the people everywhere are industrious and peace-loving with Comrade 
Stalin." 546 "I'm a small, simple person. But this does not mean that I’m unable to pour my 
righteous anger on the warmongers."547 
This ‘righteous anger’ was directed away from internal policies which were taking their 
toll on the Soviet economy and towards international tensions. In many instances, peace 
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rhetoric allowed people to graft their hardships onto the West and reimagine the Soviet Union 
as a ‘worker’s paradise’ as a coping mechanism. This applied to all strata of Soviet society. 
Along with greetings to the III World Peace Congress in 1951, Philip Fedorovich Ivanov, 
director of Red-partisan gosplemrassadnik (a state horse breeding cooperative) asked that his 
poem be read at the Congress. Ivanov, who most likely had never been abroad, seamlessly 
adopts propaganda rhetoric to paint a vivid picture where "Overseas Eisenhower, Ridgeway, 
Bradley, Dulles - these greyhounds of Wall Street are frantically scouring the whole of Europe 
and Asia to find a den of jackals for the preparation of a new imperialist war."548 Such a sense 
of belief in the reality presented in propaganda was often taken to absurd levels. Writing to 
Fadeev, Alexander Matvienko of Kharkov referred to himself as a “self-taught invalid” and 
asked Fadeev to correct any grammatical and literary errors prior to reading his poem, ‘The 
sky of life, the sky of death’, “from the heart to all delegates the third All-Union Peace 
Conference”.549 Matvienko, as if witnessing the political developments in Europe before his 
very eyes, warns that "Under America’s sky/Europe is dying /Eastern countries are heading for 
collapse/ Marshall’s aid for war and famine/The death of nations [brings with it] capital".550 
In essence, by internalising official propaganda on events that he or she had no direct 
experience of, the average Soviet citizen became “ideological agents on a par with the leaders 
of party and state”.551 This brand of ‘peace’ had less to do with conventional measures of 
reducing international tensions than with Stalin’s deep-rooted paranoid version of Marxist-
Leninism. As people began adopting Stalin’s politically paranoid rhetoric they reflected back 
Stalin’s own trauma over the war and in effect legitimising his Cold War politics. As Lieutenant 
U.D. Soloviev of Irukutsk writes in his poem, ‘For Peace we stand’: “Creeping bastards, 
despicable Yankees / Once again started a war / Be vigilant and cautious / People of all nations 
/ Vile traitors, warmongers / You do not let [them] pass / The intrigues of all sorts – traitors of 
peace / With a firm hand prevent / The plans of Rockefeller, Schumann, Pleven / Reveal its 
true spirit / Their plans are clear, plain to see / Their purpose - fascism on earth’.552 In some 
cases, the rhetoric reflected back on the regime unintentionally Stalin’s frustrations with 
diplomatic failures with the West. Soviet citizen Anatoly Scherbinovsky channelled this 
frustration in his poem to the Moscow Regional Conference for Peace, ‘To the World – Peace’. 
While praising Stalin, who “dedicates his entire life for the benefit of the people and with the 
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people works wonders” who performs miracles where “In the dense taiga factories grow, in the 
snow polar of regions cities bloom”, Stalin is unable to prevent Truman from continuing to “… 
send to Asia slew of / Carriers of death, having lost count of them.” Where “… the bombs fall 
on schools, hospitals, / and the blood in the towns and villages flows. While “Factories, 
museums, spas are burning ... / Millions of innocent people left homeless, / While a gang of 
gangsters, a criminal cohort, / Are raping, robbing, shooting at children ....” 553  Yet 
Scherbinovsky was confident that “From the Moscow Tribune the supporters of peace, / 
Millions of ordinary, good-will people, / Will manage to pry out the White House from the 
vampires / Cannibalistic, beastly claws!”.554 
If these statements sound absurd it is important to bear in mind that they functioned 
within the confines of the post-war Soviet identity of official patriotism. Just as in the 1930s 
when stressing one’s proletarian identity was paramount for social inclusion, stressing one’s 
support for the Peace Movement was greatly encouraged (if not forced upon) by the regime. It 
was not necessary to fully believe in state propaganda, but as Stephen Kotkin argues it was 
“necessary [to recognize]… how to think and behave” and “participate as if one believed”.555 
Since one of the core aims of the Peace Movement was that Soviet society approved Stalin’s 
Cold War policy through ritualised meetings where Soviet citizens gave their allegiance and 
total trust this process of internalisation did not necessarily have to be too deep-seated but just 
enough so that that regime felt confident that people were internalising official rhetoric. Yet 
this is not to entirely dismiss people as being entirely cynical, as official rhetoric was often the 
only way to make sense of the Cold War and international relations in general. Thus, Soloviev 
and Scherbinovsky may or may not have wholeheartedly believed in what they were expressing, 
since most likely neither experienced what they were describing, but the fact that they were 
both so willing to dispense with common sense points to a multitude of factors. The lack of 
reliable information on the developments in Europe, the pressure to conform to the official line 
and the generally desperate conditions of day-to-day life in post-war Soviet Union all played 
their part in forcing the average Soviet to either accept the official Soviet version of the Cold 
War or at least suspend disbelief. The Peace Movement “…was maintained not merely by the 
power of the security police but by the collective actions of millions of people who participated 
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in it, for a variety of reasons, including the apparent authenticity of the cause—whatever its 
nagging deficiencies”.556  
 
 
 The end result of the constant peace campaign, the endless meetings, the barrage of 
peace-themed film, poetry, and other art forms was not what the regime had quite anticipated. 
The internalisation of peace rhetoric was successful in legitimising Soviet Cold War policy in 
Europe by the fact that people publically reflected the regime’s rhetoric back to its propaganda 
organs through letters, greetings and poetry to Pravda and the Soviet Peace Committee. Yet 
this internalisation was uneven and produced a strange mix of everyday rhetoric. Besides the 
legitimisation of its foreign policy, through the internalisation of peace rhetoric the regime had 
intended to transform people’s everyday speech on a fundamental level. Internalisation was 
intended to replace the ordinary Soviet citizen’s everyday coarse and crude language with 
officially ‘correct’ ideological language. Yet as the letters, greetings, and poems demonstrate, 
peace rhetoric did not replace everyday vernacular but fused with it to create an absurd 
amalgamation of politicised crude language. In essence, internalisation failed on a deeper level 
to teach the Soviet people to communicate in the official language of the regime. Peace rhetoric 
was absorbed and fused and as Galich’s poem demonstrated, it became background noise 













                                                          





This dissertation for the first time documents how the Soviet-led “Peace Movement” 
was conceived, orchestrated, funded and manipulated by the Soviet leadership through four 
major institutions: the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the USSR, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the World Peace Council, and the 
Soviet Peace Committee. As archival sources clearly and evidently demonstrate, the Peace 
Movement was created in order to support Soviet foreign policy within the Soviet Union and 
in Europe. This goes a long way towards explaining how the Soviets approached the 
organizational aspects of both the domestic and international peace movements. 
The domestic Soviet ‘Peace Movement’, despite forming in the wake of the World 
Peace Congress in 1949, had a traditional Soviet from-above organizational structure. Yet the 
main difference between past Soviet propaganda campaigns and the post-war ‘Peace 
Movement’ was that the Soviet state was much more subtle in its involvement. No doubt that 
it was the Kremlin which determined the official rhetoric of war trauma and how this rhetoric 
would be used to legitimise Soviet foreign policy in the eyes of the Soviet public. However, 
through endless meetings, signature campaigns, and public speeches, it was the Soviet people 
themselves who propagandized official ‘peace’ rhetoric. The method for legitimising Soviet 
Cold War policy was to turn the Soviet Peace Movement into an endless rituals of campaign 
and meetings in which everyone publically played a role and swore to commit to the state’s 
economic quotas, trust in Stalin and the state as the guarantors of peace, and the demonization 
of the West. This was further reinforced by officially sanctioned ‘art propaganda’, ranging from 
literature to music to cinema. The cumulative effect of this was that people internalized official 
‘peace’ rhetoric, but only on the surface as official propaganda failed to fully replace everyday 
Soviet speech. As Chapter Three has demonstrated, this was a singular approach to propaganda, 
which did not require any neutrality. It was unabashedly pro-Soviet and anti-Western but with 
proviso that it allowed the Soviet masses to use official rhetoric to express the traumas of war.     
In contrast, the Soviet approach to the international peace movement was one of 
contradictions. On the one hand, they understood that in order to appeal to the masses in the 
West and expand the base of the peace movement any links to the Communist Party and the 
Soviet Union had to be concealed. On the other hand, this itself was the problem: it was merely 
concealment, and not genuine independence. Instead, the peace movement in Europe was in 
the shadow of the Cominform from its inception in 1949, its member were either bribed or 
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pressured into towing the Soviet line whenever the Soviet had to have the World Peace 
Council’s backing. The Soviets also exerted control through financing many of World Peace 
Council propaganda endeavours, be it the signature campaign for the Stockholm Agreement or 
the World Peace Council’s own journal. Yet presiding over the international movement was 
also problematic for the Soviets. They could only take a general approach to a propaganda 
campaign, one that was incapable of adapting to the specific mass tastes and sensibilities of 
individual countries. They could not understand that the rank and file in the West, who had to 
sell the positive image of Soviet foreign policy to a suspicious public, was demoralised from 
having to continue unpopular campaigns.  
For Western peace movement members, who were convinced that a more independent 
World Peace Council would help to attract more members to the ‘Movement’, the period of 
1951-1956 was viewed as a disdain during which the World Peace Council increasingly 
became a mouthpiece for Soviet fore policy. From the anti-UN fiasco of the Biological Warfare 
Campaign in 1951 to the U-turn of the Appeal for Negotiations on ending the Korean War in 
the immediate wake of Stalin’s death in March 1953 to the anti-EDC, nationalist rhetoric in 
1954 -1956 and to the fracture resulting from Soviet Union invading Hungary in October 1956, 
the ‘Peace Movement’ was stuck in a limbo of not being able to gain independence from the 
Soviet Union and being subject to Kremlin’s ever-evolving foreign policy, which made it 
impossible for the World Peace Council to take a consistent and independent line necessary for 
attracting genuine peace supporters in the West.  
However, it would be misleading to label the Soviets as hesitant tyrants who impeded 
the growth of their own movement just because they wanted control over it. As Chapter Two 
has demonstrated, there was certain logic behind Soviet control of the ‘Peace Movement’ that 
fit into the overall Soviet Cold War strategy. The Soviet Peace Campaign was a tool for 
controlling Western Communists, lest they took any initiative to disrupt the status quo by tying 
them down to within the Soviet-dominated confines of the Peace Movement. This was why the 
Soviets were slow to let the movement reform along the lines that Western Communists had 
been struggling for throughout the first decade of the Cold War. This was a divergence of goals 
and one to the detriment of the Western Communists: they had wanted to mobilize genuine 
mass movements and gain power, when in fact they found themselves marionettes for Soviet 
diplomatic aims for maintaining stability in Europe, with the Soviet acknowledging the Italy, 
France & Greece as part of the Western bloc. This was very much the source of the Peace 
Movements institutional dysfunction, which was inherent in Soviet overall strategy for Europe 
and never understood by Western Communists.   
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The Soviet Peace Campaign was entirely established and controlled by the Soviets with 
the aim of maintaining the post-war East/West bloc status quo, which they genuinely 
understood as the best security compromise that could obtained after the war with its strategic 
and ideological enemy (the capitalist West). That is why the Peace Movement and all the Peace 
Campaign never addressed reuniting Europe. There was a tacit acceptance of a divided Europe. 
The various campaigns themselves focused on specific points of crisis at the time – de-
escalation of tensions through disarmaments, banning nuclear weapons, ‘negotiations’ between 
the Five Powers, etc. – but never on the source of the Cold War itself: the division of Europe 
into two military, political and ideological camps and Soviet dominance of Easter & Central 
Europe.   
The Soviet Peace campaign was also a propaganda tool to negatively impact Western 
mass opinion of America’s involvement in Europe – from military (a European army to NATO, 
to Western Germany’s rearmament) to economic matters (Coal & Steel Organization). The 
Soviet Union acknowledged the existence of a Western bloc, but envisaged it as a European-
led, rather than American-dominated. American domination of Western Europe meant a more 
robust and militarily-capable Europe and a potential threat to the Eastern bloc as Soviet buffer 
against the West. Hence, the Peace Movement propaganda rhetoric focused almost exclusively 
on ‘Wall Street war mongers’ as the natural successors of the Nazis and the exploiters of post-
war Europe. Any idea which could supplant an American-led Europe was adapted by the 
Soviet-led Peace Movement. This even included French nationalism and supposed German 
revanchism to play on Europe fear and trauma of war  allowed to counter America’s dominance 
and Soviet marginalization in the UN by creating a ‘grassroots, people’s’ organization, as 
opposed to a governmental organization – i.e. the World Peace Council was the Soviet’s own 
(“people’s’”) “U.N.” This was born out of the position which the Soviet Union found itself 
after the war – the prestige of being one of two remaining World Powers, in contrast to its pre-
war status as a pariah state excluded from the League of Nations for waging an unprovoked 
war against Finland. Yet, even this new-found prestige could not help to legitimize Soviet 
foreign diplomacy in the U.N., in particular after the American-backed condemnation of Sino-
Soviet involvement in Korea. This further compelled the Soviets to create an international body 
which would encompass emerging decolonized nations, such as India, China, and those in the 
Middle East, that were underrepresented in the U.N.  
From Stalin’s death in 1953 to the near simultaneous occurrence of the Hungarian 
Invasion and the Suez Crisis in 1956 spelled a gradual end to Soviet focus on its European 
Peace Campaign. The failure to reform such critical aspects of the Movement as financial 
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dealings and the Peace Council’s magazine only created a divide between the Soviets and its 
Western counterparts as the Western Communists demoralization from failure to create 
genuine domestic mass movements for social action fell on deaf years. By this time the Soviets 
were as equally interested in attracting the support of the then-emerging decolonized nations, 
whose rhetoric of national liberation the Soviets hoped to harness as tool for anti-American 
policy. National liberations calls to violence against colonialism was seen by Western 
counterparts, both Communist and non-Communist, as directly undermining their efforts to 
present the Movement as a genuine peace movement, and not as an appendage of Soviet foreign 
policy. The Helsinki Bureau session 11-13 December 1955 was the breaking point for those in 
the West who had been attempting to decentralize the Peace Movement away from Joliot-
Curies grip, who himself was a marionette of the Soviet Union. By the time the Hungarian 
uprising was crushed in November 1956 the Soviet Union was convinced that the West had 
accepted the status quo in Europe, as demonstrated by their non-interference. Those in the West 
understood that they could no longer attempt to sell the Soviet Peace Campaign as a genuine 
Peace Movement to the masses. By the late 1950s the Peace Campaign was marginalized, as 
genuine grass-roots, non-Soviet backed organizations began to emerge, such as the CND.  
As Chapter One has demonstrated the origins of the Peace Campaign within the Soviet 
Union itself were directly related to the military and economic consequences which the Soviet 
Union faced as a result of consolidating Central and Eastern Europe as a security buffer zone. 
Its aims were, thus, distinct from those of the Campaign the Soviets waged in Europe. This 
highlights two points. Firstly, Soviet military security was paramount for Stalin, even if it 
threatened to irreparably damage the Alliance and consequently add more to the hardships for 
the Soviet people, even as they dealt with the traumas of the War and rebuilding the country. 
Secondly, as the Soviet Union saw a rollback of hoped-for US economic aid and an emphasis 
on hard industries for military defence in order to prop up the Eastern bloc, the task of internal 
propaganda was to reverse any sense of entitlement which the Soviet people (in particular those 
who had witnessed Europe’s  higher living standards, such as the Red Army veterans) had from 
the government to raise living standards after a hard-won victory and divert its attention to 
national security and international stability. Thus, the Soviet Peace Campaign was part of the 
broader effort by the regime to mobilize the Soviet people for rebuilding the country and to 
accept the idea that it was security, defence and the preservation of peace and not the dire living 
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